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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is an historical case study of a highly publicized 
. 
investigation of vice and official corruption which took place in 
Portland, Oregon from 1954 to 1958. Three major relevant areas of social 
science literature are reviewed. These are: historical material on 
American reform and corruption, criminology and political science. This 
literature suggests both the ubiquity and usefulness of vice and 
corruption in the urban situation. 
A set of propositions regarding vice, corruption and reform was 
developed from these works. These propositions were then examined in 
terms of the vice probe and political situation in Portland, Oregon. 
The triangulation method of this study involves three separate data 
sources : popular accounts in the print media; government documents, 
including material from the Oregon State Archives, the City of Portland 
and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field; interviews conducted by the author (1979-1981) with 
persons who had intimate knowledge of the vice situation, political 
arrangements or corruption in Portland. 
This case study has utility and general application beyond the 
single case illustrated. It demonstrates the functions and limits of 
corruption and reform. While historical in nature, this study offers 
insight into processes seen in many cities today. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no more connnon image of urban American crime exists than 
that of the gangster or racketeer who, with cunning and ruthlessness, 
moves against law and order to establish a violent empire. There are few 
who have escaped the vision of The Godfather or Public Enemy Number One. 
In the popular press as well as on the screen, the crime lord is depicted 
as an aberrant type; a rare, bad breed who, together with the corrupt 
cop, preys upon the innocence of the law-abiding citizen. 
Yet the phenomenon of the vice lord, the bribed policeman and the 
corrupt pclitician survive to reappear in countless cities, many times 
throughout history. American urban corruption, vice and crime, with 
their networks of cooperating crooks and political bagmen, is well 
documented by scholars as well as yellow journalists. 
The ubiquitous phenomena of vice and its inevitable si~ter, corrup-
tion, have not escaped the attention of modern social science. Indeed, 
disciplines far apart in perspective have found surprising common ground 
on the issue. Functional sociologists Robert K. Merton (1949) and 
Kingsley Davis (1971) focus largely upon how the urban system maintains 
and perpetuates itself. Marxist sociologists Stephen Spitzer (1975) and 
Paul O. Hirst (1972) argue that systemic contradictions between classes 
will bring about inevitable and fundamental social change. Yet both 
schools of analysis support the overriding notion that organized crime, 
vice, political corruption and machine politics serve the existing order 
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in a numi:ler of significant ways. In the main, historians of urban 
machine politics, corruption and reform like Hays (1964), Wade (1968) and 
Lubove (1969) share this assessment. All three groups see the problem 
not as an individualistic phenomenon, but rather as a part of the 
structural context of power and class relations in the urban situation. 
Four modern cases of urban machines, vice and corruption will be 
examined in the following pages: Daniel Bell's (1960) study of organized 
crime, The End of Ideology; Francis and Elizabeth Ianni's (1972) study 
of an Italian-American crime family, A Family Business; John A. 
Gardiner's (1970) case study of organized crime in Wincanton, 
The Politics of Corruption; and William Chambliss' (1978) study of a 
crime network in Seattle, On The Take. All four studies suggest 
important structural and functional aspects of the phenomena. All see 
the phenomena's survival through time in terms of interest groups served 
by, and/ or in opposition to, the crime, vice and corruption networks 
surveyed. All emphasize that these occurrences are not individualistic 
aberrations. Instead, they are seen as serving the interests of groups 
well rooted in the social structure. 
Vice and corruption serve the consumer by providing goods and 
services otherwise not available through legitimate me~ns. They serve 
the lower strata of society by providing alternate paths to wealth and 
power. Vice and corruption serve the interests of the corporate and 
wealthy classes through risk reduction and certainty in what would 
otherwise be an uncertain, open market. They serve the political elite 
by securing financial and other support through a network, at once highly 
structured and informal, of coumitments, sanctions and mutual rewards. 
Vice and corruption serve existing crime networks by giving them access 
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to the politically and economically powerful. At the same time they 
offer a measure of protection to all involved from serious formal 
sanction. 
Finally, the American phenomenon of corruption, vice, crime syndi-
cation and machine politics permits the public at large the luxury of 
condemning the very activities it freely enjoys. Morally speaking all 
have their cake and eat it too. 
Specifically, as will be shown later, vice and corruption revealed 
themselves not only in political arrangements and the existence and 
tolerance of vice, but through real estate deals, special favors in 
exchange for bribes or other help as well as in the awarding of city 
franchises for such services as street cars and garbage collection. 
This dissertation will attempt to move beyond the popular view of 
vice and corruption to develop an analysis that delineates some of the 
major factors that are associated with corruption and vice. The study 
will explore, as well, the phenomena of the exposure of corruption and 
the response of reform efforts. Using the work of sociologists, his-
torians and political scientists, a set of propositions concerning the 
problem and reactions to it will be developed. These propositions, drawn 
from the analyses of others, will be examined for applicability to a 
specific case: an incident of vice and corruption, media exposure and 
reaction, in Portland, Oreg~u in the mid-nineteen-fifties. The examina-
tion of the Portland incident will be presented in a case history. 
If the propositions apply to the Portland case, this will lend them 
support as general principles applying across different cases. If, on 
the other hand, some are shown not to be true of the Portland case under 
analysis, then limits to their generalization will be evident. 
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The Historical Incident 
The Portland story itself is an interesting tale of the collapse of 
a criminal network. It starts with a desperate a=~ by an acknowledged 
leader in Portland's underworld. 
In 1956, a local racketeer - a pinball operator, bootlegger and 
after-hours boozeball impresario - went to reporters at one of the 
city's two rival daily newspapers and laid out before them a tale of 
political corruption, labor union pressure and attempted takeover of the 
local vice scene by outsiders. 
His story, supported by clandestine tape recordings, was published 
by one of the papers, launching a vice probe that eventually gained 
national attention and became the starting point for a major U.S. Senate 
investigation of labor racketeering. 
The story and responses to it occupied the front pages of both local 
papers for months. It created a journalistic war, with the morning paper 
supporting the tale of their informant and the afternoon paper attacking 
it, and instigated a far-reaching vice probe by government officials. 
Before the probe was over, local, county and state politicians, the 
city and state police departments, leaders of a national union, and a 
host of underworld characters would be pa=aded before the public and the 
courts in a series of behind-the-scenes relationships, conspiracies, 
manipulations and overt criminal activities. 
The Portland vice probe resulted in massive negative attention 
being focused on the local crime scene. The district attorney, the 
mayor, the police chief and other officials were directly accused of 
criminal wrongdoing, and several grand juries returned more than 100 
criminal indictments. The results, however, in terms of altered 
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political careers, criminal convictions and general public condemnation, 
were surprisingly small. The only man convicted of charges directly 
stemming from the probe was the local racketeer who made the original 
complaint. The only elected official removed from office was the 
district attorney. The only important result, in terms of the structure 
of power relations in Portland, was the blocking of a vice takeover 
attempt by outsiders. 
The Case History 
Nearly a quarter of a century later, the Portland vice probe 
presents an excellent opportunity for an interdisciplinary analysis of 
an urban historical event. Press coverage of the probe and the events 
leading up to it was extensive and that record is available. Persons who 
were intimately involved are still alive. Government documents 
concerning the probe abound. 
In spite of this documentation, there is no clear consensus, no 
general agreement on what really happened. The conflicting views and 
facts so collHllon to historical research reveal the interests, pressures 
and ideologies that shape the social, political and economic climate of 
the city. Data for the history itself were gathered from three sources: 
(1) extensive reports in the local press, particularly the Oreaonian and 
Oregon Journal; (2) Oregon public records, including the attorney 
general's files in the State Archives and the six volumes concerned with 
the Portland probe from the Hearings of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (85th Congress), 
held in March of 1957; and, (3) interviews by the author done in 1979, 
1980 and 1981 with persons who had knowledge of the vice situation and 
the probe in the mid-fifties. 
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Chronologically, the history begins with a bribery scandal in the 
Oregon Liquor Control Co1JB11ission (OLCC) in the fall of 1953 and continues 
through the revelations of James Elkins, a well-known local gambling, 
prostitution and bootleg operator, whose accusations launched the vice 
probe. The Portland vice probe climaxed in the Senate Hearings of March, 
1957, mentioned above and the trials and exonerations of many of the 
principals involved. The history of the event will appear in full in 
Chapter IV. 
Following the history, an analysis of the case will be made using 
propositions developed from theoretical and historical material 
presented in Chapter II. As discussed earlier, the limits of the 
historical study and available social science literature renders the 
testing of the propositions a limited exploratory exercise. The research 
is intended to contribute to, but not develop, a complete theoretical 
model of vice, urban corruption, their exposure and reform. 
The final chapter summarizes both the history and tentative conclu-
sions on the relevance of the propositions to this case study. Further 
areas for research on urban corruption and approaches that may be useful 
to others in pursing such research will be suggested. 
CHA..'DTER I I 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As the American city grew, vice and corruption gre:.· ~swell. By the 
turn of the century a strong tradition of journalistic exposure or urban 
crime had developed. Foremost among these chroniclers of crime were 
muckrakers like Lincoln Steffens. 
Steffens (1904) exposed the interrelations between American corpor-
ate profiteers and urban political machines. He saw the ability to buy 
special favors from the "boss" was a fundamental cause of corruption. 
Graft and corruption also served the interests of various groups, he 
reasoned. These special interests included merchants, manufacturers, 
contractors and bankers. (Steffens 1904). 
Steffens addressed the ubiquitousness of the problems of corruption 
and vice in this way: 
... The corruption which breaks out here and there now and then 
is not an occasional offense, but a coDBDon practice, the effect 
of it has literally changed the form of our government from one 
that is representative of the people to an oligarchy 
representative of special interests (Steffens 1904, p. 24). 
Steffens described a situation in which relationships between the 
business oligarchy and the city government were frequently informal, 
based on personal contacts made in social situations. At the lowest 
level, the ward heeler dealt with individual citizens in saloons, offices 
and homes meeting at least some of their needs by finding jobs, housing 
or by intercession with the courts. At the top of government industry, 
where high-level decision-making took place, the arrangements occurred 
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in informal smokers, at private clubs, at dinner parties and at dances. 
(Steffens 1904; Zink 1930) 
In the decades that followed the work of the muckrakers, social 
scientists carried on analyses of the social, political and economic 
aspects of urban crime, corruption and reform. It is from this body of 
work in history, sociology and political science that propositions will 
be drawn to be applied to the case of Portland in the 1950' s. The 
remainder of this chapter will review approaches to understanding urban 
corruption and reform. Several areas will be examined, in particular: 
1) The functionalists in sociology; 
2) Modem Marxist theoreticians in sociology; 
3) Analysts of political machines and urban reform from history, 
sociology and political science; 
4) Analysts of organized crime and corruption from sociology, 
history and political science; 
S) Students of mass communication media and urban reform from 
sociology, political science and history. 
From this review of the literature, several propositions concerning 
corruption, vice and reform will be developed. The propositions will be 
stated as they emerge in the course of the literature review so that 
their basis will be apparent to the reader. 
The Traditional Functionalist View 
Among sociologists, Robert K. Merton (1949) and Kingsley Davis 
(1971) have done much to identify how corruption and vice serve various 
elements of the social order. The functionalists saw "unplanned-for 
usefulness" in disapproved and illegal activities. This, they argued, is 
what made corruption such a common feature of urbanization. 
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As machine politicians and machines are exposed and weakened, new 
machines , and new leaders appear because they are in demand, or, as 
Merton (1949) stated, what will develop is 
.•. an alternative unofficial structure to fulfill existing 
needs somewhat more effectively (p. 73). 
Merton suggested two groups served by political machines; the lower 
classes and larger businesses. 
Business corporations among which the public utilities, 
railroads, local transportation companies, communication 
corporations, electric light and power companies and so on, 
are simply the most conspicuous in this regard, seek special 
political dispensations which will enable them to stabilize 
their situation and to near their objective of maximizing 
profits. Interestingly enough, corporations often want to 
avoid a chaos of uncontrolled competition. They want the 
greater security of an economic czar who controls, regulates 
and organizes the competition, providing the czar is not a 
public official with his decisions subject to public scrutiny 
and public control. The latter, of course, would be government 
control and taboo, and the political boss fulfills these 
requirements admirably (Merton 1949, p. 75). 
Merton went on to point out how much better suited to the service of 
these groups is the "boss" than the regular inefficient city bureaucracy. 
A well-known functionalist analysis of vice is Kingsley Davis' 
(1971) examination of prostitution. According to Davis prostitution is 
seen as evil largely because it does not serve the generally dominant 
social goals. Prostitution divorces the act of sexual intercourse from 
romantic love, part of the ideological base of our social system. It 
allows men to engage in sexual activity without the socially controlling 
liabilities that are normative. At the same time, it can harm the health 
of individuals in society. 
Despite these negative aspects, Davis (1971) pointed out that 
prostitution serves certain specific functions. It protects the 
sanctity of the family; giving definition to those women who are not 
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respectable as opposed to those women who are, indicating who is and who 
is not fair game for the aggressive, roving male and allowing casual sex 
in a situation that does not threaten the stability of the home. 
The argument has often been made by vice merchants that prostitution 
provides an outlet which, if not provided in some appropriate manner, 
would eventually lead to increased sexual violence (Davis 1971). 
From the previous discussion the view that corruption meets certain 
system needs is evident. 
I. URBAN VICE AND CORRUPTION SERVE TO MAINTAIN SYSTEMIC NEEDS. 
Marxism and Crime - Left-Handed Functionalism 
The Marxist view of the role of crime and criminals in the social 
structure was well expressed by Paul Hirst (1972). He pointed out that 
Marx rejected the idea that a criminal class was an inevitable force for 
social change. In citing the example of bootlegging, Hirst pointed out: 
Illegal forms of capitalist production, for example the 
production and sale of intoxicating liquors in the U.S.A. 
between 1920 and 1933, have certain specific differences from 
legitimate, capitalist enterprises. The capital of the 
illegal enterprises has no legal title as property. Capital 
that is not legal property is a contradiction that sets very 
definite limits to its function as capital and which restricts 
the econ.omic freedom of the illegal enterprise. The 
accumulation of capital in such enterprises is limited by 
their necessarily clandestine character, and this restriction 
enforces the conversion of such accumulated capital into 
strictly legal enterprises and the employment of various 
subterfuges to convert it into legal property (Hirst 1972, 
p. 53). 
Thus, the activity of illegal or illicit businessmen eventually 
leads them into the area of licit activity. It is ironic, then, that one 
of the major accusations made against organized crime figures is that 
they move into the area of legitimate business, as if this particular 
move were in some manner a nefarious plot to dominate the economy. It 
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seems more obvious that such activities are simply a reflection of the 
need to find appropriate investments for earned capital, to seek legiti-
mate ways to use capital for the benefit of its owners just as does any 
other businessman. 
In Marxist analysis, there is an important point that should be made 
regarding criminals generally. They rank, as Hirst (1972) suggested, as 
the lowest levels of what he calls "the industrial reserve army and the 
lumpenproletariat" (Hirst 1972, p. 52). The lumpenproletariat occupies 
the lowest economic strata in the city. 
The dangerous class, the social scum, that passively rotting 
mass thrown off by the lowest of old society, may, here and 
there, be swept into the movement (the movement toward 
revolution) by a proletarian revolution, its sick (the 
lumpenproletariat) conditions of life, however, prepared far 
more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue 
(Marx and Engels 1844, 1968, p. 44). 
The lwnpenproletariat is, in short, a great body of potential agents 
for the first and highest bidder for their services. They were Brown 
Shirts in Nazi Germany, and they can be found today in our American 
cities, willing to serve whoever is willing to pay them. 
Stephen Spitzer (1975), in his article "Toward a Marxian Theory of 
Deviance and Control," attempted to develop an integrated system of 
Marxian theory of deviance and control. Spitzer began his theoretical 
concern by pointing out that the causes of deviance, the sources of 
deviance in our society, are endemic within the American political 
economy. He pointed out that many theories of deviance 
•.. affirm the preconceptions and assumptions of the dominant 
class. Deviance is assumed to reside in the immoral acts of 
individuals whose behavior we have learned to view as curious, 
dangerous or bizarre. The moral system framing the evaluation 
of these acts and its relationship to the interests of the 
ruling class remains exempt from review" (Spitzer 1975, p. 3). 
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Spitzer (1975) asserted that conventional theorists use control as 
a normal response to deviant activity (Parsons 1949), and that such 
analyses fail to understand the role of the state as the device which 
creates and maintains, as well as defines, a deviant class. 
The generally accepted theories of deviance make the state appear as 
a neutral apparatus, a judgmental body rather than an initiative body in 
the process of serving the interest of the ruling class. 
Evolving his deviance theory in terms of Marxism, Spitzer (1975) 
proposed: 
An understanding of deviance production within capitalist 
societies requires the investigation of five interrelated 
elements: (1) the capitalist mode of production; (2) the 
system of class control in capitalist societies; (3) the 
character of problem populations in capitalist societies; (4) 
channeling of problem populations into deviant statutes; and 
(5) the character of deviant populations (p 16). 
Spitzer (1975) saw capitalism, in Marxist terms, as a mode of 
production which forms the foundation for the basic interests structure 
of our social system. Further, Spitzer suggested, as do traditional 
Marxists, that capitalism contains inherently, as do all systems of 
economic order, the contradictions which will lead to its own transforma-
tion. 
Spitzer identified what he calls "problem populations," that is, 
populations that represent the raw material "for production of deviance 
in capitalist societies." These groups threaten the social relations "of 
production in capitalist societies." These populations may challenge 
any of the following: 
1) Capitalist modes of appropriating the product of human 
labor (e.g., when the poor "steal" from the rich); 
2) The social conditions under which capitalist production 
takes place (e.g., those who refuse or are unable to 
perform wage-labor); 
3) Patterns of distribution and consumption in capitalist 
society (e.g., those who use drugs for escape rather than 
sociability); 
4) the process of socialization for productive and 
nonproductive roles (e.g., proponents of alternative 
societies) (Spitzer 1975, p. 20). 
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According to Spitzer (1975), while some of these populations may 
possess revolutionary potential, that potential is significant only if 
they are indispensable to the system. Furthermore, capitalist societies 
can easily transform those who are a problem and are indispensable - the 
proto-revolutionary class - into groups who are problematic and dispens-
able. Spitzer termed these: candidates for deviance processing. He 
suggested that such problem populations are created either directly 
through expressions of contradictions in the capitalist mode of 
production or indirectly through disturbances in the system of class 
rule. 
As the state expands it locates, labels and deals with more problem 
populations. To Spitzer, state expansion is only one side of the 
equation. He lists six other factors influencing labeling and processing 
rates for problem populations (1975, p. 26): 
1) The size and active resistance of the problem population; 
2) How well organized the problem population is; 
3) How effective civil society's control structures (like the 
family, schools and the media) are in controlling problem 
populations; 
4) The availability and effectiveness of other forms of state 
people-processing (like conscription); 
5) The usefulness of the problem population for supporting 
existing social systems; 
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6) The effectiveness of parallel control networks like private 
police and vigilante groups. 
In a similar vein, he points out: 
The state is often benefited by the policies and practices of 
organized crime, insofar as these activities help pacify, 
contain and enforce order among potentially disruptive groups. 
If criminal enterprises can reliably supply goods and services 
to problem populations without endangering the hegemony of the 
ruling class, these enterprises will be sustained. It is only 
when "criminal conspiracies" and other ogranizations become 
incompatible with the goals of the state and threaten to 
undermine its legitimacy that these arrangements themselves 
become the object of official concern (Spitzer 1975, p. 27). 
Spitzer's (1975) final variable also has relevance to this study. 
He terms this the "utility of problem populations." While these popula-
tions may be a threat to capitalist relations, Spitzer saw problem 
populations as residual, unprocessed in terms of their deviance. He 
said: 
Residual groups are distinguished by the fact that while they 
remain generally problematic, the costs that they inflict are 
most immediately absorbed by other members of the problem 
population. Policies evolve, not so much to eliminate or 
actively suppress these groups, but to deflect their threat 
away from targets which are sacred to the capitalist class. 
Victimization is permitted and even encouraged, as long as the 
victims are members of an expendable class. In consequence, 
the rate of deviance processing is modulated and the 
maintenance of the capitalist order is insured (p. 28). 
Spitzer (1975) further distinguished deviant populations into two 
basic categories: (1) social junk, who, from the point of view of the 
dominant of society, are costly but relatively harmless - the mother on 
welfare, the alcoholic, and so on - who are persons of public concetn, 
but are relativelr passive and even useful in the ideological sense, and 
(2) far more significant, those of the social dynamite class - those who 
have the potential and the ability to call into question and actively 
challenge the social system and to actually disrupt the established order 
and relationships of the social system. 
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Spitzer goes on to categorize and explain four methods by which the 
state deals with dangerous social populations: normalization, 
conversion, containment and pacification. 
The fourth method is one that relates closely to that used by 
officials in this case study. Under this method, pacification, the state 
will support criminal enterprise, essentially allowing greater influence 
and power to organized crime in order to control "dangerous" elements. 
Describing this approach, Spitzer (1975) says: 
Although predatory criminal enterprise is assumed to stand in 
opposition to the goals of the state and the capitalist class, 
it performs valuable and unique functions in the service of 
class rule. By creating a parallel opportunity structure, 
organized crime provides a means of support for groups who 
might otherwise become a burden on the state. The activities 
of organized crime are also important in the pacification of 
problem populations. Organized crime provides goods and 
services which ease the burden and deflect the energies of the 
underclass. In this role the "crime industry" performs a 
cooling-out function and offers a control resource which might 
othei:Wise not exist. Moreover, insofar as criminal enterprise 
attempts to reduce uncertainty and risk in its operations, it 
aids the state in the maintenance of public order. This is 
particularly true to the extent that the rationalization of 
criminal activity reduces the collateral costs (i.e. , 
violence) associated with predatory crime (p. 38). 
From the proceeding it can be concluded that: 
II. ORGANIZED CRIME IS TOLERATED AS A USEFUL DEVICE FOR PACIFICATION OF 
POTENTIALLY REBELLIOUS POPULATIONS. 
In examining the historical material presented in this 
dissertation, it can be seen that criminal classes interface with 
political organizations to form powerful blocs that can carry out policy 
at the urban level. These groups serve specific functions, and, given 
only a limited percentage of graft-taking and of illegal activity, they 
are frequently tolerated and frequently are useful in helping govern. 
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However, Spitzer (1975) suggested when such groups effectively 
organize to threaten the legitimacy of the state, they become serious 
concern for the state. It is under such circW!lstances t'lat vice and 
corruption come under attack. This may be expressed: 
III. WHEN CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES ARE PERCEIVED AS A THREAT TO THE STATE'S 
LEGITIMACY, THEY THEN BECOME THE OBJECT OF OFFICIAL ACTION. 
The Machines and the Reformers 
Eric McKitrick (1957) pointed out that machine politics change 
little through time and that 
•.. the values of mobility, status and respectability operate 
in the underworld in a way precisely analogous to the workings 
in the upper (business) world .•• the extent to which the two 
worlds overlap in shared values is considerable (McKitrick 
1957, p. 507). 
Joe Tarr (1967) asserted that the politicians who were involved in 
urban politics during the reform era were upwardly mobile lower class 
individuals from humble and/or immigrant backgrounds. For these people 
politics provided an alternative form of social and economic 
mobility to those who found other channels blocked because of 
the lack of native family roots, wealth or education (Tarr 
1967, p. 58). 
This echoes the position of Merton (1949) on the functions of the 
political machine as offering an upward path of mobility to those whose 
access to upward mobility was blocked by their social position. 
The machine politicians were commonly involved in the practice of 
boodling, in which a politician sells his vote to the highest bidder in 
such matters as franchise distribution. Votes were sold in Chicago, for 
example, for promises not to enact legislation in exchange for support 
from legal and illegal business communities. Funds were frequently 
deposited in banks that made loans to certain politicians or businesses 
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in which politicians held stock. Tax assessments could be raised or 
lowered, depending on the generosity of persons or corporations being 
taxed. Boodling also involved the pocketing of large loans, or interest 
f ram loans, made by the wealthy to the city (Tarr 1967). 
Tarr (1967) emphasized the connections between banking interests, 
large utility corporations, and other businesses in their relationship 
to city governments. Political alliances really depended upon the mutual 
satisfaction of both political and economic needs for these groups. 
Wade (1968) pointed out that the membership of reform movement was 
drawn from the new elites, middle and upper classes who had finally 
gained access to the suburban lifestyle. They were deeply troubled by 
what they perceived as the old-fashioned style of the city machine. As a 
rising class, they took advantage of the changes in transportation and 
cooununication and moved to the outskirts of town. The new elites cham-
pioned reform and were major representatives in reform associations. The 
old machines, on the other hand, respected and shared the interests of 
the newly arrived iounigrant. There was racism and white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant bias in reformist movements (Wade 1968). 
The new reform movements were famous for their "Coounittees of 100" 
or the "Coounittee of 75." Such groups not only had an interest in 
keeping their neighborhoods safe from crime, vice and corruption, but 
wanted control of the city as well. 
The clash of the new suburbanites and the machines was not one 
between economic int2rests as such. Rather, the attack was on the 
political machine and city hall itself. The basic issue which divided 
the suburbanites and the machine men was the question of charter reform -
the attempt to alter the existing structures of governments in the 
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cities. Though the cleavage between the two might have beer ""Uch deeper, 
the issue was whether the oldest residents or the newcomers would shape 
life in the metropolis. Established residents who dominated city hall in 
the past, felt themselves losing power and were threatened by the influx 
to the inner city of ethnic minorities. Inner city populations did not 
share the motives of suburban reformers. The machine strengthened as 
reaction within the city centers to the suburban progressive's attempts 
at reform reinforced the bosses' power (Wade 1968). 
In New York, governor Alfred E. Smith united these two major power 
groups. By the 1920's, Smith had built an organization that involved 
suburban voters, the middle classes and the ethnic minorities of the city 
center. The heir of Smith's legacy was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. What 
Smith did on a statewide effort in New York, Roosevelt managed to 
accomplish nationwide in assembling his constituency for the elections 
of 1932, 1936 and 1940 (Wade 1968). 
Analyzing the development of reform in Cincinnati under the Cox 
machine, Miller (1968) documented parallel changes in three dimensions: 
geographic change in the loci of population density and class; a shift in 
party alliance; and, publication of attacks on the Cox machine in the 
press. 
The movement for reform in municipal government constituted an 
attempt by upper class, advanced professional and large business groups 
to take "formal political power from the previously dominant lower and 
middle class elements so that they might advance their own conceptions of 
desirable public policy" (Hays 1964, p. 165). 
Reformers attacked the machine as the most visible institutional 
element of the ward system, but they were also attacking the entire ward 
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form of political organization and the political power of middle and 
lower class groups which lay behind it. Thus: 
IV. REFORM MOVEMENTS FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANY THE RISE OF NEW ELITES IN THE 
CITY. THEY ARE PART OF A LARGER STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL INVOLVING 
MAJOR POWER SHIFTS. 
Reformers, Hays insisted, wished not simply to replace bad men with 
good, but they proposed to change the occupational and class origins of 
decision-makers (Hays 1964). 
Robert Dahl (1961) and Nelson Polsby (1960) perceived the urban 
polity as dominated by sets of contending interest groups. It is 
competition among these, they argued, that creates change and democracy 
in the city. 
Robert Aggar, Daniel Goldrich and Bert Swanson (1964) saw urban 
political power as tending to centralize in the hands of elites through a 
consensual process involving shared goals and beliefs. G. William 
Domhoff (1978), in attacking Dahl's (1961) view of governance, asserted 
that elites based on class, status and power dominate city political 
decision-making. Only in the process of a struggle among these elites 
for power is there serious conflict. This struggle, historically, as 
Hays (1964) suggested, can take the outward form of a reform movement. 
Weinstein (1968) found that businessmen in the Progressive Era 
supported and urged reform in the structure of city government. These 
groups supported both the city comnission and city manager forms of 
government. They opposed the ward form in which councilmen or aldermen 
were elected from individual wards often representing a specific ethnic 
class, cultural group or political ideology. 
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The city commission plan (as used in Portland) evolved directly in 
response to the great tidal wave that destroyed Galveston, Texas in 1900 
(Weinstein 1968). 
Under the Galveston plan a five-man commission, including the 
mayor, was given the power of the mayor and the old board of aldermen. 
Each commissioner headed a city department, and each functioned in part 
as a legislator as well as an administrator. The commission idea was 
seen as making possible quick, prompt, businesslike and efficient 
government. Broad powers were given to each commissioner. The idea was 
that the position would be so desirable that good men would be attracted 
to the office. The commission form spread rapidly, first through Texas 
and then to the north, and by 1913 more than 300 cities from coast to 
coast had adopted what was then known as the Des Moines Plan, basically 
the commission charter system (Weinstein 1968). 
The results, however, were far from the ideal. Popular but 
incompetent administrators were frequently selected. Often, these men 
were more skilled at playing political games than they were at 
administration. Individual commissioners often found themselves 
competing with other commissioners for scarce city monies. This meant 
trade-off's and bargains were necessitated. Since city jobs were in the 
hands of the commissioners, those officials became very powerful. City 
commissions fixed both policy and appropriations. Favor-trading and 
squabbles over 5 separate entities ir. consta~t competition were 
frequent. 
H.S. Gilbertson developed the commission-manager plan as another 
solution. The commissi'Ju··m.?nager plan was first proposed in Lockport, 
New York. The Lockport Proposal separated the legislative and executive 
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functions by retaining an elected commission to legislate in the city, 
and providing a paid, appointed manager to assume all executive 
functions. Executive ability was no longer a prerequisite for successful 
city commissioners. The day-to-day management of city affairs was 
removed from political pressure and placed in the hands of a professional 
manager. The city manager plan became known as the Dayton Plan. Adopted 
in Dayton in 1913, by 1920 there were more than 103 cities that had 
adopted the manager plan (Weinstein 1968). 
The city manager movement, like the commission movement, was sup-
ported by boards of trade and by chambers of commerce. These interest 
groups felt that electing only a few men on a citywide vote: 
•.. made election of minority or labor candidates more 
difficult and less likely. Before the widespread adoption of 
commission and manager government, it was common for workmen 
to enter politics and serve as aldermen or even mayor. 
Socialists elected teamsters, machinists, cigar makers, 
railroad conductors and trainmen, tinners, carpenters, miners 
and other workers as mayors of dozens of cities and towns in 
these years. Once the commission plan was in effect, this 
became rare (Weinstein 1968, p. 139). 
The commission and/or manager plan used a non-partisan ballot which 
was widely supported as a great advance in democracy. However, it tended 
to operate against political or ethnic minority groups (Weinstein 1968). 
In effect, it limited the potential for legitimate power of these groups, 
forcing them to seek alternate and frequently illegitimate paths to power 
and mobility. 
The manager movement spurted ahead in the period just after the 
Progressive Era. In the five years from 1918 to 1923, nearly a thousand 
cities adopted manager charters as compared to 97 in the five years 
before 1918, and 84 in the five years after 1923. 
During the first World War, chambers of commerce and boards of 
trade greatly intensified their anti-radical and anti-labor 
activities and in hundreds of small cities and towns Socialist 
locals were destroyed by the super-patriotic business groups. 
Just as the war would serve to institutionalize corporation 
control of regulatory agencies on a national level, so on a 
local level the business organizations were able to rapidly 
press forward their political domination of American 
municipalities (Weinstein 1968, p. 143). 
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With the newer forms of city government came a closer connection 
between real estate development and city government. The establishment 
of promotional commissions such as port coDlllissions became common. By 
the late 1960's this combination of public agencies and private interests 
had evolved in form and impact. Its culmination came in frequent urban 
renewal projects. Corporate needs were served by public investment to 
raise the tax base and alter land use patterns (Lubove 1969). 
Urban renewal movements, with their inevitable displacement of 
ethnic minorities and destruction of their communities, then, are part of 
a process in which state involvement in support of the business community 
emerges as a late development in the reform movement (Lubove 1969). 
The coming together of the city government and the private developer 
in land use gradually introduced an opportunity for graft and for invest-
ment of monies gained through vice activities (Stephens 1904, Hays 1964, 
Tarr 1967). There was a strong reaction both to urban renewal projects 
themselves and to questionable practices associated with those projects. 
This became, as Calvert (1972) suggested, a ..• 
.•. conflict in the American urban polity between two 
mentalities, a real estate mentality and a taxpayer mentality. 
The real estate mentality belongs to developers, speculators 
and business interests desiring expansion and growth, and the 
taxpayer mentality characterizes homeowners, non-expansive 
"lumpen bourgeouisie" business interests (Calvert 1972, p.55). 
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The distribution and development of land through the involvement of 
city government offer an opportunity for corruption to emerge. As this 
process grows, it deepens the possibility for abuse. Thus: 
V. URBAN STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN SUCH AREAS AS LAND USE PLANNING SERVE 
THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE CITY AND AT THE 
SAME TIME PROVIDE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION. 
Organized Crime and Corruption: Four Modern Cases 
Four cases of organized crime illustrate the interaction of vice and 
political power in the contemporary urban situation. Two of these (Bell 
1960, and Ianni and Ianni 1972) deal with Italian-American crime 
syndicates. Both operated in an interstate network and both have been 
characterized as part of the Mafia. Bell's (1960) model dealt with the 
rise of the well-known gambler and bootlegger, Frank Costello, who gained 
political influence and legitimacy in the process of bankrolling 
political mar::hines. Ianni and Ianni (1972) emphasized the unique kinship 
model used by the more traditional Sicilian-style crime family. They 
detailed the evolution of the crime family from local to national and 
from illegal to legal business activity. 
In the third case Gardiner (1970) studied a Jewish-based crime 
syndicate that functioned as part of a local politically influential 
group with ties of economic convenience to larger crime networks on a 
regional scale. In the fourth case, Chambliss (1978) presents a model of 
local crime networks that is not a unique phenomenon of ethnic or indivi-
dual significance, but a form of deviance structured into the pattern of 
economic and political life of the city. He emphasized its permanence 
even as its leading figures change. 
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Daniel Bell (1960) found that vice and political corruption coexist 
in a society which has made enormous efforts to curb human appetite: 
From the start, America was at one and the same time a frontier 
coDDDunity where everything goes and the fair country of the 
blue laws (Bell 1960, p. 116). 
Davis (1971) made essentially the same point in dealing with the 
pervasiveness of prostitution. The outlawing of popular pleasures may 
result less in the reduction of the undesirable activities than in the 
creation of new groups of offenders. 
As Bell (1960) emphasized, the outlawing of liquor did not stop the 
abuse of alcohol. Instead, large groups of offenders and a new illegal 
industry designed to serve them was created. Laws that fail to reflect 
the generally shared norms become a part of the opportunity structure 
that leads not only to l~w violation but to corruption as well. This 
suggests that: 
VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR VICE AND CORRUPTION CAN EXIST DUE TO THE CONTRA-
DICTION BETWEEN IDEALIZED NORMS AND ACTUAL BEHAVIOR AS REFLECTED IN 
CRIMINAL LAW. 
Bell saw a shift in big business contributions to political 
campaigns from local contests to national affairs. This shift left a 
void in funding which was solved in three ways: 
1) Monies from city employees in the form of contributions from 
city employee unions and/or time spent campaigning for elected 
officials; 
2) The taxing of gamblers through the selling of such devices as 
the bookmaking licenses of Jersey City. License fees were 
often by percentage; 
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3) Funding from newly gained, often illegally earned, wealth as 
in the case of Frank Costello (Bell 1960). 
Frank Costello's Interstate Network. Frank Costello's career, his 
development from bootlegger to patron of politicians, is used by Bell 
(1960) to demonstrate the rise of the illegally wealthy in politically 
influential circles. 
Costello faced a crisis with the repeal of the Volstead Act. His 
big break came when Huey Long, who needed ready cash to fight the old-
line political machine in Louisiana, offered Costello the opportunity to 
install slot machines in that state. Costello did so and flourished. 
Together with Dandy Phil Kastel, he opened the Beverly Club, an elegant 
gambling establishment, in New Orleans (Bell 1960). 
Costello went on to invest in New York real estate, in the 
Copacabana Night Club, and in a leading brand of Scotch whiskey. His 
opportunities to gain power in New York came when Tammany, starved for 
lack of patronage from Franklin Roosevelt and Fiorelo La Guardia, turned 
to him for financial support. Costello exploited Italian-American 
grievances against the Irish and, to a lesser extent, against Jewish 
political groups (Bell 1960). 
The Mafia Model. Popularity of the Mafia crime theme is well known. 
The Appalachian meeting in 1958 of wealthy Italian-American underworld 
figures for a barbeque at the home of Joseph Barbara is cited often as an 
example of a gathering of Italian Mafia families. Twenty of those at the 
meeting were found guilty of obstructing justice because the federal 
government said they were lying about the purpose of the meeting. A 1960 
appellate court decision overturned the conviction because the 
government had failed to demonstrate that any improper conduct took place 
26 
at the meeting (Gibbons 1977). The evidence of Valachi, the findings of 
Senator Estes Kefauver (1951), support the view that a single powerful 
crime network exists in the United States today. The President's 
Conmission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) and 
the Task Force on Organized Crime (1976) agree that a Mafia-type 
organization exists. They differ only on questions of detail and formal 
structure. 
The activities of these organizations allegedly include gambling, 
loan-sharking, the import and wholesale of narcotics, labor union 
infiltration, coin-machine operations, laundry and other services, and 
manufacturing. The Mafia exerts control over senators, congressmen, 
state and local officials, as well as federal and local judges (Cressey 
1969). 
While there is general agreement that there are Italian-American 
crime families in the United States, there is strong disagreement on how 
tightly knit these organizations are on a national level or how different 
they are from other business arrangements made by non-Italian-Americans 
in the spheres of legal as well as illegal enterprise. 
The nature of Italian-American family crime organization is 
explored from the Sicilian-Mafia perspective by Giovanni Schiavo (1962) 
who insists that the Mafia was disbanded by Mussolini in 1927 and that 
there is no reliable evidence of a Mafia in control of organized crime 
here or elsewhere. 
Nelli (1970), in chror.icling the rise of Italian-American crime 
families in Chicago, described the entrance into crime as necessitated by 
the limited opportunities available to the newly arrived immigrants. 
Most of the Black Hand activity involving violence took place within the 
27 
Italian-American connnunity. This view is consistent with general press 
accounts regarding alleged violent mob activity and is supported by Bell 
(1960). Bell suggested that crime business, like American business, has 
"shifted its emphasis from production to consumption", from areas like 
bootlegging to gambling (emphasis in the original) (Bell 1970, p. 119). 
Robert Anderson (1965) suggested that The Organization has become 
more elaborate and more extensive with increased specialization and 
inevitable bureaucratiziation, coordination and control. In this 
process the organization has shifted its name from Mafia to Cosa Nostra. 
The traditional rural structure of the Sicilian organization has yielded 
to a far more diversified, rational and modern industrial form 
appropriate to the American city. 
Ianni and Ianni (1972) cited the widespread nature of the Mafia 
story in American mythos from about 1890 on. In that year, nine accused 
assassins of the New Orleans police chief were lynched. Outraged, the 
Italian government caused the United States to pay an indemnity of 
$25,000 to each of the three families of the Italian nationals killed in 
the mob action. 
In examining the Lupollo family in New York, Ianni and Ianni (1972) 
found that traditional rules apply to alliances in a local or regional 
crime family. Such ties are based on kinship through blood and marriage 
and through ritual kinship or compareggio. Compareggio serves to bring 
together generations as well as lineages. There are also reciprocal 
obligations within families as well as across families. Where these 
first loyalties do not dominate, friendship, shared interest and self-
interest help to form new alliances outside the traditional forms. 
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Operationally, the Lupollo family and other Italian-American crime 
families are social units with social and business functions merged. All 
leadership positions, down to "middle-management" level, are assigned on 
the basis of this kinship. 
The higher the position in the organization, the closer 
the kinship relationship. 
Leadership positions are assigned to a central group of 
family members, all of whom have close consanguineal or 
affinal relationships. 
Members of this leadership group are assigned to either 
legal or illegal enterprises, but not to both. 
Transfer of monies from illegal to legal and back into 
illegal activites takes place through individuals, and is 
part of the close kin-organization of the family (Ianni 
and Ianni 1972, p. 106). 
Italian-American criminal syndicates are clan organizations with 
shared behavior and value systems. Organizations in different cities are 
brought together through blood or marriage relations. Marriage and blood 
relations "are actually a series of complex alliances binding lineages 
within the same family and allying families into what we have called 
clans, for the purpose of systematic exchange of services." (Ianni and 
Ianni 1972, p. 169) 
The Italian-American organizations replaced the Jewish-dominated 
crime syndicates. Eventually families like the Lupollos became more and 
more "American" and legitimate in their enterprises. 
The Mafia is a unique Sicilian institution reflecting the unique 
history of that land and: 
The relationship between society and the development of the 
Mafia in Sicily holds true for organized crime in this country 
as well. There is no organized crime "underworld." Rather, 
organized crime is a result of an individualistic, predatory 
philosophy of success, the malaise of laissez-faire economic 
and political practice. Organized crime is that part of the 
business system operative in the illicit segment of American 
life. The degree and tenure of minority group involvement in 
this business enterprise is basically a function of the social 
and cultural integration of the group into American society. 
At their first entrance into this society, immigrants and 
their children grasp at the immediate means of acquiring what 
the New World has to offer. As they are acculturated, their 
crimes become more American and in time merge into the area of 
marginal legitimate business practice. Where one stops and 
the other begins is not always easy to see (Ianni and Ianni 
1972, p. 61). 
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The survival of the Sicilian model in American life, the Ianni's 
argued, is not only due to homeland traditions but to the indifference of 
east coast Tammany organizations and law enforcement agencies to the 
Italian-Americans' plight in the ethnocentric and competitive urban 
centers of America (Ianni and Ianni 1972, Bell 1960). 
As will be shown later in this study, the Mafia model is one among 
many types of organizations of criminal activity. No one ethnic group 
dominates crime and criminal syndicates throughout the entire nation. 
Ethnicity is a factor in both the organization and development of crime 
networks as Ianni and Ianni (1972) suggested. The public identification 
of all organized crime with the Italian-American community hides the 
nature of much of organized criminal activity. It reflects ethnic 
stereotyping while at the same time simplifying a complex pattern of 
activity and opportunity. It is important then to realize that: 
VII. ORGANIZED CRIME IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF ANY PARTICULAR 
ETHNIC GROUP. IT ARISES FROM ATTEMPTS BY NEW IMMIGRANT GROUPS AND 
OTHERS TO MAKE A CLAIM ON WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA. 
The Local Cabal - Stern in Wincanton. Gardiner (1970) studied a 
crime organization with a Jewish leader in the fictionalized city of 
Wincanton. The Stem organization rose through gambling, principally on 
numbers. Extortion, intimidation and violence, as well as cooperation 
and syndication were used to extend and diversify Stern's interests. 
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By the early 1960's the Stern organization was active in 
horsebetting, numbers, pinball, a large floating dice game and bootleg 
manufacture of whiskey. In the process of the organization's growth, 
Stern developed complex relationships with other businessmen, with 
important politicians and the law enforcement community. Mutually 
beneficial arrangements for political and economic advantage were 
common. 
Gardiner (1970) asserted that Stern operated independently of any 
larger national organizations. Yet Stern did have partnership 
arrangements with larger east coast operations. He also invested funds 
and laid off bets with organizations from other locations with larger 
holdings. When muscle was necessary, Stern hired outside enforcers. 
These men came from larger Cosa Nostra organizations. 
Gardiner outlined a series of critical events that led to reform in 
Wincanton. The events span a period of mo:7e than fifteen years. They 
begin with a Congressional investigation of .June 1951. The Congressional 
committee findings, which were released nine weeks before the city elec-
tions, indicated that the Stern Syndicate virtually controlled the city 
police in terms of gambling enforcement. 
From 1956 to 1960 federal agents raided a tavern operated by then 
Mayor Donnelly and were able to establish a line between various city 
officials and the Stern group. 
During the eight years of the Walasek ~~1 Whitten administrations 
(1960-1968), Stern and others were successfully linked to corruption in 
city purchasing and extortion. Indictments came shortly before primary 
elections in 1963 and 1967. These repeated actions by the Justice 
Department, culminating in 1967 in a strong condemnation of corrul't.ion in 
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Wincanton in the National Crime CoODDission Task Force Report on Organ-
ized Crime (1967) forced local attention to the corruption issue. All of 
these events were accompanied by media attention. 
Gardiner argued that the federal revelations with their extensive 
media play were critical events which convinced voters to act to restore 
official morality and end corruption. This voter response took the form 
of a shift in party preference and the ousting of the old Democratic 
machine. 
VIII.AUTHORITATIVE, EXTERNALLY ORIGINATED AND VERIFIED CONDEMNATION OF 
LOCAL CORRUPTION IS A MAJOR FACTOR FOR LOCAL REFORM. 
Gardiner suggested there are three identifiable variables which 
reduce the likelihood of official tolerance of corruption existing in 
both law enforcement and other city agencies. These are: (1) Strong 
rewards such as job security, regular promotion, high pay and merit 
awards for good work beyond the standard; (2) High professional and 
public status and expectations; (3) Strong, clear supervision and chain 
of coODDand. 
IX. WHERE STRONG REWARDS, HIGH STATUS AND CLOSE SUPERVISION OF POLICE DO 
NOT EXIST, PAYOFFS AND CORRUPTION MAY TAKE PLACE. 
The Seattle Network - Business as Usual. William Chambliss (1978) 
studied an organized crime network in Seattle. Focusing his study on the 
ways in which the legal system and law enforcement structure crime into 
various business operations including vice, Chambliss saw organized 
crime in Seattle as a cabal or coalition. It involved not only 
racketeers and gamblers, but politicians, union leaders and legitimate 
business people as well. Chambliss (1978) argued that large real estate 
interests, banks and savings and loans are usually involved in and gain 
from the activities of such cabals. 
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In asserting a structural or functional notion about deviant acts, 
Chambliss (1978) used as an example an ordinance that forced nightclub 
operators to violate the law in order to make a profit. In Seattle, for 
an eating establishment to sell liquor a certain percentage of income 
must come from the sale of food as well. Chambliss pointed out that in 
order to make an adequate income, nightclub owners would have to be 
operating prohibitively large restaurants the size of a football field. 
In order to circumvent the city ordinance, club owners would mani-
pulate their books and lie about their business. Under these circum-
stances, they were vulnerable to accusations of code violation and 
criminal law violation. This situation created opportunities for bribes 
and payoffs to police. 
X. VICE AND CORRUPTION ARE STRUCTURED, THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, INTO THE OPERATION OF VARIOUS BUSINESSES. 
Chambliss pointed out: 
In Seattle, the operators of cardrooms, cafes with pinball 
machines, taverns, nightclubs, bookmaking establishments and 
sundry other enterprises, which were in violation of one or 
more laws had to pay graft to keep open. There were two 
payments a month. (Chambliss 1978, p. 102). 
Chambliss cited the Knapp Commission report on Corruption in the New 
York Police Department as further evidence of the commonness of 
corruption of the law enforcement comm.unity. Using a Marxist dialectical 
perspective, Chambliss argued that: 
... Criminality reflects and stems from contradictions that are 
inherent in the political and economic structure of society. 
These contradictions create conflicts in attempts to resolve 
them. The resolutions forced in turn reveal other 
contradictions, further conflicts and more resolutions. In 
this way, the development and maintenance of illegal business 
and/or organized crime and criminal activities fit into, 
reflect, complement and mirror the political economy of our 
time (Chambliss 1978, p. 8). 
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XI. ORGANIZED CRIME, WITH ITS USES OF VICE AND CORRUPTION, IS NO 
DIFFERENT THAN OTHER FORMS OF BUSINESS EXCEPT THAT, BECAUSE THE 
CANNOT RELY UPON THE LEGAL/CIVIL SYSTEM TO ENFORCE THEIR BUSINESS 
ARRANGEMENTS, ORGANIZED CRIMINALS CAN AND DO RESORT TO THE USE OF 
VIOLENCE AND OTHER EXTRA-LEGAL SANCTIONS. 
Chambliss (1978) described the collapse of a cooperative network of 
law enforcement agents, local politicans, vice operators and others in 
the late sixties in Seattle. Despite the occasional publication of 
stories on corruption, little in the way of effective publicity and 
consequent public arousal took place until a new editor, an outsider came 
to the second largest Seattle daily paper and began a series of exposes 
on meetings of the prosecutor with the leading figures in local vice 
operations. At the same time, a local magazine, which served a largely 
new professional middle and upper class clientele, published material on 
the corrupt connections in the city. 
The subsequent shake up, demanded by a new sense of public outrage, 
resulted in the indictment of fifty-four public officials. Yet, the 
previous political arrangement which divided power between the state-
dominating Democrats and the city-ruling Republicans, was altered only 
to a small degree. Chambliss stated that a year later a new network 
involving the same positions and crime group was developing often using a 
new set of officials. Patterns of tolerance and accommodation survived 
because it was necessary for the political health of all groups whether 
traditional rivals or not. 
In the end, in Seattle, none of the more important figures at the 
top of the corruption pyramids were convicted, though three policemen of 
high rank were. Only one racketeer was convicted. He did two years and a 
month of a three-year federal sentence (Chambliss 1978). 
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XII. A VICE PROBE WILL AFFECT THOSE INVOLVED IN INVERSE PROPORTION TO 
THEIR POWER, PRESTIGE AND WEALTH. 
The Media and Modern Reform 
It has already been shown that public perceptions of organized crime 
are influenced by what is written or presented through popular media 
sources. Miller (1968) and Gardiner (1970) and Chambliss (1978) 
indicated the role that the newspaper and other media sources play in 
reform efforts. 
Walter B. Miller (1976) examined the apparent appearance and disap-
pearance of violent youth gangs in New York City through the 'SO's, '60's 
and '70' s. Using newspaper stories, Miller showed that media coverage of 
certain types of gangs follows a pattern of "a period of virtually no 
attention, and a period of renewed attention" (Miller 1970, p. 97). 
In his study, Miller found that stories of violence have evident 
audience appeal and are used therefore frequently in the press and on 
television. Thus, when things were peaceful in the 1950' s, gang 
violence, lower on the scale of violence than war or major disaster, 
became headline material. In the 1960's when urban riots and student 
demonstrations took place, gang violence was driven from the headlines. 
By the 1970's, with civil disruption and the Viet Nam war dying down, 
gangland violence returned to the headlines. This was true, Miller 
asserted, despite figures that indicate that gang violence was a 
continuing problem in ten major metropolitan areas throughout all three 
decades. 
Public perceptions, Miller showed, followed media attention. The 
media tend to pay attention to the new in the world of violence; 
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therefore, when gang violence makes it to the front page due to a lack of 
more exciting material to replace it, such gang activity is portrayed as 
new. 
Since the investment in newness as a salable commodity is 
generally coupled with a short time perspective, periodic 
elaborations of gang behavior are seized upon and marked not as 
recurrent stylistic variations on a continuing pattern but as 
the new, the spectacular, the sensational (Miller 1976, p. 
120). 
Media attention functions as a device, according to Paul Lazarsfeld 
and Robert K. Merton (1952), to force a noncontradictory single morality 
on public issues. The media serve to affirm public norms through 
exposure of deviance. They also can serve, as Michael Lipsky (1968) 
suggested, as a path to redress of grievance by relatively powerless 
groups. 
XIII.MEDIA ATTE~"TION SHAPES PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF A SCANDAL; THIS IN 
TURN IS A FACTOR IN FORCING OFFICIAL ACTION. 
Dumhoff (1978) found that much of the process of political and 
economic policy making for urban centers took place in informal settings. 
Exclusive clubs and social events formed the backdrop for many of the 
relationships that were the cement bonding ruling class interaction on 
the social and the decision-making level. 
Hills (1956) discovered whole networks of informal as well as formal 
contacts operating in the context of dominance by elites in the political 
and economic life of the United States. Both Mills and Dumhoff saw in 
the dimension of informal social activity the opportunity structure for 
the processes of handing down and maintaining a coordinated set of 
actions, beliefs and positions. 
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If, as is suggested by proposition XI, the behavior of criminal 
businessmen is little different than that of their legitimate counter-
parts, then, given both the usefulness of criminal businesses and their 
frequent involvement with the politically powerful, there will develop 
informal social interaction among and between both groups. This is 
confirmed by Bell (1960) and Chambliss (1978). 
XIV. INFORMAL INTERATION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES AND OTHER 
ELITES DO EXIST AND ARE USED IN MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL. 
Thus far this Chapter has emphasized the cooperative nature of 
relations between criminal groups and city government. It has been 
suggested that conflict develops from outside the city itself, from 
within, as in the case of the rise of new elites, and/or in the process of 
media attention given to such events. 
Outsiders and Reform 
Both the Marxists and the Functionalists see the usefulness of 
existing arrangements involving corruption and vice to the maintenance 
of status quo. Bell (1960) suggested that in the course of the rise of 
the labor movement a new corrupt power developed. This force, seen most 
notably in the Teamsters Union, offered some potential for challenge to 
existing arrangements in the operation of vice and corruption in many 
cities. Teamster power exists, Bell (1960) suggested, because of the 
union's ability to control delivery of necessary goods and because of its 
structure of regional independence. 
Bell (1960) saw the rise of Teamsters as part of the occasion of 
governmental examination of labor in the mid-fifties. The movement of 
the Teamsters in local, state and national politics is documented as a 
factor in vice and official corruption in Seattle by Chambliss (1978). 
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XV. THE ATTEMPT OF A NEW ELEMENT, SUCH AS A POWERFUL LABOR UNION, TO 
ALTER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AMONG CITY OFFICIALS AND ORGANIZED VICE 
OPERATORS IS A FACTOR IN CAUSING REFORM. 
Gardiner (1970) suggested that when enough effective evidence has 
entered the public consciousness to create an undeniable sense of the 
failure of the system to deal appropriately with what is seen as a shared 
set of moral value violations, there develops a public consensus on the 
issue and a clear demand for reform. Coleman (1959) emphasized this 
consensual phenomenon, seeing it as affected by such dynamics as 
community identification with its leaders and the relative importance of 
the issue in the public's ideological perspective. 
XVI. WHEN THE SUM OF THE FACTORS REVEALED TO THE PUBLIC IS SUFFICIENTLY 
IN VIOLATION OF IMPORTA.~ MORAL VALUES, PUBLIC MORAL OUTRAGE 
DEVELOPS. THIS OUTRAGE IS THE BASIS FOR A POPULAR CONSENSUAL DEMAND 
FOR REFORM. 
Chamcliss (1978) and Coleman (1957) found that even under the 
circumstances of a public consensus for action, such action may be 
individualistic rather than systemic as is suggested by propositions 
XII I and XIV. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
This examination of a vice probe in Portland, Oregon is an 
historical case study of an instance of public revelation of alleged vice 
activity in a city of approximately cne-half million people during the 
mid-1950's. 
The case study model is a well-known and utilized method in histori-
cal, sociological and political science research. The techniques used in 
case studies, whatever their disciplinary bias, have certain similari-
ties. This study, therefore, uses a number of techniques familiar to 
social science. 
The Triangulation of Sources 
Several social scientists have pointed to the advantage of using 
more than one method or source of data collection as a way to validate 
data gathered in field research. The technique is called triangulation, 
or the multi-method approach (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Sieber 1973; 
Smith 1975). 
In the present study, the history of the focus incident was recon-
structed by approaching it from three data sources: (1) Accounts in the 
mass media, represented mainly by articles carried in the two major 
newspapers published in Portland during the event; (2) Government docu-
ments which resulted from the official investigations of the incident and 
from other archives; (3) Interviews done by the author with persons who 
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were involved in the incident as actors or who had some other knowledge 
of events connected with the focus incident. 
A first-order triangulation of sources combined data from the mass 
media, government documents and interviews in a search for convergent and 
divergent facts; that is, to find points of consistency and agreement as 
well as ones of inconsistency and disagreement among the three data 
sources. 
By bringing to bear three separate data sources in the case study 
and by comparing one with the other, events can be examined not only in 
terms of the limitation of official documentation, but in terms of the 
memories of individuals around whom the events occurred. Since memories 
are notoriously uncertain, the interviews can be checked against the 
archival record, against the findings of offical investigations and 
other interviews, which, in turn, can be checked against the popular 
record, against press accounts and other accounts available through the 
printed media. 
It was also possible to carry out a second-order triangulation 
technique within each of the three data sources. The details of this 
second-order triangulation will appear in the extended description of 
the three data sources which follows. 
The Data Sources 
Accounts in the Mass Media. The first source of data used to con-
struct the historical case study were the set of popular accounts in the 
mass media published during the time of the event. This includes the 
reports and investigations of the two major daily newspapers published in 
Portland at that time and also other background material on the power 
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structure of Portland, derived mainly from a number of newspapers and 
magazines published in the same city. 
The two major daily newspapers in the city took opposing sides 
during the vice probe. From this adversary context there emerged what 
was practically a "prosecution" and "defense" version of events in the 
two papers, bringing into high relief the points of general agreement and 
those facts in doubt. This was the main basis for the second-order 
triangulation done within this data source. 
In using newspaper and other popular accounts, certain problems of 
contamination arise. If, for example, Newspaper A gives an account of an 
event or set of events and is read first, the second account in 
Newspaper B, an account which may differ in part or in the main, may seem 
less valid, less real to the researcher. Conversely, if B is read first, 
then A may well be suspect. In any event, there is an element of 
contamination in the process of examining contradictory accounts. 
In order to deal with this problem, the author has employed the 
following technique: after initially reading accounts of alleged events 
surrounding the vice probe, a summary was made of what was considered to 
be the major points in contradiction and in agreement in the two major 
newspaper accounts. Setting this aside, an independent observer was 
brought in to read one version of the vice probe in the afternoon news-
paper. A swmnary, including all names, dates and places, was made by the 
observer. The observer was a graduate student from a midwestern 
university, knowledgeable in research procedures, who had no familiarity 
with Portland's politics in the nineteen-fifties, and was unaware of the 
events described. The observer described the events as presented in the 
afternoon newspaper and this summary account was compared with the 
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account made by the author. Differences were noted, and adjustments were 
made to the first account based upon the account of the independent 
observer. A presumption was made that the independent observer' s account 
would be less biased and less subject to contamination than the author's. 
This check insured that such contamination had been eliminated as much as 
possible. 
A second independent observer, also with no knowledge of activities 
in Portland, was brought in to read the accounts of the morning newspaper 
and, made a similar summary of all relevant facts, dates, places and 
persons. This account was compared with the understanding of the author. 
Government Sources. The second source of information was govern-
ment documents: the attorney general's files in the Oregon State 
Archives; lists of office holders, major appointments to commissions and 
committees of Portland's government; land holding and sales records; and 
records of the U.S. Senate Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field. 
Access to the Attorney General's files in the Archives of the State 
of Oregon provided much information. Files dealing with the vice probe 
alone took up more than 68 boxes of material involving literally tens of 
thousands of documents. Fortunately, much of that material was redundant 
and after an initial search, attention could be narrowed to less than 20 
boxes of material. Included in this material were: 
1. A final report on the probe by the Attorney General and final 
reports by members of his staff; 
2. The verbatim transcripts of several of the grand jury 
interviews; 
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3. Grand jury reports to presiding judges; 
4. Interviews by attorney general and state police staff with 
principals, witnesses and informants; 
5. Various vouchers, bills and the like relating to vice 
activities and state investigative costs; 
6. Original prepublication versions of various news stories and 
reporters' notes; and 
7. Thirteen surviving reels of tape recordings of which only 9 
proved to be at all intelligible even in part. (These record-
ings were those allegedly made by James Elkins' employee, Ray 
Clark, at the King Towers Apartments. Many tapes referred to 
in the course of the investigation and quoted verbatim in the 
press are not part of the material found in the Archives. The 
wiretap wire recordings which led to federal wiretap charges 
were not among these files.) 
This material is referred to in the bibliography by its accession 
number. 
The diverse materials on the vice probe contained in the archives 
provided many opportunities for the second-order triangulation of 
information within this data source. These included the comparison of 
testimony by different persons, the comparison of testimony by the same 
person on different occasions, the consistency of reported facts with 
records and documents, and the evidence from recorded conversations. 
The government records, of course, also played their role in the 
first-order triangulation of the three main data sources. 
A major land development scheme, the creation of a new public 
coliseum (Exposition-Recreation Center) on lands in which there was 
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alleged improper speculation by a participant in the Exposition-
Recreation Co1111Dission, and vice leaders of the Portland metropolitan 
area is involved in the vice probe according to the morning paper. 
Certain outsiders were alleged to be moving in on the vice scene in 
Portland and alleged to be participants in vice activity with the 
Teamsters Union, but the two local papers disagreed on many of the facts. 
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or 
Management Field (1957) also heard a number of allegations on this land 
speculation matter. Land records and purchase agreements and other 
records on land possession were examined as a check on the veracity of 
accusations made both in the press and through the Senate Co1111Dittee. 
Respondent Interviews. The third source of data were interviews 
with persons familiar with the probe at the time, and persons who could 
relate second-hand information through family or other contacts. 
Primary interviews came from those who could give first-person accounts, 
including reporters who composed the original articles on the subject; 
persons directly involved in vice activity in Portland at the time, 
persons involved in law enforcement in Portland at the time, state and 
local politicians and lawyers. A group of secondary interviews, while 
few in number, were significant in nature. These are interviews of 
relatives, friends and others who recall not only the flavor of, but 
specific instances relating to persons of some prominence in the vice 
probe. In addition, several tertiary interviews were conducted to verify 
the accuracy of key informants. These last were interviews with persons 
familiar with specific events in general terms who, while knowing nothing 
of special events, could substantiate points in other areas which, in 
tum, could confirm or bring into question the respondents' 
recollections. 
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Respondent Selection. Interview respondents were selected from a 
limited population made up of those persons who could be found who were 
involved in or had direct knowledge of the case under investigation or 
those who could add corroborative information on the veracity of this 
first group. Since the case under investigation took place twenty-five 
years ago, time and physical mobility have further reduced the available 
respondent population. Accessability and survivorship set natural 
limits upon available interview respondents. 
Respondents were located through media accounts of the case through 
the reports of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field (1957) and through archival sources. As 
interviews progressed, other names were suggested. Where possible these 
persons were also contacted. 
Interview Technique 
Potential respondents were told that the vice probe and corruption 
expose of the mid-nineteen-fifties was under study as part of a doctoral 
disseration in Urban Studies at Portland State University. A brief 
summary of the event, including a list of more prominant names involved 
was presented and the respondent was encouraged to tell what they knew of 
the events. The interview used an open format. Specific questions were 
asked where they appeared appropriate. The respondent population fell 
into two groups by the nature of their career patterns. The first group, 
persons active in public life at the present time or in the past, 
included media reporters, politicians, command level law enforcement 
personnel and career government professionals. The second group, 
persons of one time notoriety or unknown to the media-reading public at 
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the present time, included one time illegal or fringe business people, 
vice service users, non-command level law enforcement personnel and 
relatives of those involved in the case in the mid-nineteen-fifties. 
In the open-ended interview there are no specific sets of questions 
asked. Instead, specific areas of interest are covered. Questions 
designed to gain this information are short and designed to initiate 
lenghty descriptive responses. Informant interviews generally began 
with this question: Can you tell me what you remember about the vice 
probe that took place around 1956 in Portland? 
This question would be followed by others. The nature of the 
follow-up questions would depend on the length and degree of detail 
provided in answering the first question. For example, when a black 
informant suggested that there was a cooperative control network in 
Portland involving the white power structure, the informant might be 
interrupted and asked: Who was in that power structure? 
If an informant suggested that there were payoffs, the questioner 
would attempt to get the informant to specify what he or she knew from 
what they had heard. For example: Do you know of times when payoffs were 
made? 
This question might be followed by a question encouraging a specific 
answer like: How were the payoffs made? Or: How much money was 
involved? 
Generally interviews moved from the general to the specific and back 
again. Every attempt was made to keep the interview on relevant topics, 
although occasional digressions revealed unexpected information and 
insights. When this happened, the digression was encouraged. 
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In order to protect these sources' anonymity, the following 
procedure was used: All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed 
except where respondents requested that this not be done. Members of the 
second group were not identified by name or other significant designation 
in the study itself and at the conclusion of the study, the tapes and 
transcriptions of the tapes were destroyed. 
It must be emphasized that all respondents were informed of the 
nature and purpose of the study. All respondents were not naive 
subjects. All showed a complete and sophisticated understanding of the 
implications of cooperation with this research. They proved well 
informed and able to decide for themselves whether and to what degree 
they would cooperate. Several refused to respond or answered only a 
limited number of questions, reserving some information from the 
interviewer. 
To further preserve the privacy of the respondent groups, only a 
very limited categorical list of respondents is given here. A list of 
















One Time or Present Fringe 
Business People 6 
Vice Service Users 12 
Friends of Those Involved 











The situations in which interviews took place were often informal. 
Generally, interviews were tape recorded, but if respondents requested 
that the tape recorder not be used and/or that notes not be taken, the 
interview was still carried out. In some cases notes were then made from 
memory directly after the interview. For the most part, however, 
interview subjects allowed tape recording. 
Difficulties and advantages of interviewing techniques are detailed 
in the book Elite and Specialized Interviewing by Lewis A. Dexter 
(1970). Dexter pleads for a great deal of flexibility in interviewing 
techniques and cites Nadel's (1939) article "The Interview Technique in 
Social Anthropology." 
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In dealing with important personages, Dexter (1970) emphasizes 
keeping the interview confidential and limiting knowledge of who was 
interviewed and what was said to those who have an absolute need to know. 
Some Comments on Interviewing. The importance of opec-ended 
questioning, of patience in the interview situation, is emphasized by 
Charles Morrissey (1970). 
On the question of the kind of truth one gets from interviews, 
John P. Dean and William F. Whyte (1970) said: 
In evaluating informants' statements we do try to distinguish 
the subjective and objective components. But no matter how 
objective an informant seems to be, the research point of view 
is: The informant's statement represents merely the 
perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his 
cognitive and emotional reactions and reported through his 
personal verbal usages. Thus we acknowledge initially that we 
are getting merely the informant's picture of the world as he 
sees it. And we are getting it only as he is willing to pass it 
on to us in this particular interview situation (p. 120). 
In the process of interviewing diverse subjects, a second order of 
testing naturally develops. The reality of the "assertions" can be 
checked against recollections presented by others and by printed 
sources. This does not mean, however, that contrary stories and 
interview information can be safely discarded. Rather, decisions must be 
made as to whether such information is significant and of adequate value 
for the research at hand. Does it open up new vistas of information? 
Does it suggest ideas that were previously missed? Is the countervailing 
position held in the interview possible, likely, given what is known of 
the circumstances? Or, is it simply the faulty recollection or personal 
bias of the interview subject? Even in the last instance, the interview 
can reveal the subject's own perception of events or expose his methods. 
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As Douglas (1976) suggested, a tough-minded attitude is very impor-
tant in this kind of research. He pointed out that questions should 
always be asked in terms of assumed activities or events. For example, 
such questions as, "Where does the money come from?" in dealing with 
whores and pimps, become of particular significance. How, exactly, are 
the economic mechanics of the activities explainable? Douglas suggested 
that researchers must examine a given activity from all angles; from the 
legal, the economic, personal pleasures, and so on. He suggested that a 
check against interviews by similarly knowledgeable persons regarding 
the accusations and suggestions be made in the course of the interview. 
This type of interview was carried out as well as suggested earlier. 
The use of friendly trust and the guarantee of privacy were more 
important to most interview subjects than any other single factor in 
their granting of an interview. One newspaper reporter, however, who was 
initially thought to be very important to this study, refused to grant an 
interview because of his position with a major east coast metropolitan 
newspaper. As west coast editor for this newspaper, he felt that his 
contacts in Portland would be jeopardized if he gave an interview, 
although the events in question had taken place more than 25 years ago. 
During the course of the interviews, many difficulties were encoun-
tered, not the least of which was that most lesser known respondents 
p:a:oved unwilling to sign any kind of release form, either before or 
following the interview. While many were willing to discuss what they 
knew, they were very reluctant to put their names to any document 
relating to the case. In most instances these respondents insisted that 
whatever safeguards were provided by the university, either 
traditionally or in a nontraditional context, were inadequate. It was 
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for this reason that interviews were erased from tapes following 
transcription and that no identity was made of such respondents so that 
no check would be possible upon who was giving what information lt some 
later date. The necessity of this in ethical terms was absolute; there 
could not be any possibility of a check back on who was giving what 
information lest there be a betrayal of confidence which might have 
iounediate political or other consequences for the interview subject. 
How does one know when one has gained the complete story? How, in 
short, does one know when to stop interviewing? This problem is 
addressed by Glaser and Strauss (1967): 
The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different 
groups pertinent to a category is the category's 
theoretical saturation. Saturation means that no additional 
data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop 
properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over 
and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident 
that a category is saturated (p. 61). 
This technique was used in deciding when to stop interviewing 
respondents. When repetiton of detailed versions without significant 
new detail occurred throughout five interviews interviewing was stopped. 
Method Summary 
By using a balance of triangulated data, this dissertation avoids an 
error pointed out by Dexter (1970) - reliance on interviews without 
enough relevant background information. Such a reliance totally upon 
hearsay and elite interviews without specific archival or other forms of 
information against the interviews should be avoided (Dexter 1970). 
As stated earlier, there are three basic sources of material for 
this disseration: 
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1. The media - popular cultural sources, newspapers, magazine 
articles and the like. Access to the morgues of the newspapers 
permited an extensive examination of the available popular 
cultural sources. Systematic sweeps of categories on the 
basis of names indicated from other sources, together with 
general category and event-related sweeps of the available 
morgue materials, have been done. The result is the creation 
of two separate and somewhat contradictory sets of facts and 
interpretations. 
2. Public agency documents - court records, land records, the 
attorney general's files in the Oregon State Archives, the 
Senate Hearings of the Select Committee on Improper Activities 
in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Congress (1957). 
3. The accounts, both tape recorded and constructed through 
notes, of individuals whose association with the vice probe at 
the time was one of two types: either as an active participant 
from law enforcement, from the vice area, or from the newspaper 
business; or as a person who knew active participants, a 
secondary source. 
CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY OF THE VICE PROBE 
A brief look at Portland's governmental history is useful in 
understanding the situation that forms the background for vice in the 
city. 
Before 1913, Portland had a ward system and a fifteen-member city 
council, with several boards and commissions exercising often 
unsupervised and overlapping authority, and an executive whose 
responsibilities were unclear (City Club Report May 14, 1961). 
Following a report by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research 
alleging numerous deficiencies in several aspects of city government and 
which was issued at the height of the municipal reform movement, the city 
adopted a new charter by a narrow margin -- 722 votes out of 33, 406 cast. 
Only about 22% of those eligible had voted. The report was contracted 
for by Oregon Journal publisher C.S. Jackson, who had formed a panel of 
leaders to look at city government (MacColl 1978). 
Portland was among 200 cities which adopted the "Galveston Plan" of 
municipal government (City Club Report May 19, 1961). However, the 
commission form fell under heavy attack in the ensuing years and barely 
survived an attempt to change it in 1917. A group of prominent north 
Portland citizens tried to persuade the electorate to adopt a 200-page 
charter revision that would have restored the old eleven-member part-
time council. Six months earlier, another group had proposed a city 
manager form, the Dayton Plan. Both initiative measures were defeated in 
the June 4, 1917 election (MacColl 1978). 
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Having survived attempts to abolish it, the commission form has 
continued with minor changes. The mayor and four-member council are 
elected at large in even years on a nonpartisan ballot for four-year 
staggered terms (City Club Report, May 14, 1961). 
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This council both legislates and administers the city departments. 
The mayor has additional power to assign which bureaus are run by which 
commissioners. 
In the interval since adoption of the commission form, the prestigi-
ous Portland City Club has produced more than 60 reports dealing with 
problems of municipal organization and operation. Citizens numbering in 
the hundreds have served on the Club's standing committees to produce the 
reports, but despite this, no real changes have been effected (City Club 
Report, May 14, 1961). 
Over the years, the reports have charged the city with lack of top 
management organization, lack of planning in city physical patterns and 
controls, lack of fiscal planning and lack of organizational planning 
(City Club Report, May 14, 1961). 
Overview of the Portland Vice Probe of 1956-1958. 
The Portland vice scandal broke in the Oregonian on April 19, 1956. 
The Oregonian story was based on clandestine recordings made by James B. 
Elkins, local underworld figure, which supported his claims of behind-
the-scenes manipulations, payoffs and corruption involving local racket-
eers, the police, political figures at all levels of government and 
Teamsters Union leaders. 
The attempt of the Teamsters Union to move into the Portland vice 
arena, as alleged by Elkins and supported by others, was the central 
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issue presented by the Portland probe. Elkins' veracity or lack thereof 
is the issue around which the two daily papers, the morning Oregonian and 
the evening Oregon Journal, fought a bitter journalistic and extra-
journalistic war. At stake eventually was the credibility not only of 
Elkins, but the new mayor, the district attorney, elements of the state 
government, the justice system and the papers themselves. 
The Oregonian, a Republican paper, took the part of Elkins. The 
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management 
Field (1957) also accepted his version of the vice situation in Portland. 
(Incidentally, the Senate Hearings introduced into the public conscious-
ness a new name--Senate Counsel Robert F. Kennedy.) 
The Journal, on the other hand, saw Elkins as a lying outlaw who was 
trying to protect his own activities and those of certain members of the 
city and state governments, particularly the police department, the 
Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) and quite possibly the mayor's 
office, which they believed were cooperating in allowing Elkins and 
others to operate. 
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field (1957), believing Elkins', attacked the new mayor of 
Portland, Terry Schrunk. In doing so, the U.S. Senate Committee created 
a situation in which the local Portland leadership perceived itself as 
under external attack from outside forces which it saw as far more 
dangerous than any local threat at the time. For local leaders, whether 
of the old Republican organization or the new Democrats, the danger 
reprsented by an alleged Teamsters takeover was ended. 
This historical case study examines the Portland vice probe of the 
mid-1950's from four major perspectives: 
55 
1. The viewpoint of the Oregonian and the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management 
Field (85th Congress 1957) (essentially the perspective of 
James Elkins, that the Teamsters were trying to take over the 
local vice scene); 
2. The viewpoint of then Oregon State Attorney General, Robert Y. 
Thornton, which emphasized the role of both papers in actively 
pressuring for their versions; 
3. The viewpoint of the Oregon Journal and its reporters 
(asserting that Elkins was dishonest and that the vice problem 
was centered around Elkins and his associates); 
4. The perspective of Mayor Terry Schrunk's mentor and advisor, 
Raymond Kell (arguing that the Oregonian's interests brought 
together a number of otherwise unrelated events into what was 
perceived as a particular pattern of corruption and 
conspiracy. Kell saw Elkins not as the Oregonian projected 
him, as a major figure, but as a third-level self-starter). 
Other positions and information are presented to both challenge and 
confirm several aspects of one or more of these perspectives. 
The Second World War and After 1940-1948. 
During the war years Portland underwent an enormous transformation. 
In a city with a reputation a:; being "open," the development of Kaiser 
Shipyards and of other large war plants meant an influx of new labor. 
Upon arrival, labor contractors would direct workers, based on 
their skills, first to the best of the local firms, and then finally to 
the Kaiser Shipyards. For long-term residents there was particular 
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status attendant upon being a worker for one of the permanent local firms 
as opposed to the larger, transient firms like Kaiser. Thus, black 
informants in interviews emphasized that they were employed by local 
firms, whether their positions were as janitors or skilled laborers 
(anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
Prostitution, gambling and drinking boomed. Portland was tolerant, 
a wide open town (Kell-Uris interview 1981; anon.-Uris interview 1979). 
War Housing - an Example of an Informal Control Network. During 
the war, in response to the influx of new workers and their families, 
public housing under the Housing Authority of Portland (H.A.P.) was 
created. While the housing issue is peripheral to this study, it does 
serve to illustrate both the power relations and the informal method of 
their implementation in Portland. 
The Housing Authority included leaders of the Oregon Apartment 
House Association, Chester A. Morris and Herbert J. Dahlke. By 1944 
Chester Morris, Aaron Frank and David Simpson (of Norris, Beggs and 
Simpson, Realtors and property managers) urged that the Vanport public 
housing project be cleared as soon as the war was over (MacColl 1979). 
These new workers, many of whom brought their families as the war 
went on, were unwelcome as long-term residents. They included in their 
numbers blacks as well as whites. In Portland's black community, elites 
were contacted by the white elites. These informal contacts were used to 
maintain both the temporary nature of the new population and to keep it 
racially segregated. 
A black informant described how he and other black community leaders 
were invited by the white elite to a meeting in the board room of the 
First National Bank. There they were allegedly greeted by civic leaders, 
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including E.B. MacNaughton, President of the First National Bank. They 
were told that while housing was being prepared for white workers, it was 
expected that black workers would be placed in the homes of the existing 
black community. They were assured at that time that such black boarders 
would be temporary residents of the comunity and that the purpose of not 
building adequate housing for these workers was to ensure that their 
presence in the community would indeed be temporary. 
The informant, a close relation of a prominent illicit 
entrepreneur, said that he was the only member of the black leadership 
who had been selected to attend the meeting to object to the procedure. 
Resistance within the black comunity was adequate, however, to prompt a 
change in plans which allowed blacks into Vanport, the public housing 
city to Portland's north. 
interview 1980). 
It was segregated however (anon.-Uris 
The gathering in E.B. MacNaughton's board room suggests two things 
of importance to the study of the Portland vice probe: 
1. The close, informal power relationship between the upper-class 
elite and other elites, some of whom operated outside the law; 
and 
2. That there was an interlocking network of elites much like 
Domhoff's (1970) model and Chambliss' (1978) Seattle analysis. 
Thomas Johnson - Tolerated Illegal Entrepreneur. It was through 
the process of the selection by whites of blacks to represent the black 
comunity that Thomas Johnson gained some of his power beginning in the 
1930's. 
Johnson operated numerous speakeasies and was a bootlegger serving 
all classes, whites and blacks, through the 1920' s and 1930' s. Tom 
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Johnson's importance to the black community is legendary. Many Portland 
black persons who remember the war years have heard of Tom Johnson. He 
served interests in both the white and black communities. 
For the white elites, Johnson, through his informants and his power 
within the vice arena in the black community, kept tabs on blacks 
entering and leaving Portland. He could help maintain order within the 
closely knit social community of the black neighborhoods. He was, then, 
a crucial link between the white establishment, ~ts politicians and its 
law enforcement. Whites like James Elkins serverl a similar underworld 
function for the Portland police (black informant interview 1980). 
Tom Johnson, his family and associates served the interests of the 
black coDDDunity by relaying information, requests, dissatisfactions 
within the black community, up through the white law enforcement, politi-
cal and other influential communities. Grievances and economic needs 
could thereby be addressed. A network of communication, exchange and 
complex power relations was thus developed. 
Johnson, as the operator of the Keystone Investment Company, is 
reputed today to have been many times a millionaire. He eventually 
figured as a major partner in the effort to make a profit from the 
location of the E-R Center (the Memorial Coliseum) between the Broadway 
and Steel bridges. 
As mentioned in an earlier section, Johnson's usefulness can be 
understood in terms of latent and manifest functions (Merton 1949). 
While Johnson was never an elected or appointed official, and while he 
was never a "boss" in the sense of men like Tweed, he nevertheless served 
many of the functions of a "boss" within the black community of Portland. 
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The 1948 Reform Movement 
Earl Riley was Mayor of Portland from 1941 to 1949 and, under 
Portland's Mayor/Council system, controlled the police department. His 
chiefs were Harry Niles and Lee V. Jenkins. 
By 1947, following the murder of a ship's captain, Frank B. Tatum, 
who was last seen alive in a local vice spot, there were persistent 
rumors of police corruption. Consequently, an investigative report was 
prepared by August Vollmer, then retired Chief of Police of Berkeley, 
California. 
In his report, Vollmer suggested that "the Portland Police 
Department was over-costly, under-protective, poorly organized, 
inadequately supervised and underpaid" (MacColl 1979). Vollmer pointed 
out that the Portland crime rate had risen steadily for the preceeding 
ten years. He emphasized that there was lack of professionalism and low 
salaries. He reco11D11ended that foot patrols be expanded and policemen be 
better paid. 
The Portland vice situation did not become an important public issue 
until early in 1948 when the Portland City Club, a civic organization 
noted for its responsible examinations of city problems and suggestions 
for city operations, published a report extremely critical of Mayor 
Riley's police force and of Mayor Riley himself. 
The City Club report followed by approximately one year the murder 
of Tatum. The Vollmer Report and the City Club reports, both in part 
responses to this death, changed public attitudes toward the police and 
the mayoral race in Portland in 1948. 
The City Club report suggested eight major problems or findings: 
1. Syndicates controlled gambling completely and were 
exacting tribute from gamblers -- slot machine owners 
paid $50 a month per machine, dice table owners were 
paying $50, and so on. 
2. Mayor Earl Riley had failed to assume direction of the 
police department in his duties, he failed to consider 
the police department's importance in the scheme of city 
government, and he was inadequate in his supervision. 
3. Payoffs had placed police authorities under obligation to 
criminal elements and police immunity had led to many 
opportunities for criminal activity to flourish. 
Personnel had been shifted in the police department to 
make it easier for gamblers, bootleggers and pimps to 
operate. 
4. Portland had become a dumping ground for dope, bootleg 
activities, prostitution and the like. 
5. State and local officials were actively participating in 
and protecting horse and dog gambling and the state 
liquor monopoly. 
6. During the period from 1943 to 1945, one group controlled 
all gambling, bootlegging and prostitution in the city, 
and in fact, its position was taided and abetted and 
defended by the police department; illegal and legal 
confiscations of equipment of opposition operators were 
routine during those years. 
7. The police department sent out orders as to when vice 
establishments could operate, when they should be closed. 
Beat patrolmen exacted their own small payoffs, ranging 
from $10 to $50 a month from those operations. 
8. When the police did raid syndicate joints, such raids 
were a farce. The proprietors were informed ahead of 
time, equipment was moved out and the only persons 
arrested where bums off the street. (City Club Bulletin 
February 20 1948). 
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In response to the City Club's accusations, Mayor Riley suggested 
that City Club members and their investigators (including by implication 
the reports investigator and later city council member, Stanley Earl) 
were in league with the gamblers controlling the city government (Oregon-
ian, February 16, 1948). 
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The City Club Bulletin (February 20, 1948) alleged that major city 
figures were supportive of the gambling interests. Portland's leading 
citizens were quite tolerant of vice activity to their own profit. For 
example, Norris, Beggs and Simpson, was headed by one of Mayor Riley's 
confidants, David B. Simpson. Organized vice provided high p~ofits to 
operators, property owners and their managers. Norris, Beggs and Simpson 
were among many to profit economically by such activities (MacColl 1979). 
The police themselves received approximately $60 ,000 a month in 
protection payments according to the Oregon Journal (February 15, 1948). 
Portland had the honor of having the second highest incidence of venereal 
disease in the nation at the time (Gunther 1947). 
Press coverage of these problems was never lacking. The City Club 
pointed out in its report that 95 major press releases over a span of 12 
years referred to some aspect of the problem (City Club Bulletin Febru-
ary 20, 1948). 
Despite the Vollmer and City Club reports, when finally a crusading 
mayoral candidate was found, she was not supported by many in the 
business coDB11unity. Dorothy McCullough Lee had served previously on the 
city council, and had a spotless reputation, a stern demeanor and rather 
Puritan morals. 
Earl Riley's campaign support came from many prominent Portland 
businessmen and bankers. Among those supporting Riley were: the presi-
dent of the Portland Chamber of Commerce, Hillman Lueddmann; former 
Chamber presidents Chester Morris, David B. Simpson, Arthur L. Field and 
Sid Woodbury; president of the U.S. National Bank, E.C. Sammons; 
president of the Benjamin Franklin Savings & Loan, Ben Hazen; Iron 
Fireman executive T. Harry Banfield (for whom a freeway would later be 
62 
named); architect Glen Stanton; retailers Aaron Frank and Fred Meyer; and 
contractor L.H. Hoffman (MacColl 1979). 
These Portland civic leaders were all involved in one way or another 
in property management, and they all :!pparently stood to lose as a 
consequence of negative publicity about vice, and perhaps to gain in real 
estate involvements with the very lucrative vice operations (MacColl 
1979). 
Mayoral candidate Dorothy McCullough Lee was a wild card thrown into 
the city's political game. Her announced intention during her 1948 
campaign was to shake up the organization of city government and to make 
major reforms, to name names and to change the nature of the 
relationships that had been long developing between the licit and illicit 
business co11HDunities. The business community's response to this--public 
support for Riley, her opponent--was not unexpected. 
When Lee assumed of £ice in 1949, she was harrassed continually. Her 
personal appearance was vilified in the press; she was mocked, partially 
because she was female, but also because of her position on vice. She 
was called "No Sin Lee" and "Airwick Lee." She had to send her children 
away to boarding schools in Canada to protect them from what she 
considered to be very real threats against their lives (Lee-Uris 
interview 1980; MacColl 1979). 
Conventional sources (Maccoll 1979) show that Lee did clean up the 
police department. She appointed a new chief of police, Charles Pray, a 
professional policeman and retired state police executive. She brought 
into active involvement in police affairs a professional staff including 
Donald MacNamara, later chief under Mayor Terry Schrunk. She raised the 
salaries of policemen. She ordered the padlocking of various vice 
operations throughout the city. 
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Many, including MacColl (1979), suggest that the consequence of 
this effort was a cleanup of Portland vice. Two informants (Kaplan-Uris 
interview 1989; Lambert-Uris interview 1979) suggested that Lee rid the 
city of vice to a great extent. Other informants indicate that this was 
not quite the case. Only visible vice disappeared. Some houses of 
prostitution, gambling joints and after-hours liquor places closed for 
long periods of time. Some operators moved outside the City of Portland 
into the county. Vice activities continued either outside the county or 
in parts of the city less exposed, such as north Portland. Vice activi-
ties in the black community were not severely reduced by her actions 
(anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
A black informant who in those days operated an unlicensed nightclub 
for black patrons only, said that the legitimate establishment had a 
cooperative, economically beneficial understanding with vice operators. 
This understanding allowed not only mutual profit, but cooperation in the 
election of city officials. Elected officials, he related, were often 
chosen by the vice people with the approval of the legitimate business 
community (anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
In the interview, this informant said Lee's mayoralty was a reform 
that changed the visible aspects of the vice situation but did nothing to 
change the essential reality of power in Portland. He said there was a 
cooperating syndicate dominating vice as suggested by the City Club 
Report of 1948. Among those involved, he said, were Al Winter, Stan 
Terry, James Elkins and Tom Johnson. This was further substantiated in 
the author's interviews with former District Attorney William Langley 
(Langley-Uris interview 1980) and others. 
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This alleged syndicate also included Milt Hyatt who became involved 
by the start of World War II. Police Chief of Detectives Jack Keegan and 
his assistant, Tip Schulpus, allegedly represented the police depart-
ment. Fred and Jim Elkins were at this time involved only with prostitu-
tion (anon.-Uris interview 1979; Lee-Uris telephone interview 1980). 
Allegedly, Winter, Hyatt and Barney Morris later moved on to Las 
Vegas and Sam Rubin took over operation of the Pago Pago Club, previously 
run by Winter, where book was made on sporting events and a racing wire 
was set up. Fred Elkins handled prostitution. When Fred Elkins joined 
the group in Nevada, his brother Jim took over the Turf Club for him and 
tightened control, using the police department and others as his 
enforcers (anon. -Uris interview 1979; Lee-Uris interview 1980; anon. 
records of the Attorney General, Oregon State Archives accession number 
61-67). Elkins also forced slot and pinball operators to give him a cut. 
Tom Johnson and Swede Ferguson were said to have specific ties with 
certain ethnic communities. Together, all these men allegedly operated a 
well-ordered empire with the cooperation and mutual benefit of the 
police, real estate management firms, banking and legitimate businesses. 
A well-ordered and gentlemanly operation. 
One consequence of Dorothy Lee's mayorship (1949-1951) was a 
collapse of some of the old arrangements. She installed Donald MacNamara 
as police chief after a short time. The police department allegedly 
broke into three rival factions under Jim Purcell, Captain Carl Shoemaker 
and Captain Bill Brown. Brown's protection was extended to Ide (Pasha) 
Hasson, who opened a gambling spot on Broadway and Salmon known as 
Pasha's. Sources alleged that further protection came from Judge Eugene 
Oppenheimer and Charlie Raymond of the district attorney's office 
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(anonymous report, Attorney General's files, Oregon State Archives, 
accession number 61-67; Lee-Uris telephone interview 1980; anon.-Uris 
interview 1979). 
To what degree was there really a syndicate? Various sources, 
including informants in the black connnunity and material in the Attorney 
General's Vice Investigation files in the Oregon State Archives, 
indicate that from some time in the mid-1930's well into the 1950's, a 
syndicate or cooperative coordination of vice activity existed in 
Portland. These sources insisted that the main syndicate survived 
through the regimes of Mayors Carson, Riley, Lee, Peterson and Schrunk. 
It must be emphasized that by their very nature these sources cannot be 
considered adequate proof of the existence of a vice syndicate. However, 
the consistency of these stories and their repeated appearance make them 
worth noting. In no sense, then, is an assertion being made that such a 
syndicate did exist or that those named as part of the alleged syndicate 
in the interviews and archival materials were in fact involved in 
wrongful acts. 
The notion of a single syndicate's operation and its cozy 
involvement with Portland took root strongly in the public consciousness 
of Oregonians at this time, however. This concept of a single syndicate 
operating in collusion with police and others would become a significant 
factor in the vice probe of the late 1950' s. 
This dissertation also cannot assert with any accuracy that there 
was a formalized division of the city of Portland in terms of vice 
activity. What is known is that vice activity tended to be segregated by 
race. Specific ethnic communities seemed to have certain individuals who 
were both leaders of their communities in the proper sense, and also 
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leaders of the vice couununity. The card games, horse parlors, etc., were 
often used by important members of the general business community. These 
people knew each other socially and were political contributors and 
supporters of specifical political candidates (anon. -Uris interviews 
1979 and 1980). 
Dorothy Lee's cleanup efforts changed Portland's reputation and 
altered its self-image. Rather than a vice-ridden city, Portland pre-
sented a closed, more conservative front. John Gunther's (1947) negative 
labeling of Portland may have been a significant factor in giving the 
city a black eye and causing it to begin to pay attention to its vice 
problems. Negative national publicity also played a major role in the 
1956 probe as will be shown later. 
Other events of interest taking place during the reforms of Mayor 
Lee included the opening of the first legally allowed black club with the 
tacit and/or direct approval of both the syndicate and the legitimate 
business community. All previous clubs for black people were illegal, 
and thus could be closed and easily controlled without due process by the 
authorities (anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
Lee failed to gain the support of the dominant real estate, retail 
and business interests. She had a poor press image. Not a popular 
mayor, she failed her reelection attempt in 1952, losing to Fred Peter-
son, a druggist and city councilman. 
Vice Survives. 
In the years after Lee's cleanup efforts, the visible involvement of 
the so-called overseeing vice figures named in the 1948 report decreased 
but did not disappear. In 1955, according to informants' reports to the 
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Attorney General (Oregon State Archives), a number of whorehouses, horse 
parlors and bootleg joints were opened (Oregonian, August 3, 1953). 
There was prostitution through call houses in which, as 
distinguished from bawdy houses, the women are contacted first by phone 
and make specific dates with clients. Bawdy houses are locations where a 
client makes contact with a prostitute without any prior arrangement or 
references. The significance of references in the call house operation 
is that it tends to keep the neighborhood location quiet and the 
operation orderly. 
Gambling took place in clubs like Duncan's and the Desert Room, in 
upper-class clubs and outside Multnomah County in places like the 
Fireside in Clackamas County. In addition, Tom Johnson operated a number 
of after-hours joints and gambling dens in the so-called "colored" 
section of the city, in areas which are now the Memorial Coliseum and 
Albina. Other gamblers, horse parlor operators and after-hours liquor 
dealers were bankrolled. Their operations existed sporadically 
throughout the town, particularly in the older parts of downtown close to 
the river, in north Portland and in southeast Portland. Men like Swede 
Ferguson, James Elkins and others maintained operations which would 
periodically be closed, usually with prior warnings from the police 
department. They would then reopen a short time later, either in the 
same location or another. 
Abatements (padlocking) were rare. As shall be detailed later in 
this study, there is indication that the Portland Police Department had 
within its ranks patrolmen and connnand-level officers who tolerated, 
cooperated with and were financially rewarded by vice operators in the 
city. Such cooperation was rationalized in terms of the control of crime 
and criminals offered by such tolerance. 
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More important perhaps, were large slot machine operations and 
bigger still, of pinball machines by men like Stan Terry, Lou Dunis, the 
Nemer brothers, James Elkins and others. Coin machines were the largest 
source of gambling revenue in Portland (Reiter-Uris interview 1980; U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). These groups eventually united as the 
Coin Machine Men of Oregon, a group of 23 operators. Still later, they 
brought in the Teamsters Union in a Teamsters organizing drive which was 
to become a major subject of the vice controversy. The Coin Men 
attempted, through various means, to legitimize and maintain their 
businesses in the face of growing political opposition within city 
government. It is within the context of attempts to keep pinball opera-
tions legal that much of the vice probe took place. 
The following is a list of the principals in the Portland vice probe 
of 1954-1958. It will aid the reader to follow the events presented in 
the rest of this chapter. 
Altschuler, Morrie; bookmaker brought to Portland by Joseph 
McLaughlin. 
Amundson, Lowell; policeman allegedly witnessed 8212 Club 
bribe. 
Archer, Bob; operator of the Rialto Billiard Parlor. 
Baker, Doug; reporter, Oregon Journal. 
Beckman, Les; Portland pinball operator. 
Bennett, Clifford 0. (Jimmy); Portland bootlegger. 
Brewster, Frank W.,; president of the Western Conference of 
Teamsters, Seattle. 
Clark, Raymond F.; Elkins' employee who tape recorded the King 
Towers conspiracy. 
Colacurcio, Frank; Seattle restaurant operator. Maloney fled 
to his home. 
Crisp, Lt. Carl; Portland police officer. 
Crosby, Clyde C.; international organizer for the Teamsters in 
Oregon, member of Portland's Exposition-Receration 
Commission. 
Crouch, Neill; operator of the Mount Hood Cafe, Portland. 
DeGraw, Clyde; operator of the Dekwn Tavern, Portland. 
Dunis, Lou; Portland pinball and vending machine operator. 
Earl, Stanley; Portland city commissioner, accused of ties 
with Elkins, major author of City Club Report on Vice 
1948. 
Elkins, Fred; brother and occasional business partner of 
James B. Elkins. 
Elkins, James B.; financier of illegal gambling, bootlegging 
and prostitution operations, Portland. 
Ferguson, Harvey (Swede); Portland bootlegger. 
Goldbaum, Hy; gambler and friend of Frank Brewster. 
Gurdane, Vayne; family friend of William Langley and command-
level officer Oregon State Police. 
Hanzen, Henry; Portland and Salem attorney and early supporter 
of Langley for district attorney. 
Hardy, Helen; Portland bawdy house madam. 
Hildreth, Lloyd; secretary, Portland Local 223, Teamsters 
Union. 
Howlett, Oscar; assistant Multnomah County District Attorney. 
Jenkins, James Q.; employee of James Elkins. 
Johnson, Thomas; leader of the Portland black district 
underworld. 
Kane, Bernie; employee of James Elkins. 
Kaplan, Arthur; presented evidence to grand jury from attorney 
general's staff. 
Kell, Raymond; attorney, major supporter of Terry Schrunk. 
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Kelley, John W. (Bill); Portland real estate dealer. 
Lambert, William; reporter, the Oregonian. 
Langley, William M.; district attorney, Multnomah County. 
Malloy, Frank; business agent, Portland Local 223, Teamsters 
Union. 
Maloney, Thomas Emmett; Seattle gambler, associate of the 
Teamsters leadership. 
McLaughlin, Joseph Patrick (alias McKinley); Seattle gambler, 
alleged associate of Teamsters leadership. 
Mccourt, John B.; District attorney defeated by William 
Langley. 
Minielly, George; led sheriff's raid on Ray Clark home. 
Nemer, Norman; Portland punchboard operator. 
O'Donnell, John J.; Multnomah County auditor and Teamster-
backed candidate against Earl for city commissioner. 
Peterson, Fred L.; former Portland mayor. 
Plotkin, Leo; bootlegger and associate of Thomas Maloney. 
"The Spy" for Langley. 
Plummer, Herman; Portland real estate dealer. 
Purcell, Bard; Portland police lieutenant, brother of the ex-
chief. 
Purcell, Jim, Jr.; Portland police chief under Mayor Fred 
Peterson. 
Schrunk, Terry; Ex-sheriff and mayor of Portland who defeated 
Peterson. 
Sellinas, Sam; Seattle associate of Teamsters. 
Sloniger, C.R.; Portland attorney. 
Smalley, Helen; Portland bawdy house madam. 
Sutter, Richard; policeman, allegedly witnessed 8212 Club 
bribe. 
Sweeney, John J.; Crosby's predecessor in Oregon and later 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Western Conference of 
Teamsters. 
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Terry, Stanley G. ; Portland pinball operator. 
Thompson, Ann; bawdy house madam, Seattle and Tacoma. 
Thornton, Robert Y. ; Oregon's attorney general. 
Tiedemann, Merlin; policeman, allegedly witnessed 8212 Club 
bribe. 
Turner, Wallace; reporter, the Oregonian. 
Walters, Herman; business associate of Budge Wright. 
Williams, Brad; reporter, Oregon Journal. 
Winter, Alfred; alleged syndicate figure. 
Wright, Veral P. (Budge); Portland pinball operator. 
Wyckoff, Ralph; presented evidence to grand jury, attorney 
general's office. 
Zusman, Nate; operator of Desert Room, Portland nightclub. 
The Exposition-Recreation Center Deal - 1954-1956. 
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The first event allegedly linking Teamster officials and James B. 
Elkins begins with the passage of an $8 million bond measure on May 21, 
1954, calling for the building of an Exposition and Recreation Center, 
today known as the Memorial Coliseum. 
The location of the center was unspecified. The bond measure called 
for an Exposition and Recreation (E-R) Commission which was to design, 
locate and operate this facility. Appointments were made to the 
Commission on June 15, 1954, by Mayor Fred Peterson. On July 3, 1954, 
its first meeting took place. The chairman was James Polhemus and the 
commissioners were Carvel Linden, James Richardson, John Carson and 
Clyde Crosby. Crosby was appointed to the Commission as labor's repre-
sentative. All the others represented various aspects of large and small 
business interests, real estate and banking within Portland. 
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Clyde Crosby, as the International Organizer for the state, was the 
highest ranking Teamster in Oregon. The various Teamster Union locals in 
Oregon were then under the control of the International through a 
trusteeship and could not elect their own officers. 
When Clyde Crosby was appointed to the Exposition-Recreation 
Commission, an opportunity for personal financial gain on the part of any 
member of that Commission existed. In later testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management 
Field (1957) and in the Oregonian (April 20, 1956), it would be alleged 
that Crosby, through special knowledge, was able to aid his cohorts, Tom 
Maloney and Joseph McLaughlin, together with James Elkins and Tom 
Johnson, in a scheme to make money through the purchase of land options 
on the site that Crosby would help select. Crosby would later deny these 
allegations and be exonerated in court. 
According to the U.S. Senate Comittee Hearings (1957), there were 41 
options purchased through Thomas Johnson with the involvement of Joseph 
McLaughlin, one of the owners of the Battersby and Smith Cardrooms in 
Seattle, and a close associate of Thomas Maloney and various members of 
the Teamsters Union leadership, particularly Frank Brewster. According 
to the minutes of an Exposition and Recreation Commission meeting on 
October 5, 1955, Commissioner Crosby proposed that the Steel-Broadway 
Bridge site be chosen for the Exposition-Recreation Center. 
Yet his justification of the location of the central site on the 
east side made sense. Crosby pointed out that the Stanford Research 
Institute in studies specifically commissioned by the Commission had 
recommended no downtown site for the E-R Center. Crosby indicated that 
for months he had been trying to convince the E-R Commission that the 
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Broadway-Steel Bridge site was the best and most desirable site for the 
Memorial Coliseum (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957. Note: The U.S. 
Senate Select Comittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management 
Field 1957 will hereafter be abbreviated to U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
In the U.S. Senate Comittee Hearings (1957) an affidavit described 
how, in the last part of January or the first part of February 1955, 
James Elkins asked realtor John William Kelley to examine some houses on 
which he was considering options. These were located in the Williams 
Avenue area near the Broadway and Steel Bridges (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). According to Kelley, by March of 1955, Elkins, Kelley 
and Tom Johnson of the Keystone Investment Company, had gathered with 
Herman Plummer, a black real tor, to examine property options being 
purchased in the Williams Avenue area. 
Elkins told Kelley that he had an "in." By June of 1955 Elkins and 
Joe McLuaghlin, a Seattle gambler, had met in Kelley's office to draw up 
a contract on the assignment of certain options to be purchased in the 
Steel-Broadway Bridge area. 
During the conversations between McLaughlin and Elkins, according 
to Kelley, Clyde Crosby's name was mentioned on six occasions. McLaugh-
lin, in the presence of Kelley, supposedly called a man named Crosby and 
made reference to Clyde in the phone conversation. On the basis of this 
evidence given to the U.S. Senate Committee investigators and read into 
the minutes of the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, there is indication 
that Crosby was at least conversant with the plan of these men to make 
money on the E-R Center location (U.S. Senate Colllllittee Hearings, 1957). 
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It is interesting to note that as Crosby fought what he thought was 
a losing battle to locate the E-R Center at the Broadway-Steel Bridge 
site, the options were one by one sold off. The only man to eventually 
make a profit from the options was Tom Johnson, the original black 
partner and long-time land owner in the particular area involved. 
Later evidence presented to the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
(1957) indicated that the initial attempt to organize a profit-making 
venture around options and advance knowledge concerning the location of 
the E-R Center was not well received by the various partners involved. 
The plan, which apparently was initiated independently of the Teamsters 
leadership, did not materialize until Frank Brewster discovered it and 
decided to go ahead in supporting it (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, 
1957). 
The final decision on an east side versus west side location for the 
E-R Center involved a voter advisory election in the May 1956 primary, 
the same election that saw pinball outlawed. The west side site lost. 
At the time that the site selection issue was before both the public and 
the Commission, a large retail and business center was being planned on 
the east side close by the eventual location of the E-R Center. This 
complex, the Lloyd Center, involved large property holdings on the edges 
of what was known as Sullivan's Gulch, reaching all the way down to Union 
Avenue, close by the river, and nearly to the E-R site selected. The 
Broadway-Steel Bridge site now holds the Memorial Coliseum. 
Whatever Crosby's interests may have been in the selection of an E-R 
site at that location, there is ample evidence that others, not parti-
cularly associated with the Teamsters Union, ranging from Tom Johnson to 
the enormously powerful Lloyd croporation, had particular interests in 
creating a center at that location. 
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James Elkins - the Man Who Talked 
As will be shown later, much of what we know about the alleged 
conspiracies connected with this vice probe came from a source of not 
particularly good reputation. The man who began the exposes was James B. 
Elkins. Elkins, an admitted vice figure, was a convicted felon who had 
shot it out with the police in Arizona. In addition, he had been 
convicted of a narcotics charge. Elkins used wiretaps and hidden tape 
recorders to gain support for his allegations, allegations which were 
later challenged. Many suggestions were made that Elkins had manipulated 
tapes and wire recordings for use as blackmail devices against District 
Attorney William Langley. Elkins, moreover, had much to gain by convin-
cing the public that he was a much-maligned and harmed individual facing 
overwhelming odds in his fight against an attempted takeover by outside 
gangster elements, with ties to the Teamsters Union. 
Elkins' stor1 was accepted by the Oregonian in a series of well-
documented and exciting articles beginning in April, 1956, by William 
Lambert and Wallace Turner. These two would go on to win a Pulitzer 
Prize for this vice expose. Their version of the vice problem in 
Portland would become the nationally accepted version when it was retold 
at the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings (1957). 
In retrospect it may seem strange that the Oregonian and later the 
U.S. Senate Committee (1957) would accept with so little critical 
investigation the word of a man of Elkins' reputation. Yet this 
acceptance makes sense in terms of the interests of both. In terms of 
local Republican interests, it can be seen as a response to the rise of 
the Democratic party in Portland. This switch must have been perceived 
as a threat by the Republican Oregonian in its desire for a continued 
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place in the hegemony of its traditional interests which included a 
traditional anti-union bias. The Senate investigation, like the 
Oregonian, had a vested interest in lessening the power potential of 
organized labor. 
It may be in this context that the Oregonian saw the rise of William 
Langley and Terry Schrunk as inherently sinister. Fred Peterson, the man 
who lost the mayoralty to Terry Schrunk in a nominally nonpartisan race, 
was a Republican and was supported by the Oregonian. In contrast, the 
Oregon Journal, an independent Democratic paper, would make a determined 
case that the Oregonian was ignoring real corruption and collusion 
between James Elkins and members of the Portland Police Department, 
including Chief of Police James Purcell and Mayor Fred Peterson. The 
Journal took a position critical of the way in which Lambert and Turner 
proceeded in their investigation. They believed Elkins to be a liar. 
It is doubtful there shall ever be a clear and definitive statement 
of who was telling the truth and who was lying. There are no doubt 
elements of truth and falsehood in all parties' accounts. Each and every 
witness, both in the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings (1957) and in the 
reporting of the Oregonian and the Journal, had much to gain by a 
convincing presentation of his own version of the vice situation in 
Portland. 
Two Papers, Two Views 
Some background on the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal will shed 
some light on the reasons for their divergent views. Both were old 
family-owned newspapers. Ironically, E.B. MacNaughton, the same man who 
took such an active role in guiding the life of the black community 
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during the war years and who was president of the First National Bank by 
1942, was publisher of the Oregonian. In 1949-1950 he authorized the 
sale of the Oregonian Publishing Company (MacColl 1979) to the Newhouse 
newspaper chain. By 1956 the Oregonian' s financial and political ties to 
the local political structure were weaker than those of the Journal. 
The Journal was locally owned as an independent paper in the control 
of the Jacksons, an old-line Portland family. It was far more centered 
in local politics and interests. The Journal stayed in local hands 
through the 19SO's, when it too went to the Newhouse chain after an ugly 
strike in which labor was defeated at both papers. 
The Oregonian, Republican slanted, though editorially independent 
of its owners in New York, nevertheless had both the advantage and the 
disadvantage of having its financial base and control resting in the 
hands of parties a continent away. 
The two daily papers, as independent and highly competitive enter-
prises, not only took differing positions on the vice situation, their 
reporters became bitter opponents. In an interview 23 years later, 
William Lambert, ex-Oregonian reporter, now with the Philadelphia En-
quirer, had this to say about the papers' rivalry: 
..• the Journal deliberately set out to destory the story. Now, 
how do I know this? I can tell you some of the things they did. 
I know, for example they went to the extent of printing up a 
broadsheet with some of these inflammatory editorials about 
"Big Jim Elkins, the vice king and the narcotics user" and how 
he was trying to destroy all these decent, honorable people. 
They instructed their carriers to put that in every Oregonian 
box. Now, we've got affidavits. We had an enormous amount of 
material to support this •.. Our circulation people got this 
information. They interviewed Journal carriers who were told 
what to do with these damn broadsheets. 
They deliberately, they distorted stories like I've never seen 
since in a daily newspaper .•• They just set out to do a hatchet 
job, and the only way you could ever really understand this is 
through a thorough analysis of what was done in both papers 
item by item. Then you can see the pattern. It is so clear 
that it's shocking. Lambert-Unis interview, 1979). 
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There is little question that the intense and unpleasant rivalry 
between the two papers served to bring much more information to the 
public. Today, because both papers share the same ownership, the wildly 
divergent views and bitter rivalry probably could not happen. 
Robert Y. Thornton, at the time of the vice probe an up and coming 
State Attorney General, had a different view of the role of both papers 
in the probe. Thornton emphasized that the police must have known long 
before the story broke that there was a busy vice scene in Portland. But 
it was the publication of the story that forced action on the part of the 
authorities (Thornton-Uris interview, 1980). 
Thornton indicated he was pressured and dismayed by both papers' 
conduct: 
One of the fascinating aspects of the whole thing was the 
bitter, spiteful duel between the two newspapers. I think 
that's a very discreditable chapter in the history of Oregon 
journalism. 
The first thing that the Journal did was just deliberately set 
out to wreck the Oregonian's expose. They just conducted a 
torpedo attack on everything that the Oregonian was claiming. 
Their reporters came into the grand jury room and interviewed 
grand jurors. They had no right to be in there at all, but the 
court didn't do anything about it. I thought that was 
outrageous • 
. . • I think for the first two or three days they didn't say 
anything after the expose started; then they started this 
business of doing everything they could to combat the 
Oregonian's expose. The unfortunate part of it was that it 
just impeded the investigation something terrific • 
• . • and then the Oregonian tried to pressure me. Well, 
after ••. the first time the Terry Schrunk matter was put before 
the grand jury I put it before, and they complained that 
Schrunk wasn't indicted, and so I let Bob Davis present it this 
(second) time to the grand jury, and the grand jury did not 
indict, and then they again tried to pressure me into putting 
it before them the third time, and I wouldn't do it, and they 
sent the word down that if I didn't, there was going to be a 
real hatchet job on me, and they did it (Thornton-Uris 
interview, 1980). 
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Eventually, as will be detailed later, the grand jury did indict 
Schrunk. It is hard not to see traditional political party rivalries and 
loyalties as a part of the above-mentioned pressure. Schrunk and 
Thornton were Democrats. The Oregonian and the man they supported for 
mayor in 1956, Fred Peterson, were Republican. 
Doug Baker, of the Journal, in reflecting upon the journalistic 
ethics of the time, substantiates William Lambert's characterization of 
Journal reporter, Brad Williams, as a cynical character like Hildy 
Johnson out of the play The Front Page (Lambert-Uris interview, 1979; 
Baker-Uris interview, 1980). 
The Teamsters Move In 
In 1954, according to an April 22, 1956 Oregonian article by Turner 
and Lambert, the Teamsters leadership had decided to organize and 
dominate the pinball business. According to this article the refusal of 
City Councilman Stanley Earl to support pinball operations in Portland 
made Earl an enemy of Clyde Crosby. In a Central Labor Council meeting 
over political endorsements during the week of April 15, 1956, SO members 
of the Teamsters Union allegedly packed the meeting and forced a 70 to 62 
majority vote favoring the endorsement of John J. O'Donnell for the 
council seat then held by Stanley Earl. Earl was a long-time labor 
movement figure, an officer of the International Woodworkers of America, 
and active in the CIO--a candidate who would have gained labor support 
had the Teamsters not intervened in the decision-making process (Oregon-
ian, April 22, 1956). 
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According to the Oregonian article, the Teamsters Union in Seattle 
had developed a specific technique to bring pinball within the control of 
the labor union, a technique labeled by the Oregonian as "The Seattle 
Plan." It involved creating first an organization of coin machine men 
including all pinball, jukebox and slot machine operators. This single 
organization would then be more amenable to Teamsters control. All 
employees of the Coin Machine Men would be coerced into joining the 
Teamsters Union. The Union could then use their control over the Coin 
Machine Men for a number of political and economic purposes. It would 
become possible, for example, to boycott taverns doing business with beer 
and liquor companies that were engaged in labor struggles with the 
Teamsters. This is but one example of how such power would be useful. 
The implication was made that monies would change hands in the course of 
organizating the Coin Machine Men. 
The Oregonian (April 22, 1956) pointed out a specific example of 
this process. It alleged that on September 1, 1955, the Dekum Tavern on 
Union Avenue took delivery of a coin-operated shuffleboard from a Seattle 
firm, the American Shuffleboard Sales Company. At the same time, the 
owner of the Dekum Tavern directed William Goebel, a member of the Coin 
Machine Men of Oregon, to remove Goebel's machine. Shortly after that, 
the jukebox in the establishment, owned by a different member of the 
Oregon Coin Machine Men, was removed from the tavern. The tavern was now 
without a jukebox. It was unable to receive deliveries of food and beer 
because of Teamster picketing. The Dekum Tavern owner was told not to do 
business with Stan Terry, then on the outs with the Teamsters over his 
effort to keep his employees out of the Union. 
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The tavern case came before a U.S. District Court judge and a 
temporary injunction was issued on November 1, 1955. 
Accusations in other law suits, according to the article, suggested 
that coin machine control led to coercion through picketing and was 
coDDDonplace in the Seattle area although new to Oregon. Membership in 
the Coin Machine Men of Oregon eventually meant membership in the 
Teamsters Union. With the creation of the Coin Machine Men of Oregon 
came formal Teamster manipulation, discipline and cooperation. 
Territories could be formally divided up and profits in restraint of 
trade could develop. If discipline was not followed, a member could be 
expelled, not only from the Coin Machine Men, but from the Teamsters 
Union as well. 
In an Oregonian front page article on April 23, 1956, Turner and 
Lambert stated that Paul Patterson, Republican governor of Oregon, was 
helped by the Teamsters in his 1954 campaign. They stated that Patterson 
was under continual pressure from the Teamsters. In 1954 the Teamsters, 
through the intervention of Thomas Maloney (who, through various 
records, is tied to Frank Brewster, Clyde Crosby, John Sweeney and other 
officials of the Teamsters Union), turned Democrat William Langley's 
campaign for District Attorney from one in which he was virtually certain 
of defeat at the hands of incumbent Republican John B. Mccourt. Through 
contact with laboring people and massive influxes of money and skills, 
Langley was elected District Attorney of Multnomah County in 1954. 
The Oregonian pointed out that Mccourt was supported by the 
Teamsters in two prior elections, but then abruptly not supported when 
Langley's campaign was developed around the efforts of Thomas Maloney. 
When Portland Teamsters head Clyde Crosby visited Mayor Fred Peterson and 
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Peterson refused to fire Jim Purcell as Chief of Police, the Teamsters 
Union, in the person of Crosby, warned Peterson that he would be losing 
their support and then moved to support the opposition candidate, Multno-
mah County Sheriff Terry D. Schrunk, for mayor (Oregonian, April 22, 
1956). 
According to the April 23, 1956 Oregonian article, Fred and James 
Elkins, both involved in racket operations and well known as bankrollers 
for after-hours joints in Portland, entered Langley's campaign and 
agreed to pay printing bills as part of a deal involving Clyde Crosby and 
the Teamsters Union. According to Crosby, as cited in the article on 
April 23, Elkins went to the Teamsters building to ask Crosby to give the 
Union support to Langley. Elkins said that the Langley effort was 
supported by Tom Maloney, and finally Clyde Crosby made the decision to 
bring the support of the Teamsters Union in Oregon behind William 
Langley. This was after Maloney had called John Sweeney, secretary-
treasurer of the Western Conference of Teamsters in Seattle. 
The article alleged that $5,000 from Union sources went to Langley's 
campaign. Jim Landye, a reputable attorney who represented the Teamsters 
Union, had heard rumors from Mccourt that Teamster leaders were 
supporting Langley because the Union was going into the rackets. Landye 
doubted these rumors, according to the Oregonian story, and went to the 
Teamsters hall to find out. Landye told McCourt, the article continued, 
that he was right. Landye did not resign from Mccourt' s re-election 
committee, but refused to take an active role in the campaign since he 
had a conflict of interest. 
The April 23 Oregonian stated that Mccourt was informed that part of 
the reason for the Union's opposition to him was his support and 
83 
friendship with Stan Terry, then on the outs with the Teamsters Union. 
Later Terry would reconcile his differences with the Union and become a 
leader of the Coin Machine Men of Oregon. The Oregonian further stated 
that as the date of the election neared, U.S. Senator Warren G. Magnuson 
of Washington came to Portland and made a radio speech supporting 
Langley. Magnuson came to be identified as an associate both of 
Teamsters Union leadership generally, and one of the most notorious 
leaders of that Union, Dave Beck, (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, 1957). 
According to the April 23 Oregonian article, Thomas F. Maloney came 
to Portland to gain a foothold in Portland political and vice operations. 
Maloney was brought to Portland by James Elkins to help direct Langley's 
campaign. Maloney had frequent contacts with Langley, successful candi-
date for District Attorney, James Elkins, Clyde Crosby, John Sweeney and 
Joe McLaughlin of the Battersby and Smith Cardroom and Saloon in Seattle. 
Langley and Elkins were partners in the late 1940's in a restaurant 
known as the China Lantern in which gambling activities were reputed to 
have taken place (Oregonian, April 23, 1956). Langley, in a 1980 inter-
view, denied the connection, saying that the relationship was on paper 
only, and even then only lasted a few days. 
Through various airplane reservations, hotel reservations and the 
like, much of James Elkins' story of the meetings among Clyde Crosby, 
John Sweeney, Frank Brewster, Tom Maloney and himself are corroborated 
(Exhibits 15 though 40 of the Hearings of the Select Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 1957). 
Given the Teamsters' effort to organize pinball, it is plausible to 
suggest that the Teamsters were attempting to assure that an administra-
tion friendly to the Union's involvement would be elected, one that was 
tolerant of pinball. 
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It seems just too strong a coincidence that the Coin Machine Men of 
Oregon were organized at the same time or shortly after a similar 
organizational effort had been successfully undertaken in Seattle. 
Certainly the Teamsters' coffers and membership were enriched through 
monies gained in this organizing effort. 
If the Teamsters were, as Elkins accused, attempting to move into 
organized vice activities in Portland, then Crosby's, Maloney's and 
McLaughlins' activities became more understandable. The key to compre-
hending all of this rests with the tape recordings made secretly by James 
Elkins of both telephone and room conversations of Maloney, McLaughlin, 
Langley and others. It was these conversations that formed the crux of 
the James Elkins case, and the basis upon which Elkins argued that the 
Teamsters Union was attempting to move in on his activities, as will be 
shown later. 
While the Elkins recordings do show elements of conspiracy among the 
above-mentioned parties, there is no proof that the Teamsters leadership 
itself was aware of these activities or was actively encouraging them. 
Rather, the recordings show frequent references to "John" and "Frank" in 
Seattle as men to check with. Corroborative evidence creates the clear 
implication of Teamsters Union involvement in the Portland rackets. As 
will be shown, the manipulations of power figures on the local level 
constitutes a strong indication of the Western Conference of Teamsters' 
interest in the local racket scene. 
Horace Crouch, owner of the Mt. Hood Cafe, described the picketing 
of his property. Teamster pickets, organized by Teamsters 
representative Frank Malloy, later were described by Clyde Crosby as an 
"advertising picket." When Malloy was approached by Crouch as to why he 
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was being picketed, Crouch was told that he had to pull Stan Terry's 
pinball machines from his property in order to continue operation. This 
was during the period of time when, according to testimony, Stan Terry 
was engaged in a struggle with the Teamsters Union to allow only himself 
and not his employees into the Union (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, 
1957). Terry eventually lost and returned to the Teamsters Union. 
Three months after the picketing of Crouch's Mt. Hood Cafe, he was 
allowed to have Terry's machines in his shop because Terry had 
capitulated to the Union. This was denied by Terry (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). Crosby's explanation of this incident 
includes the denial that the Teamsters had ever attempted to keep people 
out of the industry or to control the coin machine industry in any way 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, 1957). He denied any knowledge of fair 
trade agreements and stated that the only contracts that existed were 
standard union contracts. 
Crosby indicated that the only thing he understood about the picket-
ing at the Mt. Hood Cafe was that there was a dispute with the American 
Suffleboard Company over a contract. Local 223 Teamster Secretary, Lloyd 
Hildreth, who later denied the allegations of improper picketing, 
indicated that the American Shuffleboard Company, which was servicing 
the cafe, attempted to have a different contact than other coin machine 
men had, and that the picketing was an effort to force American into 
signing the same standard, industry-wide contract which American did 
sign (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings, 1957). 
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A View From a Distance - The State Capitol 
No more clear a history of the vice probe exists than the transcrip-
tion taped by then Attorney General Robert Y. Thornton on June 4, 1959. 
Like all histories and particularly those drawn up by history's 
principals themselves, it is limited in perspective. In this case, 
because of the position he held as grand jury inquisitor and chief 
investigator for the state, and as a politician forced by circumstance 
and the ambitions of others into an impossible role, Thornton reflects 
the bitterness of a man burned by a fire set by others. In spite of this, 
there is little question of his fundamental honesty or accuracy in 
recalling events then less than six years old. 
Thornton began his account by relating a scandal in the Oregon 
Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) in the fall of 1953. An investigation, 
conducted at the suggestion of Republican Governor Paul Patterson by 
Robert McGuire of the law firm of McGuire, Shields, Morrison and Bailey, 
centered on an alleged $10,000 bribe offer made by head of OLCC Investi-
gation-Undercover Division, Thomas Sheridan (Thornton, Oregon State 
Archives 1959). 
During the reign of Mayor Fred Peterson (1952-1956), after-hours 
bootleg and gambling establishments flourished in Portland with little 
action from either the Portland police or the OLCC enforcement people. 
The Attorney General's office became aware of more than mere tolerance of 
liquor violations. Gifts ranging from cases of liquor to trips to the 
Kentucky Derby were reportedly accepted by OLCC enforcement people. The 
entire North Precinct of the Portland police as well as others were being 
paid off, reported Thornton in his history (Thornton, Oregon State 
Archives 1959). 
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Shortly after Thomas Sheridan was suspended, Governor Patterson, 
who was elected with Teamsters support, was visited by Crosby, Portland 
Teamsters head, and was asked to reinstate Sheridan. 
Thornton believed: 
That there had been very definitely a criminal conspiracy, a 
criminal partnership involving Elkins, Maloney, McLaughlin, 
Langley and Crosby. And part of the hope of that criminal 
conspiracy was to derive revenue from the continued operation 
of these bootlegging-gambling joints which at the time were 
being bankrolled by James Elkins (Thornton, Oregon State 
Archives 1959). 
When Thornton found that he could not obtain the depositions taken 
by McGuire during his investigation, he announced that he would conduct 
his own investigation using ex-FBI agent, LeRoy Scousen. 
When Democrat William Langley, with Thomas Maloney's and Teamsters' 
help, was elected Multnomah County District Attorney in the fall of 1954, 
Thornton attempted to persuade Langley to use the Grand Jury to 
investigate the liquor matter which he believed Governor Patterson was 
"sweeping under the rug." 
Before taking office, Langley promised to investigate. But once in 
power, he delayed acting until suddenly, in September of 1955, he 
announced that he would call the Grand Jury into action. The Grand Jury 
met and the result was, in Thornton's words, "a whitewash." (Thornton, 
Oregon State Archives 1959) 
Yet there was another result. In a press conference following the 
Grand Jury meeting, ex-Portland policeman Bartholomew, employed by 
Scousen, accused Thornton of using the investigation to II • ... raise a 
political stink. 11 (Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959.) 
Thornton apparently suffered as a r~sult of the editorial wrath of 
both the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal. Thornton would remain caught 
on the horns of the press for the whole of the probe. 
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There are some purely circumstantial indications that Thornton may 
have been spiked in his investigative efforts by the so-called King 
Towers conspirators, Elkins, Maloney, Crosby, McLaughlin and Langley. 
Tapes found in the archives of the State of Oregon appearing to be part 
of the clandestine tapes made by Ray Clark at James Elkins' orders, show 
a definite pattern of attempted manipulation of major political figures. 
The frequent use of pressure and intimidation or the threat of it, 
without any subtlety or concern for existing unspoken and quite tradi-
tional arrangements, would prove the undoing of the King Towers plotters. 
The style of action more than the actions themselves would turn 
Portland's elites off as nothing else could or would. Such anger at 
upsetting the gentlemen's agreements in the city's political, economic 
and recreational life would extend as well to the efforts of the Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957). 
Thornton saw a pattern of payoffs to the highest levels of the 
police department by madams like Jerry Rogers and by cardroom operators 
like Andros of the Dahle and Penne cardroom. Thornton saw these payoffs 
as channeled through Elkins and Tom Johnson. He listed after-hours, 
bootleg, gambling and whorehouse operations, some within a half-block of 
the police station as: the Three Deuces, the Keystone, the Main Stem, 
the Red Front, the Explorers Club, the New Western Hotel, the Perry 
Rooms, Tiny's Place and the Market Club, as well as seven Pan games and 
two Chinese gambling operations. He believed that all elements of the 
Oregon law enforcement conununity were aware of the Portland situation 
(Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
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The pattern of denial and averted official eyes persisted even after 
the Oregonian played the Elkins tapes of the King Towers conspiracy for 
Governor Elmo Smith's assistant, Ed Armstrong, State Police Superin-
tendent, Fod Maison, and State Police Captain Vayne Gurdain, a family 
friend of the Langleys. 
It was not until the Oregonian broke the story on April 19, 1956 
that any official response was forthcoming. Later, in a characteristic 
attack upon the Oregonian, the Journal would rhetorically ask why the 
Oregonian had not gone to the authorities if their tale were true. The 
answer was simple. They had, and had been rebuffed (Thornton, Oregon 
State Archives). 
Governor Elmo Smith 
conditions in Portland. 
asked the State Police to investigate 
At that point Langley invited Thornton to 
assist. Thornton refused, not wishing to be caught powerless in a 
complex and dangerous situation. Finally, Governor Smith did as Attorney 
General Thornton wished. He ordered Thornton to intercede and gave him 
power to supercede District Attorney Langley. 
According to Thornton's history, editorial page editor, Herb Lundy, 
managing editor Robert Notson, and the Oregonian' s attorney, David Fain, 
urged Thornton to give their informants immunity. Otherwise the 
Oregonian balked at giving testimony. The 1955 anti-wiretap law could 
put the listeners, as well as the initiators of such materials, in jail. 
The Oregonian wanted to protect their informer, Jim Elkins and their 
staff. After tense discussions with Governor Smith and his staff, the 
immunity requested was denied. Thornton dated his troubles with the 
Oregonian from that time (Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
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With Assistant State Attorney Francis Wade, Thornton continued his 
investigation, planning to use the June Grand Jury for presentation, but 
Langley and his staff were using the May Grand Jury to present Langley's 
version of the vice problem. Langley barred Thornton from access to the 
Grand Jury. Thornton sought and received a court order to stop Langley, 
but not before Judge Dobson had to order the Sheriff's office to break 
into the Grand Jury room. Langley maintained then and maintains now that 
he saw a conspiracy by Jim Elkins and others (including possibly the 
Mayor and Chief of Police) to discredit him while he, as District 
Attorney, was trying to stop a corrupt system in its tracks (Langley-Uris 
interview 1980). 
While the Oregonian agreed not to publish Grand Jury witnesses' 
names, publisher William Knight and editor Arden Pangborn of the Journal 
would not agree. They were convinced that any investigation that did not 
result in toppling Elkins, Clark and anyone else involved with them, 
including the Mayor, was inadequate. 
In his history, Thornton indicated that the Journal offered 
electoral support for him if he would conduct the investigation the way 
they wanted - including firing Francis Wade and hiring Robert Davis. In 
the end, both men were used by Attorney General Thornton (Thornton, 
Oregon State Archives 1959). 
The Journal was not the only agency to pressure Thornton. The State 
Police wanted the entire matter placed in their hands, and even went so 
far as to use Thornton's brother-in-law as a go-between to persuade 
Thornton. Brad Williams, Thornton said, spread rumors of bribes by 
Elkins to Thornton, a charge both Thornton and Elkins denied (Thornton, 
Oregon State Archives 1959). 
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It was with horror and a dawning sense of doom that Thornton dis-
covered that much of the Oregonian's famed Elkins tapes were unintelli-
gible to the average listener. (After hours of listening over and over 
to the surviving archival tape copies, the author can state that less 
than a fifth of the material is fully comprehensible today.) Thornton 
faced a nightmare. Witnesses were scared. Some had disappeared. 
Reporters wormed their way in everywhere, even into the Grand Jury 
waiting room. It was a circus. With the tapes as a grand finale, it was 
certain to be a terrible flop (Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
Still Thornton persisted as best he could. He divided the matter 
into seven areas: 
(1) The King Tower conspiracy; 
(2) The E-R land grab; 
(3) The pinball-Teamsters cases; 
( 4) The bootleg and gambling spots; 
(5) The call girl operation; 
(6) The payoff system with the Portland police; and, 
(7) Whatever was left or appeared uncategorizable (Thornton, 
Oregon State Archives 1959). 
District Attorney Langley was not through yet, however. Elkins and 
his associates were hit with many other charges, tending to both quiet 
them and limit their credibility. 
The Journal was, from Thornton's point of view, ruthless and unfair 
to him and to the investigation. On July 23, the Journal ran Langley's 
own version of events. This Thornton saw as a way for Langley to reach 
the public without ever testifying before the Grand Jury. 
92 
While Bob Davis was presenting the police payoff material to the 
Grand Jury, an Elkins employee unexpectedly fingered Terry Schrunk as a 
bribe recipient. Schrunk offered to take a lie detector test, which he 
failed. Nevertheless, Thornton felt the case against Schrunk was weak at 
best. 
The Oregonian pushed for Schrunk's indictment and eventually, after 
the matter was presented four times to the Grand Jury, he was indicted. 
He would later be exonerated as witnesses against him were impeached or 
changed their stories. Thornton saw the failure of the Schrunk case, 
tried early on as it was, as the end of public confidence in the whole 
investigation (Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
Thornton faced a long list of witnesses and growing criticism of the 
cost of the investigation. Public officials were invited rather than 
subpoenaed to testify. Multnomah County District Attorney William 
Langley was quite willing to talk outside the courthouse, but refused to 
appear voluntarily before the Grand Jury. He was not subpoenaed as it 
was feared that he might escape prosecution through the immunity process. 
McLaughlin, found by the Journal along with Maloney, was offered up 
like a piece of cake at the tail end of the Jury hearings. Again, fearing 
the immunity issue, Thornton did not use either man. Doug Baker of the 
Journal interviewed Thornton with a concealed microphone and, according 
to Thornton, printed a distorted version of the interview (Thornton, 
Oregon State Archives 1959). Indictments were often drawn up in error. 
Jurors were contaminated in at least one case and a new jury was needed 
before indictments could be presented. 
According to Thornton, his assistant, Arthur Kaplan, was brought in 
for his experience in the pinball enforcement area. While presenting to 
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the January Grand Jury, Kaplan, with the assistance of Ralph Wyckoff, led 
what came to be called "the run-away Grand Jury" which produced 59 new 
indictments and a Grand Jury report accusing nearly everyone, including 
the Attorney General, of a massive cover-up of extensive corruption 
(Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). In 1979 Kaplan indicated that he 
still felt that Portland was a hotbed of organized crime underneath its 
placid exterior (Kaplin-Uris interivew 1979). 
As a punishment suited to the crime, Thornton ordered Kaplan and 
Wyckoff to prosecute the cases they had indicted. Kaplan, meanwhile, was 
in contact with Robert Kennedy of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Improper Activites in the Labor or Management Field (1957). Eventually 
he escaped to a staff position on the Committee. At one point, Thornton 
believed he was sent to Washington by Kennedy solely to give Kaplan a 
free reign with the Grand Jury (Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
Langley met with Thornton, against the latter's better judgment, 
and, according to Thornton, in the course of a rambling discourse in 
front of three others, Langley accused him of taking a bribe, an 
accusation he failed to deny. Thornton stated that Brad Williams used 
the failure to deny as support for an accusation in the Journal 
(Thornton, Oregon State Archives 1959). 
In the final analysis, Attorney General Robert Y. Thornton faced an 
impossible task. He took over an investigation that was compromised at 
all levels. Witnesses were unreliable or absent. The tapes upon which 
Elkins' story hung were unintelligible without an interpretor. Not 
surprisingly, in terms of successful prosecutions the results were 
minimal. 
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The View From the Grand Jury 
Examination of the report of the March 1957 Grand Jury, the so-
called run-away Grand Jury presided over by Wyckoff and Kaplan, reveals a 
very reasoned argument for the failure of the vice probes. 
They began by pointing out that records and evidence kept by both 
the Sheriff's office and the police department were poorly maintained and 
controlled, which made concealment of crime easy. Evidence was hard to 
retrieve and in many cases lost. 
The Grand Jury found that officials used their status and power as 
well as public monies to avoid scrutiny. Langley's action in continuing 
to indict key witnesses for crimes that would silence their testimony, 
and pressure through the police department by then Mayor Terry Schrunk to 
silence witnesses against Schrunk, are two examples the Grand Jury cited 
(Grand Jury Report, Oregon State Archives 1957). 
The Jury noted that many of Elkins' loudest accusers were those who 
in years past could have done something about Elkins' activities but did 
not. Two investigators on the District Attorney's staff and a police 
detective were assigned full time to aid in vice investigations (Grand 
Jury Report, Oregon State Archives 1957). 
The Grand Jury went on to accuse the former Sheriff and District 
Attorney, among others in the city and county government, of knowing 
Elkins and having business dealings with him. They suggested that these 
officials were compromised by business and campaign tie-ins and were thus 
unable or unwilling to act against the crime network. 
The Grand Jury turned upon Attorney General Thornton and accused him 
of failing to carry out the Governor's order to investigate the situation 
in Portland with adequate vigor, competence and effectiveness. The Grand 
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Jury agreed that the Teamsters were using their power to control vice in 
Portland, but were very critical of Thornton's handling of the probe. 
The Grand Jury believed Thornton was reluctant to prosecute all 
involved. Thornton refused to act against popular figures and appeared 
to discourage indictments in several instances. The fact that the state 
would appropriate only $300 to investigate and indict Langley and Schrunk 
was typical of the lack of money and staff time spent on the investiga-
tion. 
Thornton failed, the report said, to assign adequate legal staff to 
the case. He allowed witnesses to be harrassed and did not adequately 
supervise the Grand Jury. He allowed evidence to be lost or 
contaminated. Thornton did not follow up on acts of contempt of court. 
He failed to coordinate the overall investigative effort. As an example, 
the Jury cited Thornton's alleged failure to meet with the investigating 
attorneys and staff to plan an overall effort. The Grand Jury said he 
ignored evidence of crime and discouraged the hearing of evidence (Grand 
Jury Report, Oregon State Archives 1957). 
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or 
Management Field Takes on Portland 
While the vice probe version presented at the U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings (1957) serves as a convenient device for organizing the Portland 
events along the lines of the most dominant view at the time on the 
national level, it is nevertheless an incomplete view. The U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings' counsel was Robert Kennedy. (The Committee, was 
popularly known as the "McClellen Rackets Committee.") The Committee was 
chaired by John L. McClellen. Senators Irving Ivers, John F. Kennedy, 
Sam J. Irvin, Pat McNamara, Joseph R. McCarthy, Karl Mundt and Barry 
Goldwater were also on the Committee. 
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According to an interview with Arthur Kaplan, an investigator for 
the Attorney General in the vice probe in Portland, and who later worked 
for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field, the Committee was seeking a sensational opening for 
its attacks on organized crime in the field of labor. He was, he indi-
cated, instrumental in making contact with Robert Kennedy and persuading 
him of the importance of the Portland vice probe as a beginning of an 
examination of the Teamsters Union (Kaplan-Uris interview 1979). 
When the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings (1957) are examined, it must 
be understood that this was a case carefully prepared and orchestrated by 
Robert Kennedy and that it was the launching of not only this particular 
investigation, but of the attack on alleged organized crime and on labor 
in general. 
The U.S. Senate Committee Hearings (1957) follow a pattern set 
during this same period by other congressional investigations including 
the House Committee on Unamerican Activities. Persons called before the 
Committee and under indictment in Oregon were repeatedly asked questions 
that could serve to incriminate them. Committee members often showed a 
total disregard for the fundamental rights of witnesses. In an interview 
given in 1980 by one-time Oregon Attorney General Thornton (presently 
serving on the Oregon State Court of Appeals), this point was emphasized. 
Turner and Lambert Testify. The Hearings began with Oregonian 
reporter Wallace Turner testifying as to the origins of his news stories. 
Turner pointed out that he knew Elkins as early as 1949 when Elkins was 
already part of the crime scene, and that he knew him off and on as a 
source for newspaper stories through October 1954; that therefore Elkins 
had reason to trust Turner and vice versa through all those years. Yet, 
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Turner insisted that he did not associate much with Elkins until February 
1956 when he began to see him to develop the vice probe stories. 
Turner pointed out that the Portland City Council had, by resolu-
tion, asked the Senate to come to Portland to investigate the Teamster 
activity in Portland. He claimed that Elkins had been physically 
threatened. As a direct consequence of his involvement in attempting to 
bring the Teamsters' organized crime activities in Portland to light, Jim 
Elkins faced federal and local indictments for various criminal 
activities. 
Turner further alleged that in the course of the investigation some 
of Elkins' recordings were illegally seized at the home of one of Elkins' 
employees, Ray Clark, at one time Chief of Police of St. Helens, Oregon 
and ex-Portland policeman (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Lambert testified that there was a conspiracy between the Teamsters 
Union and the Coin Machine Men of Oregon and that there was difficulty in 
any special Grand Jury's investigations of the matter because there was 
no provision in Oregon politics for special Grand Juries. 
The Attorney General of Oregon could not undertake special investi-
gations of ciminal matters without the specific direction of the Governor 
of the State. At the time that these investigations were taking place, 
the Attorney General was a Democrat and all other statewide elected 
officials were Republicans. William Langley, District Attorney of 
Multnomah County at the time, was also a Democrat and had announced that 
he would undertake an investigation of the allegations of James Elkins. 
Further complicating this was Langley's known associations with Elkins 
in prior business deals (the China Lantern). He had, Turner said, a 
direct interest in the outcome of the Grand Jury investigaion (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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Evidence was given that the Teamsters had tie-ins with certain 
principals in the investigation. Albert J. Ruhl, a Teamsters official, 
indicated that in 1948 Tom Maloney had requested a loan from the Union to 
open Maloney's Sports Center in Spokane. The loan was granted because 
Maloney was a friend of Frank Brewster. Ledger sheets indicate that the 
loan was made. 
Maloney Stayed Mum. Tom Maloney took the Fifth Amendment 
innumerable times and refused to identify a document appearing on page 
366 of the Senate investigations in which Maloney assigned certain 
valuables to McLaughlin, including interest in a cardroom for about $10. 
Further, according to evidence developed by the Committee, Maloney 
visited Brewster and used Teamsters travel credit cards, according to the 
secretary operating out of the Teamsters Union office, and travel for 
Maloney and McLaughlin through various airlines was arranged through 
Frank Brewster's office. (This allegation is verified through documents 
presented, pages 366-370 of the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
McLaughlin Does Not Talk. Joseph P. McLaughlin then testified. He 
indicated that he knew Frank Brewster for 20 years but declined to answer 
if the Teamsters ever paid any of his bills. He refused to indicate 
whether or not his cardroom had a Western Union ticker tape for race 
results and would not indicate if there was gambling going on. In 
general, McLaughlin would not answer any questions about the Portland 
situation, citing the fact that he was under indictment in Portland (U.S. 
Senate Co'dioittee Hearings 1957). 
Elkins Says Much. The next Senate witness was James Elkins, 
racketeer and owner of the Service Machine Company, one of the companies 
in the contract group known as the Coin Machine Men of Oregon. Elkins 
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came to Portland in 1936. Prior to that, in 1931 in Arizona he was given 
20 to 30 years for assault with intent to kill a policeman. He was 
pardoned after four years. (No explanation was ever made as to why this 
criminal figure was given a pardon in the State of Arizona.) In 1938, he 
was arrested in Portland when he picked up a narcotics package from a 
Western Union office, was convicted in federal court, and served a year 
and a day. Elkins indicated that his life was not always an easy one in 
the rackets, that, for example, in the course of picking up slot 
machines, he and his brother were shot at. He testified that since 1940 
he had no trouble. Then in 1956 he faced some 14 to 16 counts in Oregon 
alone and 9 counts in federal courts on wiretapping and other matters 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Elkins wanted to get his machines into the busy Labor Temple. He 
attempted to get into any number of unions so that his machines could 
have a union label and be acceptable in the Temple. But no union would 
let him in. Then, in late 1953 or 1954, he learned that the Teamsters 
Union might admit him. He went to Seattle and patiently waited, hoping 
to see Frank Brewster. He was not let in. He stated that he learned that 
Tom Maloney was a friend of Brewster's and might be able to help him. He 
then made contact with Maloney, offering to pay Maloney's way to Portland 
if Maloney would introduce him to John Sweeney, who at that time was 
still Oregon International Teamsters representative. Elkins was 
introduced to Sweeney and was allowed into the Union. He denied having 
paid Maloney any fee other than expenses for his help in this matter 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
In mid-1954 John Sweeney moved from Portland to Seattle, where he 
was made Secretary-Treasurer of the Western Conference of Teamsters. By 
1956 Sweeney died. 
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Maloney indicated to Elkins that he knew Brewster very well and that 
strong political connections of the Teamsters gave Brewster much power. 
Brewster, in fact, could order Sweeney around. Elkins paid $450 for 
Maloney's expenses and loaned him $500. As a result, Elkins met with 
Sweeney several times. Elkins went to Seattle and had conversations with 
the Chief of Police. 
Elkins denied a rumour that he gave $50,000 to Pomeroy's campaign 
for Mayor of Seattle. But, according to Elkins, he did go to the Olympic 
Hotel in Seattle and met with Joe McKinley, a famous racketeer, reputed 
to be the 1940' s boss of Seattle rackets, gambling and bootlegging. 
Elkins later met with Sweeney and was told by him that Maloney was to get 
a piece of any action that should come out of their mutual arrangement. 
After being shut down in Seattle, Maloney came to Portland and helped 
with the Langley campaign. After the primary, Sweeney introduced Elkins 
to Crosby at the airport. Sweeney told Elkins that he wanted Elkins to 
meet Langley the next day at his office (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
Langley Gets Teamsters Support. Elkins at this time mentioned his 
partnership with William Langley in the China Lantern, which operated 
illegal gambling. Continuing, Elkins said he was told that within ten 
days there would be a green light from Brewster to support Langley for 
District Attorney. Elkins indicated that he expected from the District 
Attorney warnings of raids and no abatement on his properties. Elkins at 
this time was suspicious of Langley and felt that Langley was tapping his 
own phones during conversations with Elkins. 
Elkins said that attorney HenryHanzen represented abortionists and 
was the man behind the scenes in Langley's primary campaign. A lot of 
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money for Langley came through Hanzen, Elkins claimed. In addition, 
Elkins asserted that a man who allegedly owned a lot of property, 
including supposed whorehouses put a lot of money into Langley's 
campaign, was Joe Snitzer (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Langley requested that $1,200 be raised to pay the printing bills of 
his campaign, Elkins said. At this point, according to Elkins, Elkins 
went to see Crosby about backing Langley, and Crosby said he would not 
since the Central Labor Council was backing John Mccourt. Crosby and his 
people did not even want to have lunch with Langley at that time. (It is 
important to recognize that all of this is Elkins' version, sifted 
through the Oregonian and under the direction of Robert Kennedy.) Elkins 
and his brother Fred, met with Hanzen and Langley, and Fred Elkins agreed 
to call Maloney. Crosby again refused to back Langley (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). Langley has since denied any knowledge of 
Maloney' s involvement in his campaign for Multnomah County District 
Attorney (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Whatever the real reasons for Teamsters support of Langley, the 
Langley campaign for District Attorney is an excellent example of a 
congruence of events and interests around a specific political 
objective. 
Elkins apparently had understandings, as has been suggested 
earlier, with members of the Portland Police Department, but a less clear 
understanding with the County Sheriff's Department. The nature of these 
understandings, payoffs, activities and so on, are fairly clear though 
they cannot be proved. Indeed, indictments of officers, based on 
testimony of a police "snitch," did not result in any convictions of 
police officers. 
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Elkins decided to comit himself to the operation of Langley's 
campaign with the understanding that he would be free to operate his own 
organization without much official harrassment from the new District 
Attorney. Maloney came down to Portland, ostensibly to work on Langley's 
campaign. At this time, Jim Elkins and his brother Fred each gave 
Maloney $100 plus his hotel expenses. 
Elkins said he began to make lawn signs for Langley's campaign and 
the Teamsters put the signs up (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
A letter dated October 5, 1954, from Maloney to Elkins makes clear 
the relationship between the partners in attempting to get Langley 
elected. The letter begins: 
-
Friend Jim, 
Well, here I am back at Spokane and I really had to shoot 
both Barrells and when I connected Stan Terry with McCourt that 
did it. John talked to Crosby for an hour and Jim if that kid 
lets John Sweeney down it is not right and and it puts you and 
I right in the middle. About two weeks from now I will get the 
Okay from Sweeney when I pick him and Frank Brewster at the 
Airport here Saturday I will have that Malloy take him around 
to all the Big Freight Lines and Bakeries and have your man 
meet the men so they can go home and talk about meeting the 
next District Attorney. Now John wants him to go right into 
Terry Schrunk and he can mention Johns name and in to Newberger 
and that Woman Congressman and if you get that off ice opened I 
promise you that I will get some Financial Aid for the kid and 
get him elected ... " (sic) (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957, 
p. 367). 
The consequences of not playing ball with Elkins in support of 
William Langley can be seen by what happened to pinball operator Stan 
Terry. Terry's connection as a pinball operator and his support for John 
McCourt were the reasons for Terry's ouster from the Teamsters Union, 
Elkins claimed. But, his disaffection from the general interests of the 
Teamsters in bringing all his men into the Union may have led to Terry's 
status as a non-person within the Coin Machine Men of Oregon. When Terry 
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recanted and persuaded the Union leadership to allow him to rejoin, he 
had no further troubles. 
The above letter clearly implies conversations between John Sweeney 
and Frank Brewster. Brewster gives clear direction as does Clyde Crosby 
for the support of William Langley for District Attorney. 
Elkins gave $1,200 to Maloney for Langley's campaign. Elkins 
further rigged up sound equipment and went to the Pacific International 
Exposition where he attempted to use his equipment. 
According to Elkins' testimony before the U.S. Senate Co11DDittee 
Hearings (1957), then Sheriff Terry Schrunk ordered the sound truck out. 
Maloney called John Sweeney in Seattle. According to Elkins, Sweeney 
then called Schrunk who then allowed Langley's equipment to be used at 
the Pacific International Exposition. Elkins gave an additional $3,600 
in campaign money to Maloney plus the $1,800 for Langley's printing bill 
(U.S. Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
Maloney indicated to Elkins. Elkins said, that the Teamsters would 
pay for Langley's California vacation where he would meet John Sweeney, 
Frank Brewster and other influential people within the Union. District 
Attorney Langley by this time had agreed, at least tentatively, with 
Elkins' demands for warnings in advance of raids and for no abatement 
procedures against hjs organizations. In November, after the election, 
Elkins went to the Olympic Hotel in Seattle and to San Francisco to meet 
with Maloney, Brewster, Sweeney and Langley (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
By September of 1955 the partners in the tentative plan to involve 
themselves with vice activity in Portland had had a serious falling out. 
Elkins became suspicious of his partners and began to tape record their 
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conversations, carrying a Miniphone. He felt that he was being manipu-
lated into appearing a liar because he was paying the conspirators less 
then they expected. Was Elkins double-dealing his various partners? 
Maloney clearly wanted to open his own gambling joints and wanted a 
piece of Elkins' profits. Whether the Teamsters leadership ever knew 
that this was Maloney's game is unclear. Certainly there is no clear 
evidence presented at the Hearings on this. 
According to Elkins, the ta:_Jes that he made, which were later played 
in part before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field (1957), cover the plans for illegal 
activities in abortion, gambling, bootlegging, after-hours joints and 
prostitution. Yet this is not explicit on the tapes (Attorney General's 
Archives). 
Elkins' apparent initial plan, according to Elkins himself, was to 
play the tapes to Brewster or Sweeney. Finally, he said, he met Brewster 
and was warned to lay off Crosby and Langley (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
It is, of course, difficult to say whether Elkins was lying. There 
is documentation of his trip to see Brewster but none of what went on in 
Brewster's office. Here is Elkins' version: 
As near as I can remember it, I came into his room and I first 
sat down in his little waiting room. Three men came in, looked 
me over for a couple of minutes and walked out. Then, he came 
in and I went in his place. I'm looking around, and he says, 
"You don't have to be so afraid of me. I don't wire up my 
place." I said, "I am not afraid of you wiring it up, Mr. 
Brewster." He said, "I am going to tell you to start with I 
don't like the people you represent." And I said, "I don't 
represent any people, just Jim Elkins." 
And he said, "Well, I'm going to tell you something else. I 
make mayors, and I break mayors. I make chiefs of police, and 
I break chiefs of police. I have been in jail, and I have been 
out of jail. There is nothing that scares me." 
And I said, "I don't want to scare you. All I want is to be 
left alone." He talked a little more, and he got red in the 
face, and he said, "If you bother my two boys, if you embarrass 
my two boys, you will find yourself wading across Lake 
Washington with a pair of concrete boots." I believe that was 
the expression. I said, "Let us name the boys." And the boys 
were Clyde Crosby and Bill Langley (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957, p. 100-101). 
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During this encounter Brewster indicated doubts about Maloney but 
said that Joseph McLaughlin was O.K. Brewster complained that Elkins was 
not giving enough to "his boys." Elkins said that he was, from that time 
on, hassled. He received threatening phone calls and thugs visited his 
house. 
Under questioning by Robert Kennedy, Elkins indicated that he 
caught two men hassling his wife at their home. Elkins said: 
"Well, I pulled up to the curb, and I talked to them, and they 
left, and they didn't come back no more. 
The Committee Chairman said: "You did what?" 
Elkins responded: "I talked to them. Well, I pointed the 
shotgun at them, and I talked to them, and they didn't come 
back any more." 
Kennedy said: "Did you do anything else with them?" 
Elkins replied: "Yes, I did. One of them, yes, I treated him 
a little rough." 
Kennedy: "What did you do with him?" 
Elkins: "Well, I hit him on the head. I knocked him around a 
little bit, and put him back in the car and told his buddy that 
I was going to shoot the next person that came in my yard." 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 102). 
Apparently, the men never returned. Elkins nevertheless felt that 
the Teamsters had control of Sheriff Schrunk. He felt the Sheriff was 
not willing to help him, but some Portland policemen were (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
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What is possible is that Elkins was indicating indirectly that he 
had some access to the police department but none within the Sheriff's 
department. It is not clear that the Sheriff's office was in league with 
the Teamsters Union at this point except through inferences made in the 
matter of Langley's campaign and the fact that Schrunk was supported by 
the Teamsters in his race for mayor against Fred Peterson. 
Elkins' testimony on the period from around January, 1955 
concerning meetings taking place at the Olympic Hotel in Seattle and San 
Francisco, indicated that Langley wanted Elkins to accept Tom Maloney as 
partner and cut him into his business. Maloney apparently had ambitions 
of his own (which may or may not have reflected the interests of the 
Teamsters Union) in terms of setting up the town for an increase in vice 
activity. This is supported by the tapes available through the Oregon 
State Archives. Elkins balked. He agrued that he did not have control 
of cardrooms as Maloney had thought. , Maloney wanted, according to 
Elkins, to open three or four whorehouses. Maloney indicated that he 
wanted Elkins to meet with Ann Thompson, an alleged madam. 
Elkins always denied having anything to do with prostitution though 
he was under indictment at the time of the Hearings for prostitution 
activities. There is much corroborative evidence, as shall be presented 
later, of the serious interest Maloney had in prostitution. There was 
also evidence of Elkins' interest in prostitution in the testimony of 
certain prostitutes (U.S. Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
The Plan. According to Elkins, Langley told him John Sweeney and 
Frank Brewster wanted him to put Joe McLaughlin "into the picture" (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). Sweeney, Maloney, McLaughlin and 
Elkins met at the Olympic Hotel in Seattle. The discussion there 
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centered around the pinball and punchboard issue. Sweeney, according to 
Elkins, insisted that Elkins sit down with Maloney and McLaughlin because 
Brewster wanted McLaughlin to come to Portland to keep Maloney out of 
trouble. According to Elkins, McLaughlin was to be the contact person 
with the District Attorney's office. Elkins and Maloney were to have 
nothing to do with the District Attorney, according to the plan. It was 
made clear at this meeting, according to Elkins, that the District 
Attorney would be given orders - that he would not be asked, but 
instructed as to how he was to proceed. 
Elkins agreed to help McLaughlin and Maloney open a couple of joints 
of their own. He did not yet realize that he had to cut them into his 
territories and profits. Both men, according to Elkins, complained 
consistently that Portland was not an "open" town and that the Chief of 
Police would be removed if he did not cooperate more fully. They 
insisted Elkins must have police protection, though Elkins, according to 
his testimony, repeatedly denied that such protection existed (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
On January 2, 1955, the successful, Teamsters-supported candidate 
for District Attorney of Multnomah County, Democrat William Langley, 
took off ice. Early in January, McLaughlin and Maloney registered at the 
Multnomah Hotel. All facts of hotel registrations, transportation 
tickets, etc., are verified through documents presented to the Committee 
and are available as appendices to the Committee's materials (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
At this time, according to Elkins, there were discussions about who 
should be the investigators for the District Attorney's office. (Such 
investigators are crucial persons, usually from the police department or 
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other law enforcement agency, who provide information upon which many of 
the warrants, particularly in the area of vice, are developed.) They 
also discussed setting up gambling and bootlegging activities on an 
increased basis, Elkins said. Elkins acknowledged the ownership of two 
bootleg joints and said there were only two others in the entire city. 
Elkins was told that he was to provide $2,000 a month to Langley, to be 
cut between Langley, McLaughlin and Maloney. He indicated that he could 
not afford that amount (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
At this point, according to Elkins, John Sweeney informed Elkins 
that he was to take orders from McLaughlin and that they were all to get 
along. Elkins indicated that he did not want to discuss his bribes to 
Langley in open session. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper 
Activites in the Labor or Management Field (1957) allowed him to pass 
over this matter. 
Elkins said he was supposed to be organizing the town for the 
conspirators. He was to be the front man within the legal community. He 
was to deliver money to McLaughlin. He gave them money, but it was money 
from his own operations rather than money collected from other illegal 
activities in Portland. But, he said, he got into trouble because he 
could not provide accountings for the money. All of the conspirators 
were concerned that Sweeney and Crosby seemed unable to get the Mayor and 
the Police Chief to open the town to their interests (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
McLaughlin and Maloney repeatedly came to town to talk with Elkins. 
Eventually Elkins met with Ann Thompson, alleged madam, at the Portland 
airport. 
Portland. 
Apparently neither of them were interested in an operation in 
She indicated that all she wanted from Elkins was his word 
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that it would not work. She did not want trouble with McLaughlin and 
Maloney, and by implication, with Sweeney and Brewster (U.S. Senate 
CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
The talks with Ann Thompson resulted in her decision not to open 
houses of prostitution in Portland. Before the CoDDDittee she indicated 
that she did indeed talk with Elkins about opening houses of 
prostitution. She attempted initially to minimize the role that Maloney 
played but did eventually acknowledge that Maloney had a significant role 
in setting up the prostitution plan (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
Maloney repeatedly contacted Sweeney and at one point made a phone 
call in Elkins' presence to the Governor of Washington, Albert Rosellini. 
(Rosellini was identified with the vice activity network in the State of 
Washington by William Chambliss (1978). 
By February 1955 John Sweeney met with Elkins. Sweeney requested 
that Elkins get on the ball. He indicated that Brewster expected 
McLaughlin to be able to run things. At this point, Elkins was more 
worried, he said, and had his brother look for bookie locations to open 
(U.S. Senate CoODDittee Hearings 1957). 
Elkins indicated that race results would be supplied through 
Associated and United Press wires. They were available through the 
Teamsters' paper in Portland. Elkins indicated that he questioned 
whether Ron Moxness, then the editor of the Teamsters' newspaper, would 
allow the use of the wire services for race results for bookie joints. 
Elkins was told that Moxness could be replaced, which did happen (U.S. 
Senate Colllllittee Hearings 1957). 
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The Group Falls Apart. There was a falling out in April 1955 among 
the conspirators. It lasted through May and June. At the end of April, 
Elkins had stopped paying anybody in the Seattle group. Yet by August or 
September Elkins was once more making payoffs because he was threatened 
by Brewster. He did not, he said, open any other joints. He indicated to 
the conspirators that they did not understand how tight the city was, 
that the city administration would not let him open any further 
operations. The conspirators believed he had unlimited influence to the 
Mayor and the Portland Police Department and thought he was lying (U.S. 
Senate Connnittee Hearings 1957). 
One question remains unanswered here: did Elkins have such access? 
There is evidence that payoffs did occur, but there is no hard evidence 
that Elkins could have increased his hold within the city. 
A pimp was brought down from Seattle by McLaughliti and Maloney. A 
meeting took place in the King Towers apartments arranged for by Elkins 
for the conspirators' use. He had already bugged this apartment. The 
pimp wanted to open three or four places in Portland. Elkins told him 
that he would be unable to operate for any length of time. A promise was 
made by the conspirators that Clyde Crosby was going to see the Mayor of 
Portland about the Chief of Police. 
There is confirmation from all sources, including ex-Mayor Fred 
Peterson, that Crosby did go to see Peterson about replacing Police Chief 
Jim Purcell (Peterson-Uris interview 1980). Peterson said he refused to 
go along with Crosby's desire that the Police Chief be changed. In the 
interview Peterson reported that Crosby said he had orders from Seattle. 
Following this he was no longer supported by the Teamsters. Terry 
Schrunk received their support instead. 
Fred Peterson described the meeting in December 1955: 
Clyde Crosby came to my office and stated he had an official 
message to deliver to me. He said, "I hate to bring this 
message to you, but it is an official message, and I have to 
give it to you. Brewster, Sweeney and I talked this over, and 
I have been instructed to tell you that if Purcell continues to 
be Chief of Police, we will have to find another candidate for 
mayor to support." 
During this discussion I asked Clyde Crosby for the reason that 
this action should be taken, and he stated that a man had been 
beat up, and he also said that a man had been innocently 
arrested for vagrancy. I told him if he would give me the 
details, I would look into the matter and take appropriate 
action. He stated that I could easily find out, and that the 
Teamsters' attorney, Jim Landye, was handling the case of the 
individual that had been arrested on a vagrancy charge. I told 
Crosby that I would not do anything about the removal of the 
Chief of Police whom I had appointed unless there was a reason 
for his removal, and Crosby told me to think it over, or they 
would find another candidate to support for mayor .•. " 
(Peterson's Affidavit, U.S. Senate Conunittee Hearings 1957, 
p. 552-553). 
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It should be noted that neither Fred Peterson nor former Police 
Chief James Purcell were ever questioned in person by the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activites in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957). Their testimony was in the form of signed affidavits. 
During this period Tom Maloney saw the Teamsters as the ultimate 
political weapon. According to Elkins, Maloney believed that the whole 
state could be taken over politically by the Teamsters. Elkins acknow-
!edged some of their power, saying that Mayor Fred Peterson was ousted by 
the Union. 
Elkins said that he went to Purcell and told him that he would get 
fired if he did not play ball. Elkins says that Purcell threw him out. 
Elkins further said that there were 10 to 15 houses of prostitution 
operating in Portland. Purcell would periodically close them down but 
there were rarely prosecutions (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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Purcell was eventually indicted by the Grand Jury subsequent to the 
Oregonian investigation for malfeasance but he was never brought to 
trial. 
In January and February 1955 there were also discussions of the 
pinball and punchboard operations in Portland and how much money could be 
made. These discussions are supported by taped evidence presented to the 
Committee. Crosby, it was expected, would go to the City Council to get 
the ordinance changed to allow pinball operations. In fact, the 
ordinance on punchboard was changed to allow people to possess but not 
use the cards. 
Elkins indicated that this involvement in punchboard included a 
partnership with Norman Nemer, Joe McLaughlin and Tom Maloney. They met 
at the King Towers and Nemer agreed to have Teamster stickers placed on 
his punchbaords which would give him an exclusive on punchboard 
operations. Maloney was to be hired as a bookkeeper for Nemer. Elkins 
was to receive 25% of the take. Nemer was to get 25%, and McLaughlin was 
to get the rest to divide among the men in Seattle and his own team. 
Nemer joined the Union and then informed the Coin Machine Men of 
Oregon of his decision. He was the first to join and they reacted 
angrily. No one else in the organization at that time was allowed into 
the Union. Only Jim Elkins and Nemer were members. 
Nemer, according to his own testimony, got the Union stickers from 
Clyde Crosby. Nemer confirmed his involvement, indicating that sometime 
before February 15, 1955 he went to the King Towers with McLaughlin and 
Maloney. A discussion took place on the division of territories. The 
names of Brewster, Sweeney and Crosby were mentioned (U.S. Senate Commit-
tee Hearings 1957). 
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There was little possibility that the Coin Machine Men of Oregon 
would remain independent. They had to come to terms with the Teamsters 
Union and those terms would be dictated by the Union. However, according 
to Elkins, the punchboard arrangement fell part in time largely because 
the Seattle men wanted more than 50% of the take, and Nemer and others 
were not interested in giving up that kind of profit. 
Nemer further indicated that the Teamsters, who promised to keep 
pinball legal, were getting the lion's share of his operation. He was 
being financed through monies from Elkins and McLaughlin (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Maloney's biils paid by the Teamsters and a city directory listing 
of him as a Teamsters organizer made the link between Maloney and the 
Union clear. Bills indicated that Maloney and McLaughlin were at the 
King Towers and that they used Clyde Crosby as a reference in getting 
that apartment (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
The King Towers Setup. The King Towers incident is an illustration 
of Elkins' ability to manipulate situations. Maloney was chased by a car 
through the West Hills and around town. In terror he ended up parked in 
front of the police station until dawn. Maloney turned to Elkins to ask 
for a place to stay. Elkins suggested the King Towers. What Maloney did 
not know was that there only was one apartment available and that Elkins 
had already bugged it. The decision to tape record conversations taking 
place in that building had long since been made. A friend of Elkins was 
installed next door to the wired rooms. 
Stanley Earl Appears. City Council member Stanley Earl appeared 
next before the Committee and gave a history of pinball in Portland (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). Earl had been a member of the City 
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Council from 1952. He had been very active in the CIO and a member of the 
IWW in the old days. He indicated that on May 18, 1955 Crosby threatened 
him and said that if he did not support the licensing of pinball, the 
Teamsters would not support him for re-election in 1956. 
The City Council banned coin in the slot-operated devices beginning 
in July 1951 by a unanimous vote under Mayor Lee. Stan Terry appealed 
this decision to a three-man panel of Circuit Court judges of Multnomah 
County. The judges, by a two to one vote, ruled against the city. 
Portland appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court and won. Pinball machines 
were outlawed. The pinball operators then responded by removing the coin 
slots from the machines to avoid the ordinance. The city retaliated by 
banning all pinball devices. 
By 1956, the Teamsters Union had collected enough signatures to 
force a referendum on the pinball issue. The ordinance would not be 
enforced pending the vote. In May of 1956 the people voted to uphold the 
ordinance against pinball. This referendum may have been influenced by 
the fact that by April 1956 the Oregonian had broken the pinball-related 
vice stories. 
Earl said that the people who wanted to legalize pinball were the 
Coin Machine Men of Oregon, tavern operators and the Teamsters Union. 
The Teamsters did not officially attempt to organize pinball until 1955, 
but Earl stated the Teamsters had supported pinball long before they had 
any official interest in it. He said they supported the pinball industry 
in July 1951, in fact. Pinball had been operating since 1935 and in 
those days was not licensed, merely taxed - $10 to the State, $50 to the 
federal government (U.S. Senate Co1IDDittee Hearings 1957). 
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Earl said he used to be in favor of pinball, seeing it as a revenue 
source for the city. He estimated that there were 2,200 pinball machines 
in the city. He said that on April 28, 1954, he switched his vote when a 
workingman's wife came to him and said her husband had lost all of his 
salary in one week playing pinball machines. 
Crosby Answers Earl. Clyde Crosby responded in the Hearings by 
saying Earl supported pinball in 1951 before he had been on the Council. 
Earl changed his vote and attitude in April of 1954 because Elkins had 
leased his pinballs to Stan Terry until July 31, 1954. 
Crosby accused Stanley Earl of being in cahoots with Elkins and the 
Oregonian journalists in the Bourbon and Ham Club. The allegations 
concerning the Bourbon and Ham Club were denied. Various witnesses 
indicated that the club was merely a device used to celebrate elections. 
The Bourbon and Ham Club held meetings at the Press Club during which 
everyone could drink all the bourbon, eat all the ham and play all the 
poker they wanted. 
The club served as a meeting place for politicians and the press 
and, as such, was part of the established informal network in Portland. 
Indeed, the involvement of gamblers in occasional meetings of the Bourbon 
and Ham Club points out the essentially corrupt nature of the relation-
ships between city, newspaper and gambling people (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 195 7) . 
Earl Rebuts Crosby. According to Earl, Crosby indicated to Earl 
that his message on pinball came directly from John Sweeney and other 
Teamsters Union higher-ups. The Teamsters supported Jack O'Donnell, 
then County Auditor, for Earl's seat, and O'Donnell was given $4,750 (a 
great deal of money in the mid-19SO's) for billboards, radio, TV spots 
and newspaper space. 
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Earl indicated at this time that Brad Williams, Oregon Journal 
reporter, was a very close friend of Tom Maloney's. Earl suggested that 
Williams was the author of a yellow sheet attacking him during the 
election contest. Columnist Drew Pearson used this information. It 
resulted in a libel suit against Pearson in Coos Bay, Oregon. (Earl lost 
the libel suit in 1958.) Elkins and Earl were not close, Earl insisted. 
Earl opposed pinball and supported the City Club in its opposition to 
organized vice. 
They Sure Played a Mean Pinball. According to Elkins, Maloney 
wanted Elkins to break his pinball franchise arrangement with Stan Terry 
and take back his pinball machines. At the same time, Joe McLaughlin was 
attempting to persuade Budge Wright, another of the Coin Machine Men of 
Oregon, to take over Terry's routes. McLaughlin committed the Teamsters 
to giving Wright equipment after Wright lost the Bally distributorship. 
Wright was promised that he could get this distributorship and have any 
locations he wanted through the Teamsters Union. Elkins had leased his 
37 pinball machines to Terry because he did not want to hire new 
operators, and Terry already had the equipment and machines. Elkins 
apparently believed that pin.ball was doomed or dying in the Portland 
market (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). At this point in 1955, 
only Nemer and Elkins were unionized. Budge Wright, Joe McLaughlin and 
Fred Elkins formed a company apparently to take over Stan Terry's opera-
tions. The company was to be known as the Acme Amusement Company. 
All this time, McLaughlin and Maloney were insisting that Crosby 
could get the City Council to change its mind on the pinball ordinance. 
Elkins disagreed. He stated that it would have meant a quarter of a 
million dollars or more in immediate profits if Acme had been successful 
in controlling all pinball in the Oregon market. 
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In the spring of 1954, according to an affidavit by Budge Wright, 
there was a meeting at the Multnomah Hotel of certin members of the Coin 
Machine Men of Oregon. At that meeting were Stan Terry, Lou Dunis, Harry 
Oms berg, John Sweeney and Lou Welcher, a San Francisco coin machine 
distributor. Discussion continued half-heartedly through 1954, 
according to Wright (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
By November of 1954 Stan Terry had been kicked out of the Teamsters 
Union. In January of 1955 Elkins told Wright to meet with Joe McLaughlin 
who was identified as a Union organizer from California. 
After the picketing of the Mt. Hood Cafe, the Coin Machine Men of 
Oregon signed up with the Union. A fair trade agreement was signed by 
the new Union members. This meant that city pinball distribution was 
divided through the Teamsters. 
In further testimony, Elkins said he was told by McLaughlin and 
Maloney that Terry and Dunis must be kept out of the Union until Terry 
agreed to eat crow and pay a large fine to get readmitted. Terry went 
through a series of efforts to get into the good graces of Frank 
Brewster. Eventually Terry paid more than $10,000 just to get in to see 
Brewster, who humiliated him. When Terry was finally readmitted, Maloney 
was very upset. 
The Coin Mac~.:dne Mell of Oregon was not created by the Teamsters 
Union. It was a rational response to opposition to pinball by the City 
Council later taken over by the Teamsters. A redefinition of the right 
of individuals to organize in thef.r own interests took place. Kennedy 
and his staff in the Hearings Sf!emtd to suggest that this legitimate 
pressure group was part of an org2.nized crime net~~ork by dint of the fact 
that pinball had become illegal. 
118 
Stan Terry indicated that his difficulties with the Teamsters began 
in 1953. John Sweeney wanted all of Terry's men to be in the Union. 
Terry, already a Teamster, resisted unionization for his employees. When 
he realized what this would cost him, he went to Seattle twice and San 
Francisco once just to talk to Sweeney and Brewster about getting back 
into the Union. Pressure was put on Terry at various levels. The Mt. 
Hood Cafe picketing in February was just one example. Crosby, according 
to Terry, suggested seeing Sweeney in San Francisco. Terry eventually 
went to attorneys Black, Kendall and Fain, who also represented the 
Oregonian Publishing Company. David Fain called Jim Landye, attorney for 
the Teamsters Union, and explained that Terry was ready to join the Union 
and would sign any contract they wanted. 
Terry's machinations in attempting to get back into the Union's good 
graces are an indication of the power of the Union. Terry indicated that 
Elkins told him that there was an attempt by Teamsters people to take 
part of Elkins' money from him. Terry denied paying the $10,000 to get 
readmitted (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Teamsters and Oregon Politics. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) had heard 
dubious sources supporting James Elkins' story about the Teamsters 
moving into the Portland vice market. But support for his story also 
came from Howard Morgan, a well-known, respectable and responsible old-
line Oregonian. He was head of the State Democratic Party and a member 
of the Federal Utility CoD1Dission at the time of the Hearings. Because 
of this, Morgan's testimony is perhaps the most supportive of Elkins' 
allegations and the most damaging to the Teamsters Union. Morgan said 
that the Union had never followed party lines in its position on 
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elections. For example, it supported Paul Patterson, a Republican, for 
governor, while the rest of labor supported Joseph Carson, a Democrat. 
Patterson, the incumbent, won. In 1954, Teamsters supported Democrat 
William Langley for Multnomah County District Attorney against 
Republican John Mccourt (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Horgan, as head of the Democratic party, heard about the Teamsters 
support of Paul Patterson a week before the Central Labor Council's 
paper, the Labor Press, made endorsements public. He held a meeting with 
Sweeney, Crosby, Malloy and others in the Teamsters Union and was told by 
Crosby that the decision had been made in Seattle (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). Morgan, at this time, attempted to find somebody other 
than Langley to run against John HcCourt, but Langley, the only Democrat 
to file, ran unopposed for the nomination (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
According to Morgan, Langley was not seen after the nomination until 
about six weeks before the end of the campaign when suddenly Maloney came 
down from Seattle. Maloney represented himself as being from David Beck, 
Frank Brewster and John Sweeney. He called himself a Teamsters official 
and immediately put Langley on what Horgan called "a 22-hour schedule" 
with plenty of money. Morgan indicated that many Democrats were 
frightened by Maloney, that he was not well liked, that he was not a man 
interested in good government (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
According to Morgan, after the election Ken Rinke, County 
Democratic Chairman, and Morgan ran into Teamsters Maloney, Crosby, 
Sweeney and Jim Hagen and had coffee with them at the airport. Morgan 
and Rinke warned the Teamsters that they did not want them moving in on 
Portland. This comment was not well received, Horgan said. 
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During a later period in the campaign, according to Morgan, Attorney 
General Robert Y. Thornton, the only Democrat elected to state office in 
1952, wanted to investigate the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) 
in a case of bribery. Republican Governor Patterson would not let 
Thornton investigate the OLCC in Multnomah County. The Oregon Constitu-
tion, Morgan pointed out, did not allow superseding of a local District 
Attorney's power without the governor's direct instruction. 
Morgan described the pressure put on him in the matter of the OLCC 
investigation on December 10, 1954, at a Democratic dinner party: 
Mr. Maloney showed up at that dinner and just before the guests 
were to sit down, with about 700 people in the room, 40 or SO 
of them standing around within earshot and watching the 
performance, Maloney, with no warning walked up to me in the 
middle of the hall, and with a cigar between his first two 
fingers, thumped me on the chest, scattering cigar ashes all 
over a dark blue suit I had on, and said, "You make Thornton 
lay off that Liquor Commission investigation," in a very loud 
voice. Of course, I was angry and while brushing the cigar 
ashes off my clothes, I said, "That sounds like an order," and 
he said, "That's an order." 
I then told him to go to hell, but the immediate question I 
asked him was, "What is your interest in the Liquor Control 
Commission? Why don't you want that investigated? Why do you 
care whether it's investigated?" 
He said, "You know damn well what this means to us. Paul 
Patterson is our pigeon, and we don't want anybody shooting at 
him. II 
What this means is that Oregon is a monopoly state. The Liquor 
Commission is appointed by the governor. It is a three-man 
commission. It is directly responsible to the governor. Any 
embarrassment to the Liquor Commission, and there have been 
stories about scandals in the commission since it was 
established in 1933, is a tremendous handicap to the governor. 
It is his responsibility. 
After I told Maloney that I would have nothing to do with 
Thornton's starting the investigation, and I would have 
nothing to do with his stopping it even if I wanted to, which I 
didn't, he retired then and talked to Clyde Crosby. Crosby 
then approached me, and in a more quiet tone of voice said, 
"Has Maloney been trying to give you a bad time?" And I said, 
"He has been trying." Crosby said, "Well, I would put it a 
little differently, but it amounts to the same thing. We wish 
Thornton would lay off." (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957, p. 320). 
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At this time, according to Morgan, Attorney General Thornton 
announced that Governor Patterson would not let him investigate. Instead 
he would ask District Attorney Langley to help in the OLCC investigation. 
Morgan warned Thornton away from Langley, but Thornton did not apparently 
believe him. Four days later, Thornton called Morgan and said that he 
was right, that Langley had chickened out on the investigation, and 
Morgan then predicted correctly that if Thornton kept pressing the 
matter, the Republican governor would nevertheless have a Democrat -
District Attorney Langley - investigate the matter (Morgan-Uris 
interview 1981). 
Morgan testified that the Teamsters attempted to remove County 
Commissioner Mike Gleason. Morgan believed that the Teamsters Union was 
attempting to take over law enforcement and government in Multnomah 
County and eventually in the whole state of Oregon (Morgan-Uris interview 
1981; U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
By September of 1955 Morgan was convinced that the 1956 elections 
would result in a complete takeover of Oregon by the Teamsters. At that 
time, he said, he went to the press. Morgan went to Malcolm Bauer, then 
the editor of the Oregonian, Douglas McKeene, then the editor of the 
editorial page of the Oregon Journal, and Wendell Webb, then the editor 
of The Oregon Statesman. No one believed his story, Morgan said. It was 
not until James Elkins went to the Oregonian in the spring of 1956 that 
people began to give Morgan' s story some credibility. 
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In 1956, Morgan reported, Governor Robert Holmes had a deficit of 
$15,000 in his $43,000 election campaign and had been offered $10,000 in 
exchange for reforming the OLCC. Morgan was sent to find out where the 
money was coming from and eventually talked with Matthew Spear, a liquor 
and beer distributor. Morgan said he asked Spear about the money at a 
luncheon and Spear indicated that the money he heard about came from Beck 
and Brewster and that they wanted a Teamster on the Liquc~ Commission in 
return for the $10, 000. Morgan said he refused the offer. A public 
official would be reluctant to put a Teamster on the OLCC after the 
scandal that took place in the 1930's involving Beck, the Teamsters and 
the Liquor Commission (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Apparently, the Teamsters were interested in the OLCC position 
because they wanted control of selection and distribution of liquor from 
east coast distillers. This would enable them, during strikes on the 
east coast, to put pressure on those distillers by rejecting their 
product during labor disputes. 
Under subpoena, Matthew Spear appeared before the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957). He indicated that he had worked for K & L Distributors in 
Seattle. The officers of that company included Dave Beck, Jr. and 
eventually Mrs. Dave Beck. Spear indicated that the $10,000 was merely a 
hypothetical offer (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Elkins resumed his testimony and indicated that two members of the 
Liquor Commission staff were fired for accepting gratuities. One of 
these, Thomas Sheridan, came to Elkins, who did not at that time know 
him, Elkins said. Elkins took Sheridan to Crosby (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). Crosby, said Elkins, called Sweeney, who said, "We might 
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as well see if we have bought a pig in a poke." This is a reference to 
Republican Governor Patterson (U.S. Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
After a discussion with Governor Patterson, said Elkins, Crosby called 
and said that the matter was taken care of. Sheridan was reinstated in 
his job with a loss of only a month' s pay. 
Elkins insisted that, in 1955, Governor Patterson and Multnomah 
County District Attorney Langley had clandestine meetings. Maloney told 
him that the investigations of the OLCC under Langley would be a 
whitewash and that witnesses necessary to the investigation would 
disappear from sight. Langley's and Sheridan's conversations were 
recorded by Elkins, Elkins claimed (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
Elkins said Joe McLaughlin had traveled with Clyde Crosby in May of 
1955. This was confirmed by other witnesses. In San Francisco, Crosby 
and McLaughlin did stay at the Olympic Hotel in adjoining rooms and did 
take the same flight, further confirming Elkins' story (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957, p. 743, Exhibit 37). 
Clyde Crosby, in the first quarter of 1955, encouraged the relation-
ship between Maloney and McLaughlin. There were in constant discussion 
regarding cutting up the vice pie in Portland. Using his clandestine 
tape recordings, Elkins presented what he said were the voices of the 
conspirators dividing up Portland. The first taped discussion played for 
the Connnittee seemed to center around the question of football gambling 
sheets. People allegedly involved in the football service were Maury 
Autschuller, Leo Plotkin and Bob Archer, operator of the Rialto Pool 
Hall. Archer balked. Elkins put pressure on Archer insisting that he 
must go along or be shut down by the District Attorney's office (U.S. 
Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
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Throughout this period, Maloney and McLaughlin tried to get Elkins 
to open up more bootleg, gambling and after-hours joints. Maloney wanted 
to get into prostitution, according to Elkins, and contacted Nate Zusman, 
owner of the Desert Room nightclub, who put him in touch with two madams, 
Helen Hardy and Helen Smally (Big Helen and Small Helen) . 
In her affidavit, Helen Hardy stated that in May or June of 1955, 
Zusman indicated that he had reliable information that District Attorney 
Langley would see that she would not be bothered if she opened up a call 
house with Helen Smalley in Portland (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). Zusman offered backing and told her that Maloney was the man with 
the information on the District Attorney's office. Hardy then rented a 
house at 24th and Pettygrove, furnished it expensively, and opened. She 
said the Zusman and Maloney visited the house together. Two weeks after 
the house was opened, a police car was parked in front of the house every 
night from ten in the evening until three in the morning. She called 
Zusman and asked what the hell was going on. He put Maloney on the phone 
and Maloney then said that Zusman should not have said that it was safe 
to open. 
Five weeks after opening, Helen Hardy said Police Chief Purcell and 
two detectives came to her door and told her to get out of business at 
once. She did. She relocated at 11th and Glisan in the warehouse 
district, opening in October. Still scared, Helen Hardy talked to 
Purcell's brother, Bard Purcell, apologized and assured him that she did 
not mean to offend the Chief of Police. 
Here is an indication again of the informal networks between the 
police and criminal elements. That Helen Hardy felt that she should make 
this apology to avoid further trouble is of significance to an 
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understanding of how vice operates successfully in a city serving the 
needs of the vice customer and helping to maintain an established order 
in which there is no 1.:11aos or confusion. 
Her apology, together with her move out of a decent residential 
neighborhood, was evidently enough. There was no further touble with the 
police. She quit in December 1955, she said, because there was not 
enough business for her and Helen Smalley together and that Smalley 
closed voluntarily in April or May of 1956 when the vice expose began 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Zusman, "The Mark of Stark," Appears. Nate Zusman was then called 
before the Committee. Zusman demanded a lie detector test, but only if 
Helen Hardy also took one. Robert Kennedy asked Zusman if he had ever 
been open after 2:30. He indicated that he had not. 
Zusman: "I have been accused of everything, and I have vice 
men there every day, and I wouldn't even think of that." 
Kennedy: "Why do all the vice men go to your place?" 
Zusman answered: "They have no place else to go, I guess, so 
they come around to us." 
Kennedy: "Is there something about your place that they like?" 
Zusman: "We have a nice show." 
Kennedy: "Do any other policemen other than vice men come to 
your place?" 
Zusman: "We have detectives coming in and out. We have the 
men on the beat coming in and out. We have an open door." 
Kennedy: "But mostly the vice squad?" 
Zusman: "The vice squad come in quite often. They call roll 
there sometimes." (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 
474). 
In lengthy testimony, Zusman admitted his involvement with criminals 
though each admission was made reluctantly. He indicated finally that he 
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was at the whorehouse, as Helen Hardy had testified, but denied Hardy's 
version of their conversation (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Zusman stated that Alphonse Calabrese and Jerome Alderman, two 
investigators for the Senate Committee, were rude to him. As proof of 
this, he said that Brad Williams, an Oregon Journal reporter he had 
called, and his attorney who happened to be there, overheard his conver-
sation and could corroborate this. Brad Williams is shown here in a 
crucial position of seeming involvement with a member of the vice commun-
ity. 
Zusman accused Police Lt. Carl Crisp of the vice squad of being a 
stooge for Elkins. Zusman also accused Crisp of attempting to put him 
out of business because he would not sell his club to him. Later, in a 
signed affidavit, Lt. Crisp denied the accusations of Zusman. 
Zusman indicated: Leo Plotkin had worked for him and Plotkin had 
mentioned his connections with Maloney, Brewster and Sweeney; Maloney 
had been in constant contact with Zusman; Plotkin understood there was a 
District Attorney's connection for Swede Ferguson, another vice 
operator, that allowed Ferguson to stay open despite the illegality of 
his after-hours and gambling joints; Plotkins all this ti.me was reporting 
vice operation locations to Langley through Maloney and was referred to 
on the King Towers tapes as "The Spy." (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
"The Spy". Apparently Leo Plotkin became involved with Marie 
Maynard, a recognized operator of houses of prostitution and 
conversations on her behalf took place with Maloney. Maloney indicated 
to Plotkin that he would talk to Lt. Crisp, head of the vice squad. 
Crisp, according to Plotkin, told Maloney that Marie Maynard would have 
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to close down her whorehouse for a while but could reopen later. Maloney 
admitted that Langley did not want a lot of whorehouses mushrooming up 
all over town, but would allow three or four houses to exist. Maloney 
had also indicated that Chief of Police Jim Purcell was uncooperative 
about allowing places to continue to operate (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
Plotkin had indicated to Kennedy in Seattle that he believed that 
the Teamsters were trying to get rid of the chief of police and mayor in 
Portland. Plotkin now modified his testimony and indicated his involve-
ment with football sheets, billiard parlors, etc. 
Plotkin stated that Clyde Crosby secured an attorney for him when he 
was arrested. Plotkin was the man beaten by the police which occasioned 
Crosby's going to the Mayor to complain about the police department and 
to threaten the Mayor. Crosby allegedly demanded that the Mayor get rid 
of the head of the police department or lose the support of the Teamsters 
Union. 
Bard Purcell, the Chief's brother, in his affidavit, confirmed that 
Helen Hardy did ask him about Tom Maloney, who was identified as a 
Teamster, and that she had the impression from Maloney that she would not 
be bothered by the police (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Later Zusman failed his lie detector test, a test he demanded so 
vociferously. But Zusman was not the only individual before the 
Committee to fail a lie detecter test or to refuse to take one. 
The Outsiders Push Hard. If Elkins' and others' stories are to be 
believed, Frank Brewster had made a terrible misjudgment believing that 
McLaughlin could control Tom Maloney. Maloney, in his own ambitious way 
and with his own small-time orientation, appeared to be pushing far too 
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hard at the Portland establishment, trying the relationships between the 
guardians of justice and the vice activists. 
In response to the pressure from Maloney and others, Elkins opened 
up the Rialto and Elite billiard parlors as poker, dice and "21" houses 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). Both were immediately closed. 
This confirmed Elkins' understanding of his situation. Maloney and 
McLaughlin still believed Elkins was holding out money on them. He ended 
up givimg them close to $20,000 in eight months, he said, but they were 
still unsatisfied. Langley, according to Elkins, insisted that they were 
was not getting enough from Elkins. This is confirmed by the King Towers 
tapes (Oregon State Archives, accession number 69A-542 n.d.). All of 
this money, Elkins argued, was coming out of his own pockets because he 
could not open any joints without the police closing them. (Langley, in 
1980, emphasized his belief that Elkins was lying to get rid of a D.A. 
who would close down Elkins' power (Langley-Uris interview 1980)). 
Maloney became interested in opening up a place in the black commun-
ity. He went to see two operators in that community, Bob Seger and David 
Nance. Maloney attempted to persuade them to become involved with Tom 
Johnson in opening up places in the black neighborhoods. Maloney, 
exhibited no understanding of existing arrangements as attested to by 
interview subjects in 1980 (anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
According to Elkins, Maloney' s demands seemed unending. Elkins' 
efforts to get Maloney and McLaughlin off his back kept failing. Crosby, 
as was suggested earlier, kept insisting that Brewster and Sweeney wanted 
Maloney and McLaughlin in the Portland area. Soon Maloney was demanding 
a piece of the Chinese action. Maloney further asked that he get a cut of 
the abortion action, Elkins said (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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Elkins, throughout the Hearings, maintained that he had nothing to 
do with the abortion business, but other sources link Elkins closely with 
elements in the abortion community. His involvement with a Portland 
hospital which was reputed to be an abortion center is a case in point. 
According to police informants, Elkins' operations through the hospital 
were mainly as a source for narcotics for himself, but also as a possible 
connection for income from abortions (Reiter-Uris interview 1970). 
By the time Maloney was making these demands, Elkins knew that 
McLaughlin and Maloney were complaining to Sweeney about him. There were 
discussions involving double-crossers of William Langley. He knew, for 
example, that Langley was not getting all of the money that Elkins was 
giving to Maloney and McLaughlin to be given to Langley. By then, Elkins 
was, he said, a frightened man. He decided that Maloney intended to 
frame him. 
The transcriptions of the tapes as presented to the Committee showed 
Maloney, McLaughlin and Langley talking about being able to get rid of 
Elkins. Elkins was referred to on the tape as "The Character," and 
Langley as "The Kid" or "Abe Lincoln" or "Honest Abe." It was decided 
that they would either get rid of "The Character" or start operations in 
the county, well away from him. Langley said that he could have Elkins 
put in jail. Both McLaughlin and Maloney worried that messing with 
Elkins would result in their having trouble themselves (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
On the same tapes there were discussions of choices for the new 
chief of police, always with the assumption that the chief would be 
replaced. An affidavit was introduced into the Committee Hearings from 
Harvey (Swede) Ferguson, operator of gambling establishments and after-
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hours joints, indicating that Elkins had loaned $5, 000 to Ferguson. 
Ferguson had been referred to Maloney by Langley. After discussion 
involving Langley and Maloney, Ferguson had opened the Key Bridge Club 
and the Dance School, both of which were after-hours joints featuring 
liquor, dice and cards. Elkins would take 50% of the gross and the half 
remaining was given to Elkins to pay off Ferguson's debt. Plotkin was 
hired as his floor man to oversee the operation. The Key Club and the 
Dance School were alternately opened. As one was raided, the other would 
open. 
By October or November of 1955, when Maloney was leaving town after 
the break-up of the partnership with Elkins, Swede closed his joints, 
feeling that there was no longer any protection left. Maloney was 
apparently insisting that Plotkin be fired, and Swede insisted that 25% 
of the gross of Elkins' money was given to Maloney, allegedly for protec-
tion, presumably to go to Langley (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
On March 22, 1956, Elkins got Joe McLaughlin to sign a receipt 
allegedly for 1955 tax purposes involving the Service Machine Company, 
which was Elkins' front organization. Listed as Exhibit 39 on page 753, 
it tended to support Elkins' claims of a business relationship with 
McLaughlin. 
Lt. Carl Crisp, responding to accusations in the Hearings, 
presented an affidavit acknowledging that he met Maloney in August of 
1955. Maloney identified himself to Crisp as a big man with the 
Teamsters. Maloney interfered in attempts to convict a notorious madam, 
Blanche Kaye. Crisp was careful to emphasize that he knew of no certain 
link between Crosby and Maloney (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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In an affidavit, Bard Purcell insisted that Maloney talked to him 
about having to open the town up for vice. He wanted Bard Purcell to 
contact his brother, the Chief of Police, to tell him of that necessity. 
Maloney kept ref erring to Brewster and Sweeney in their conversations 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
According to Elkins, Maloney and McLaughlin brought Morey 
Altschuler to Portland to run a horse book. Elkins indicated that he 
eventually considered going to the Governor or the Oregonian with his 
tapes as evidence, but that he feared that his own business operations 
would suffer thereby, and that he would not be taken seriously. Finally, 
he said, he went to see District Attorney William Langley with his tapes, 
apparently attempting to pressure Langely into taking some action. 
According to Elkins' testimony at the Senate Hearings, Elkins went a 
second time to Langley's house and threatened to give the tapes to the 
Oregonian if Langley did not stop taking orders from Maloney and McLaugh-
lin. Depending upon what was the real nature of Elkins' and Langley's 
relationship, this demand and threat could well have been a form of 
blackmail. 
Elkins said that he played a part of the tapes for Clyde Crosby. 
The purpose of this was, he said, to prove that Maloney and McLaughlin 
were not sharing their take as agreed upon with Crosby, Brewster and 
Sweeney. Elkins said that Crosby wanted to take the tapes and play them 
for Brewster and Sweeney in Washington. But Elkins said he learned that 
Crosby told Langley that he, Crosby, could get the 70-plus hours of tape 
recordings and thus set up Elkins to lose the one bit of evidence that 
Elkins had against them (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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The Ex-Mayor Explains. Former Portland Mayor Fred Peterson (1952-
1956) submitted to the Committee an affidavit dated March 2, 1957. In 
late December 1954, he was introduced by Clyde Crosby to Tom Maloney at 
lunch. During that lunch, Crosby said he wanted Maloney to help manage 
Peterson's campaign in May of 1956. Peterson was noncommital, saying 
only that he had a campaign manager. He said that Maloney frequently 
came to the Mayor's office to give him unsought advice (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Maloney pushed himself upon those who did not really want him, a 
characteristic seen throughout his Portland career. Did Maloney create 
many of the problems? It is unclear whether Maloney was an agent of the 
Teamsters carrying out orders or an independent using and influencing the 
Union to become involved in Portland. 
On Friday, June 17, 1955, Maloney sent a note to Mayor Peterson 
offering the help of the Teamsters in getting special interest votes. 
Maloney stated in his note that because Peterson "had guts," he would be 
helped. Maloney invited Peterson to contact him through Clyde Crosby. 
The help of Ron Moxness, editor of the Teamsters paper, was offered in 
the mayoral race. 
By late July or August of 1955, Maloney went again to Peterson 
saying Nance and Seger would get the black vote for Peterson if they were 
allowed to operate in the black area. This fits with earlier accusations 
that Maloney was trying to get a piece of the black gambling and vice 
activity. 
But Tom Johnson pretty much coordinated vice within the black 
community. Johnson now faced an outside force that was attempting to 
rearrange the delicately established relationships between the 
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authorities and the various vice operators. Johnson probably did not 
want or need partners in either his comunity businesses or the E-R 
property deal, yet Teamster clout made him accept, at least outwardly, 
the new arrangement. 
Peterson, according to his affidavit, refused Maloney' s offers. 
Maloney then asked to talk to Chief Purcell, seeking a special introduc-
tion, which was denied. Maloney later went to Peterson asking for a 
meeting between Purcell and Langley, who apparently were then feuding. 
How Maloney would fit in as a go-between is unclear unless one considers 
that Maloney was involved closely with Langley. Perhaps Maloney planned 
to use his supposed Teamsters clout to form an agreement to divide 
Portland among rival factions. By December of 1955, Clyde Crosby had 
come to Peterson and said that Brewster and Sweeney wanted Purcell out of 
office, as mentioned earlier (U.S. Senate Comittee Hearings 1957). 
The extortion materials used by Elkins included tapes he had made of 
others without their permission. Some of that material, never used by 
Elkins, came from a phone tap that was in violation of federal wiretap 
statutes. This will de dealt with later. 
Did the Sheriff Take a Bribe? Elkins, late in his U.S. Senate 
Select Comittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957) testimony, presented yet another story which would have great 
impact on Portland politics. Elkins began by saying that he had an 
interest in the 8212 Club, a club in the Kenton district ostensibly owned 
by Clifford 0. (Jimy) Bennett. Elkins said that he was paying Maloney 
and McLaughlin in part out of the proceeds of this club. Plotkin (The 
Spy) told Maloney that the 8212 Club was not doing that well. Elkins 
alleged that Maloney contacted Ray Kell, identified in the Hearings as 
134 
the Sheriff's campaign manager in the Schrunk mayoral campaign against 
Peterson. Maloney allegedly told Kell that Schrunk should raid the 8212 
Club (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Elkins said that on September 11, 1955 Schrunk did raid the 8212 
Club, but only three or four drunks were arrested. He said that Clifford 
Bennett, the club operator, told him that he had given Schrunk $500. 
According to Elkins, Laura Stone, bookkeeper at the Kenton Club, told him 
that they were $500 short, and Deputy Sheriff Wally Wallins told Elkins 
shortly thereafter that he could go ahead with the operation of the 8212 
Club in Kenton. 
Clifford Bennett was then called to the stand and refused to 
testify. Virginia Jenkins, bartender at the club, described the raid. 
She said that two sheriffs came into the place at 3:30 a.m., that there 
was visible gambling going on, that there was card playing and craps and 
that there was money on the tables. She said that Bennett talked with 
one of the deputy sheriffs. She said that she found it strange that 
Sheriff Terry Schrunk was part of the raid. Bennett went upstairs and 
returned at once. Bennett then told her that the raid was occurring 
because he forgot to take care of Schrunk. Bennett then asked her for a 
manila envelope and went outside. She stated that this was a county 
sheriff's raid in the City of Portland, an unusual occurrence in and of 
itself (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
John W. Vance, an admitted thief, said that he was at the 8212 Club 
the night of the raid, that he was working as a checker for Elkins and 
that Bennett asked him, "Isn't it better to pay $500 tonight rather than 
$15,000 tomorrow?" He saw Bennett put $500 in an envelope. (It must be 
pointed out that Vance and the others, as Elkins' employees, were not the 
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most reputable of witnesses.) (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Laura Stone further indicated that Elkins bankrolled the 8212 Club for 
$1,500; that when the club was closed that night, Bennett returned $1,000 
to Elkins and told her that the $500 had been paid to Schrunk (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Under subpoena, Merlin L. Tiedeman, a Portland policeman, testified 
that he and his partner Lowell Amundson received a radio call at 3:30 
a.m. on the night of the raid on the 8212 Club. He was told by the 
Sheriff to come to Denver and Kilpatrick Streets and to pick up a lost or 
stolen bicycle. 
At that address, he said, he saw Bennett come out of the club, talk 
to the Sheriff, go back into the building and come back out, talk briefly 
to Schrunk again, go around the corner where there was a water fountain 
and a telephone pole and put "something" behind the pole. He said that 
Schrunk went over to the pole shortly thereafter and picked something up 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). Officer Dick Sutter, another 
Portland policeman, was also there and was said to have remarked, "That 
crooked son of a bitch." 
Visibility was good, the policeman reported, and the action took 
place less than 50 feet from them. Officer Lowell Amundson confirmed 
seeing the same things that Officers Sutter and Tiedeman said they saw at 
the 8212 Club (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Frank Daniels, identified as an unemployed bartender, testified to 
the Senate Committee that he, while out looking for a job, perceived the 
raid and saw Schrunk pick up the enveiope near the 8212 Club (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). He stated that after the raid, he asked 
Bennett what was happening, and Bennett said he was almost arrested, but 
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that now everything was okay. He said that he told the story around 
town, and eventually the word got back to Turner and Lambert of the 
Oregonian and they interviewed Daniels (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
Terry Schrunk, by 1957 Mayor of Portland, appeared before the 
Committee. (Schrunk was Sheriff from 1949 to 1956 and Mayor from 1957 to 
1973). He began his testimony: 
I am astounded and amazed that a Committee of the United States 
Senate is being used, without any knowledge on the part of you 
gentlemen certainly, for political purposes such as this." 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 595). 
Shortly thereafter, the Committee, which did not treat Mayor Schrunk as 
well as it treated Elkins, interrupted his statement and pushed him hard. 
Schrunk requested that an affidavit by the previously mentioned operator 
of the 8212 Club, Clifford Bennett, be admitted into evidence. But the 
Committee refused Bennett's affidavit saying that since Bennett would 
not testify and took the Fifth Amendment, his affidavit would not be 
appropriate. Schrunk then stated that Bennett told him that Wallace 
Turner of the Oregonian threatened Bennett, saying that the Hearings were 
all set up and that Turner did not want Bennett to mess it up. 
Schrunk suggested that the Committee was using Wallace Turner as a 
consultant. Schrunk argued that Turner had an interest in the outcome of 
the Committee's hearings (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). It is 
true that the Oregonian reporters had a vested interest in the outcome of 
the Hearings. The Committee relied upon the Oregonian's version of the 
story. The Committee never called Doug Baker, Rolla Crick or Brad 
Williams of the Oregon Journal as witnesses and rejected Schrunk' s 
suggestion that they might be called to give a balance to the matter. 
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What might have happened had they given testimony? Hindsight and 
what-if's are irrelevant to this kind of history, but the U.S. Senate 
Select Coamittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957) was definitely biased in that it did not choose to hear those 
witnesses, witnesses that presumably would have been available to the 
Committee had they been sought. 
(In 1958, Schrunk was tried for receiving the $500 sum from Bennett 
and was found not guilty. A significant number of the police witnesses 
changed their testimony by the time of the trial saying they were not 
sure Schrunk took anything at all.) 
Schrunk Strikes Back. Mayor Schrunk accused Elkins of being 
involved in electing the mayor of Seattle as well as supporting Peterson 
against Dorothy McCullough Lee. Schrunk further accused Elkins of 
controlling law enforcement in the police department and some sheriffs 
with bribes and blackmail. He further labeled Elkins a major vice lord 
of Portland. He stated that Crosby never approached him with any illegal 
proposition and pleaded that the CoDDDittee talk with Journal reporters 
for an objective position. He arged that the Journal was fair and the 
Oregonian not (U.S. Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin responded that Elkins had been 
corroborated so far by other sources. Robert Kennedy jumped in to point 
out that a document that supposedly was prepared by the Oregon Journal 
for the CoDDDittee was actually prepared by Brad Williams and that the 
Journal was in fact going to discipline him for it because it contained 
false statements. 
The Chair, Senator McClellen, then dimissively said of the Journal 
people that they could write what they wished and contribute it to the 
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Committee, but that they would not be subpoenaed because it already was 
becoming too expensive. 
Schrunk said that the Oregonian was using the Hearings as a device 
to libel him. He said that in 1950 James Elkins and his crowd put up Glen 
Ackerman on the Republican ticket and Bard Purcell, brother of Chief Jim 
Purcell, and then a police officer with the Portland Police Department, 
on the Democratic ticket in an effort to defeat Schrunk for Sheriff. The 
Committee again did not allow Schrunk to continue with this line of 
testimony (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Schrunk was never allowed to make a full explanation. Yet he 
admitted knowing Maloney and knowing that Maloney worked on Langley's 
campaign. He denied knowledge of work by Maloney on his own campaign. 
The Committee was clearly attempting to link Schrunk with Maloney. 
Schrunk continued his version of the 8212 Club incident. He stated 
that on September 2, 1955, James Madison brought a bad check from the 
8212 Club to Schrunk's attention. Schrunk then had Detective Minielly 
check out both the check and why the club, which was supposed to have 
been closed, was open. Schrunk explained that in 1954 he had asked the 
Oregon Liquor Control Commission and the city police to close the 8212 
Club. On December 12 and August 26, 1954, there were raids on the club. 
When Minielly checked the matter out in September of 1955, he discovered 
that Bennett had rented the place and seemed to be close to some city 
policemen, according to Schrunk. Minielly said to the landlady that if 
the city police did not close the place down, the county police would. 
Bennett apprently tried to contact Hinielly and Minielly refused to talk 
with him. 
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At this point, Schrunk said he ordered his uniformed police to get 
inside the private 8212 Club. It is interesting that Schrunk did not 
order undercover police into the club but attempted only to bring in the 
uniformed policemen. 
Apparently, two officers did follow a crowd into the club while in 
uniform. The officers said they saw blackjack being played, but that 
they saw no money changing hands, said Schrunk. Schrunk argued that a 
search warrant, which required evidence, was needed in order to get into 
a private establishment. The city police could get in because of a city 
law relating to such an establishment. But the County Sheriff's office 
was limited by state law which required a search warrant. Schrunk 
emphasized the complexitites of getting a conviction in a gambling case 
which involved money changing hands, money being visible and so on. 
The club was closed on the 10th because Minielly had hassled the 
landlord on the 9th. Early ol.1 the 11th Schrunk discovered that the club 
was again open, and the raid took place. Schrunk indicated that he 
arrived after the raid and was invited inside by Bennett but saw nothing. 
Schrunk said that only a few drunks who were outside the club could be 
arrested because there was no known exchange of money visible to the 
officers (U.S. Senate Connnittee Hearings 1957). 
Schrunk futher said, under questioning by the U.S. Senate 
Connnittee, that no abatement proceedings were undertaken because the 
place was closed down after this and that there was no real evidence. 
Schrunk repeatedly denied receiving the $500 and emphasized that it is 
necessary to observe money changing hands to do anything in a gambling 
place. 
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This is a questionable matter. Why did Schrunk not send in under-
cover officers? Why send in uniformed officers?" And more importantly, 
why not attempt to have undercover officers engage in gambling activity? 
But Schrunk emphasized that a history of disorderly operations must be 
shown in order to abate a place or to padlock it and that only uniformed 
men were available at 3 a.m. Yet the place had been raided twice before 
the 11th. With plainclothesmen it should have been easy to prove a 
gambling charge. 
Mayor Schrunk insisted, in direct contrast to previous witnesses, 
that there were no clear evidences of gambling. Schrunk asked that the 
CoDDDittee call the county policemen involved in the raid to testify. 
Senator Joe McCarthy responded, asking why he did not close the 
club. Schrunk kept insisting that he did not have the authority. One 
question then remains: Why did he conduct the raid in the first place? 
(U.S. Senate CoDDDittee Hearings 1957). 
Mayor Schrunk said that he had tried to raid another place of 
Bennett's in the city earlier, but that place was closed because Bennett 
had been tipped off. He said that the Oregonian had also been tipped and 
was waiting at the site of the raid before the Sheriff's officers got 
there. Schrunk was then asked, "How many times did Sheriff's officers 
make raids within the City?" (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957) 
Schrunk acknowledged that there were 20 to 30 such raids. He insisted 
that they only took place after complaints that city police were not 
doing anything to deal with gambling. Elkins' employee Virginia Jenkins 
emphasized again that there was both drinking and gambling going on while 
the two uniformed officers were in the place (U.S. Senate CoDDDittee 
Hearings 195 7) . 
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Schrunk admitted that he was on the corner by the fountain but 
denied picking up any kind of package. He pointed out that it would be 
illogical that he would do this right in front of a group of policemen 
who were parked across the street, especially police from a rival juris-
diction. This is important. It does seem unlikely that Schrunk would 
accept a bribe in such a bold and obvious manner (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
Committee Counsel Robert Kennedy then began to pressure Schrunk. 
Kennedy asked how it could be that eight officers including two who 
worked for him could all be testifying against him. Schrunk then offered 
to take a lie detecter test from a reputable agency. Eventually a lie 
detecter test was agreed upon, to be given by the Secret Service. 
Schrunk said that he had been unfairly treated in similar circumstances. 
(Schrunk flunked a lie detecter test administered by the State of Oregon. 
Schrunk explained this by insisting that test was a frame-up, that 
somebody had "gotten to" the agency giving the test.) (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). Senator Sam Irvin said that lie detecter test 
are, at best, a dubious check of honesty and are not always admissible in 
courts of law. 
Responding to the suggestion that he was one of the Union's men, 
Schrunk emphasized that his election was supported by several unions, 
including the Teamsters, and by businessmen, church and civic groups. He 
stated that the University of Portland and the Oregon Journal supported 
his electoral efforts. 
Schrunk admitted that he knew Clyde Crosby. He indicated that he 
knew Maloney only as a guy from Seattle who helped Langley and denied 
personal knowledge of Jim Elkins. He also said that Elkins was into 
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prostitution as well as other rackets and that Elkins was a dope addict. 
He insisted that there were people who said that you must know Elkins to 
stick around Portland and be involved in local politics, but that he 
emphatically did not agree (U.S. Senate Colllllittee Hearings 1957). 
Portland Policeman Richard Sutter testified through affidavit that 
he was ordered to watch Schrunk' s house and inform his superiors the 
minute Schrunk left his home. Schrunk introduced the affidavit himself 
to emphasize collusion between the city police and vice operators. 
Sutter indicated the surveillance was carried on from February 22, 1956 
to March 30, 1956, and was done because officers were afraid that Schrunk 
would raid the vice operators. Schrunk indicated that over $80,000 was 
spent on watching him. Schrunk further indicated that the Grand Jury 
called into the case initially at the instance of the Oregonian had ended 
up by indicting Elkins more often than any other individual. 
A February 17, 1957, statement by Katherine Weeks, a convicted 
prostitute, was read into the record. She said she worked in a house 
from which Elkins collected money. The house was run by Jerry Rogers, 
Ray Clark's wife. Weeks swore that many of the women working in the 
house were hooked on narcotics supplied by Jim Elkins (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
A second affidavit by Officer Sutter was introduced. Sutter, who 
initially indicated that Schrunk had taken the bribe, stated that he was 
no longer sure of anything in regard to the incident. 
Schrunk acknowledged that one of the members of the first Grand Jury 
investigating the bribe issue, Hrs. Jane Rossman, voted against him one 
day then changed her vote the next. He acknowledged that the day she 
changed her vote her husband was appointed to the Zoo CoDDDission and that 
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on that day she had talked with Ray Kell, Schrunk's campaign manager. 
Kennedy then read a statement from the judge that threw the Grand Jury 
out because of the irregularities of Jane Rossman's actions (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). While there is no clear financial or power 
advantage to being on the Zoo Commission, such an appointment did carry a 
certain social status. 
Robert Kennedy pointed out in an attack upon Schrunk that Harvey 
(Swede) Ferguson's operations in gambling, after-hours joints and 
illegal liquor at the Taft Hotel and Tom Johnson's Keystone Club 
operation had had no abatements against them despite their notorious 
operations. Kennedy then presented a list of 35 clubs he claimed were 
operating under Terry Schrunk as Mayor. He claimed that only three of 
them had ever been hit in raids while Schrunk was Mayor. (A later 
examination of these 35 clubs by the Portland Police Department suggested 
that most of the operations as listed by Kennedy's investigators either 
never existed or had not existed for some time.) 
Twenty-one of the listed clubs turned out to be in what was then 
known as either the "North" part of town or the "colored section." One 
was a Chinese gambling place near Williams and Russell; another, the 
35th, turned out to be the Fireside, a notorious gambling retreat in the 
city of Milwaukie, south of Portland and outside of Schrunk's 
jurisdiction. It was at the Fireside that many of the business community 
used to gather to gamble in the days when the Pago Pago, owned by Al 
Winter, had been closed by Dorothy McCullough Lee. Of the remaining 
places, most were in the Northwest and Southwest, and virtually all of 
them were operated by such figures as Blanche Kaye, Marie Maynard, Nate 
Zusman and others. Most were call or bawdy houses. 
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Crosby, Elkins and the Teamsters. Teamster official Clyde Crosby 
was then called to the stand and explained that his arrest in Arizona 
when he was a teenager was because of a theft of food (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Crosby argued that the Oregonian, James Elkins and local underworld 
figures were responsible for his indictments. He said that John Mccourt 
was supported by Jim Elkins in the District Attorney contest in 1954, 
which was why Crosby got the Union to support William Langley (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). After November of 1954, the Teamsters, 
Crosby admitted, did start to organize pinball machine distributors and 
routes which involved 125 to 150 people. This happened at a time, he 
said, when he found out Elkins had pinball machines in the Labor Temple. 
Crosby said he used his influence to keep Elkins out of the Union because 
Elkins was a gangster and that Elkins went above his head at least once 
to try to get into the Union. This dovetails closely with Elkins' own 
version of what happened. 
Crosby said that early in 1955 Stan Terry called saying that he had 
bought Elkins' routes. Crosby stated that he did not believe this until 
two months later. It was for that reason that Terry and Dunis were not 
let into the Union until March of 1955. Crosby went on to state that he 
was confused and disturbed when Stanley Earl, who used to support 
pinball, suddenly opposed it (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
A 1980 interview with a former policeman who arrested Jim Elkins for 
narcotics use, indicated that City Councilman Stanley Earl was "up to his 
neck in crooked activities." This man, now a journalist also worked as a 
private investigator for Drew Pearson on the libel case against Earl 
(anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
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Crosby indicated that Earl's anti-pinball position was instigated 
by Elkins, who he suggested was a confidante of Earl's. It was Elkins, 
said Crosby, who wanted the Teamsters to be involved in local politics. 
He wanted Teamsters' help in shaking down taverns to force them to take 
Elkins' coin machines. Crosby said that he asked Governor Smith to have 
the Attorney General investigate the Portland situation. 
Crosby insisted th.at one night he saw Elkins and Police Chief 
Purcell talking together. After this, he confronted Peterson with 
Elkins' power. Peterson said he had never heard of Elkins, which led 
Crosb~ to believe, he said, that Peterson was controlled by Elkins (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Clyde Crosby indicated that cab drivers in the Teamsters Union kept 
complaining to him that uniformed and vice officers were telling cab 
drivers to take customers only to Elkins' approved list of joints. 
Anyone that operated without Elkins' approval got raided by the police. 
Raids on Elkins' places were extremely rare, and when they did occur, 
Elkins was always informed ahead of time so that he could get expensive 
equipment out of sight. 
Crosby stated that he received veiled threats from Elkins ordering 
him to support Peterson. His wife and children were subject to phony 
telephone calls. Crosby said that he purchased a gun and put the word 
out in the community that he had done so, hoping that Elkins would leave 
him alone. He then applied for a gun permit from the Sheriff's office 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
However, when he sought a gun permit, he did not inform the Sheriff 
that he was an ex-felon, having been convicted of burglary under the name 
Bob Harper in Arizona. When the F. B. I. reported to Sheriff Terry Schrunk 
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that Crosby was an ex-felon and should not be in possession of firearms, 
Schrunk either did not know about or sat on the report of the F .B.I. Only 
when the Oregonian revealed this did Schrunk rescind the gun permit. 
Shortly thereafter, Clyde Crosby, under pressure about lying on his 
permit form, resigned from the Exposition-Recreation Commission. 
If Clyde Crosby's problems were limited to his dishonesty in 
applying for a gun permit, and if all of his contacts with James Elkins 
were limited to a secondhand, reputed role in a profit-making real estate 
scam, the importance of Crosby's involvement and of the Teamsters Union 
itself would be fairly limited. However, according to a sensationally 
presented copyrighted article by Wallace Turner and William Lambert 
appearing on April 22, 1956 on the Oregonian's front page, such was not 
the case. Turner and Lambert stated that on May 18, 1955, while Crosby 
was the International Representative of the Teamsters Union, he 
requested City Councilman Stanley Earl's support for a vote to continue 
the operation of pinball machines in Oregon. Earl was made to understand 
that if he did not vote as requested, he would lose Teamsters Union 
support. 
Clyde Crosby said all the Teamsters Union wanted from Terry Schrunk 
was to get rid of Elkins' organization. Crosby suggested in his Senate 
Committee testimony that Elkins controlled Circuit Court judges and one 
Supreme Court judge. He emphasized Commissioner Earl's influence with 
the press and Earl's role in the Bourbon and Ham Club, which had its 
costs borne by Jim Elkins. Crosby said that Oregonian reporters Lambert 
and Turner engaged in a smear of him because nothing else had worked in 
trying to smash the Teamsters. They hated the Teamsters because the 
Union was against Peterson (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
147 
The Oregonian, he asserted, had viciously attacked Thornton on the 
occasion of Elkins' indictments. Elkins was far more sinister than the 
Oregonian had ever admitted. Crosby insisted that Elkins used wire taps 
for blackmail purposes. He repeated his accusations that Turner and 
Lambert had a "weird" and close relationship with Jim Elkins. Crosby 
acknowledged knowing Brewster, Beck, Maloney, McLaughlin and Frank 
Malloy. He said he met Maloney only in August or September of 1954 and 
was introduced to McLaughlin through Maloney in 1955. 
Crosby indicated that Maloney was a "fabulous character" who had all 
sorts of capabilities, but that he, Crosby, was sold a bill of goods by 
Maloney. He admitted to knowing Elkins socially but said he hated and 
feared him. He denied having lunch with Elkins in 1955 and then admitted 
that he was not sure whether he had or not (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
He, likewise, had no recollection of having dinner with Elkins. 
When confronted about a meeting allegedly between Sweeney and Elkins that 
he attended at Amato's Ho-Ti Supper Club, he acknowledged the meeting, 
saying only that Elkins joined them there, and it was not intended that 
Elkins be at that dinner. He admitted that Elkins had come to his house 
twice: first, he says, to extort $10,000; the second time in an effort to 
be friendly. 
It was through the tapes, Teamsters' International Representative 
Clyde Crosby claimed, that the extortion attempt was being made. Crosby 
admitted hearing the tapes from Ray "Dopehead" (Crosby's word) Clark with 
Brad Williams. Crosby did not ask how Journal reporter Williams got the 
tapes. He had heard, but did not say how, that Williams was going to be 
playing the tapes for the State Police at Williams' house. He did not 
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know or remember who told him. He stated that he was uninvited but he 
brazened his way in and listened to three or four hours of wire 
recordings. He did not hear himself, but only heard references to 
himself. When asked to give his copies of the wire recordings to the 
Committee, he offered to do so as soon as he was home. However, the tapes 
were never presented (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
The Committee was clearly dismayed and confused as to why Clyde 
Crosby was admitted to Brad Williams' house along with the state 
policemen to hear the tapes. 
As Senator Hundt said: 
What transpired? You got to the house, invited yourself in, 
and they said, "Gee, Clyde, come right in. I forgot to invite 
you to the party. We are happy to see you." Or did they say, 
"You cannot come in," or what did they say? What was their 
reaction? (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1956, p. 711). 
Crosby indicted that their reaction was embarrassment, but that he 
was fighting for his life. 
Senator Mundt then replied: 
I can understand your motivation perfectly. I am just 
wondering what their reacton was. 
Kennedy then questioned Crosby very intensely: 
Kennedy: You have said Elkins is head of a syndicate. 
Crosby: Yes, perhaps a little strong word. 
Kennedy: What about Elkins' employees working on your party 
room? (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 711). 
Elkins indicated to the Committee that Crosby never paid him for the 
work on Crosby's basement party room. Crosby insisted that he later 
learned that the men working on his party room were Elkins' men and that 
he paid the person he contracted with in the matter, Tom Maloney. 
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Maloney may very well have received the money and not given it to 
Elkins. Thus again we see a situation in which it is possible that Tom 
Maloney failed to pass on monies as he had agreed. 
Elkins' employee James Jenkins refuted Crosby's evidence, saying 
that he had worked on Langley's campaign as an employee of Elkins. 
Jenkins claimed that he was one of the men who was involved in the 
repairs and improvements in Crosby's basement (U.S. Senate Conuni ttee 
Hearings 1957). He was with Elkins' worker Barney Kane. They drove 
Elkins' trucks marked Service Vending Machine Co. and parked in Crosby's 
driveway. 
Jenkins alleged that Crosby said, "If the thing on the E-R clicks, 
we'll have money for everything" (U.S. Senate Conunittee Hearings 1957, p. 
721). Jenkins said that Crosby showed him the area where the E-R site 
would be. Two slot machines of Elkins' were delivered to Crosby's house 
prior to the fixing of the basement. Later Crosby admitted the gift but 
said he did not know from whom it came (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
These were Elkins' workers, they had a vested interest. But 
Crosby's testimony was being refuted. The materials alone on the repair 
of Crosby's house, it developed, cost more than $800. 
It should have been clear to Crosby that Elkins' men were doing the 
work on the basement. It took several days to do it. It was extensive 
work for which the total bill was only $200 and Elkins' marked trucks 
were in Crosby's driveway (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
At this point Crosby was asked if he ever discussed with Elkins the 
Broadway Bridge site. Crosby refused to answer and was dismissed (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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Where's Jimmy? A telegram from Arden Pangborn, editor of the 
Oregon Journal, was read into the record. The telegram indicated that 
Clifford 0. (Jimmy) Bennett would not testify to the Committee because he 
had been followed by Elkins' agents into California, Nevada and other 
places, and feared for his life. The Committee would not allow Bennett's 
or Sutter's affidavits admitted as evidence since they would not testify 
under oath (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
On Friday, March 8, 1957. the Journal indicated in an interview that 
Bennett, hiding in Vancouver, Washington, denied payoffs on December 5, 
1956. The statement denying any payoff to Terry Schrunk was witnessed by 
Cliff Alterman and Sheriff's Detective Minielly. (Cliff Alterman is the 
law partner of Ray Kell and Ted Runstein today.) 
On December 19, 1956, a second affidavit was obtained from Bennett 
in Great Falls, Montana. And by November 3, 1956, Officer Sutter had 
changed his story, insisting that his notebook of September 11, 1955 
showed he worked with Officer Lindholm, not with Tiedeman or Amundson. 
Thomas Maloney was called to the stand and took the Fifth, but he 
did deny ever being employed by the Teamsters Union or being a Teamsters 
official (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Joseph P. McLaughlin was called before the Committee and invoked the 
Fifth Amendment (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
The Mayor Backs Down. On Tuesday, May 12, 1957, Mayor Terry 
Schrunk returned to the Committee after having agreed to take the lie 
detector test and then having balked at several of the questions. 
Schrunk agreed to answer questions regarding whether he received the 
bribe at the 8212 Club but refused to answer the questions below. This 
was despite the fact that Schrunk's attorneys had approved the questions 
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(without consulting Schrunk) thinking them fair. Schrunk agreed to 
answer questions about the 8212 Club, but refused to answer six of them, 
arguing that these first six questions were tricky. The Chair then asked 
the six questions and Kennedy added a seventh. They were: 
1. Are you personally acquainted with Jim Elkins? Schrunk 
pointed out that this is a loaded question, that he only 
met with him once, but that he didn't know how to answer 
the question; personally acquainted, what does that mean? 
2. In a restaurant did you get several hundred dollars from 
Jim Elkins? Schrunk said no, but that the question was 
too far afield from the issue of the 8212 Club and 
therefore, he refused to answer it. 
3. Did you ever take payoffs from Stan Terry? Schrunk said 
no, but Terry had contributed money to various causes 
Schrunk was involved in and, therefore, Schrunk did not 
know what the correct answer would be. 
4. Did you receive any payoffs from any pinball operators? 
Again, the answer was no, except, of course, for 
political contributions and contributions to worthy 
causes. 
5. While Sheriff, did you receive bootleg money through 
attorney Ray Kell? Schrunk said no, he did not, but that 
again the question was too far afield of the matter of the 
8212 Club and the alleged bribe. 
6. Did you receive payoffs from any gamblers? The answer to 
this question was a simple no (p. 761). 
7. Did you receive contributions directly or indirectly from 
Al Winters (sic)? The answer eventually was no (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 771). 
Schrunk acknowledged that he might have thanked Elkins for gifts he 
made to the Lower Columbia Peace Officers Club (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
Finally, after taking a good deal of abuse from various members of 
the Committee, Schrunk concluded, stating that the matter of his honesty 




From the point of view of Oregon politicians, the Oregon estab-
lishment and Portland in general, the area and its people had suffered a 
severe national beating. The effect was very significant. Schrunk was a 
popular and well-received public official and now he was being discred-
ited and humiliated in a national context. With him the entire state's 
reputation was in jeopardy. 
Affidavits from various parties flowed to the Committee now. From 
Officer Bobby J. McClendon came indication that Officer Sutter did say 
that he had seen the bribe action at the 8212 Club; Sutter had received 
payoffs; Sutter had remarked that it was very difficult to convince a 
Grand Jury about Schrunk. McClendon's affidavit indicated that Sutter 
had discovered that two members of the Grand Jury were personal friends 
of Schrunk. 
After the first Grand Jury, Lt. Bryan allegedly told Sutter that if 
he played his cards right, he might end up as a sergeant and that Bryan 
might end up as Police Chief. Later, .Sutter and his wife talked about 
what a wonderful man Schrunk was. A few days before the election in 
1956, Sutter gave a sworn statement to Schrunk favorable to Schrunk. 
After that, Sutter was told by Bryan to leave town for two weeks for a 
paid vacation. He did, after picking up his wife and kids. When Sutter 
found out Mcclendon had been called before the Grand Jury, Sutter came by 
to tell McClendon to be evasive. Sutter's position had thus completely 
changed. After Mcclendon testified to the Grand Jury, Bryan fround out 
about the Grand Jury testimony somehow, and Bryan called McClendon' s 
superior officer who then was enraged at McClendon (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
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Crosby Returns. Crosby was recalled as a witness. He again empha-
sized the he was unaware that the workers he had hired were Elkins' men. 
He had paid for the basement room through Maloney, and Maloney perhaps 
had not relayed the money. He said that he discussed the E-R with lots of 
people but that he never talked about anything illegal in the E-R matter. 
Everyone he met was interested in the Exposition-Recreation Center (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Crosby emphasized that he never talked to McLaughlin about taking 
options on the property and that he could not remember if he talked with 
him on the phone at all about it. He did not know McLaughlin as a 
gambler, but he did in fact do some betting through McLaughlin, admitting 
that he talked with McLaughlin about where to place bets in the Seattle 
area (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Slowly, piece by piece, Crosby ended up acknowledging that he 
traveled with McLaughlin to San Francisco though he suggested that their 
being together was a coincidence. When it was pointed out that both 
men's plane tickets were obtained by Teamsters official John Sweeney, and 
that they were paid for by Union funds, Crosby had no explanation. 
Crosby admitted that they took the same transportation to the hotel. He 
did not know, he said, that they had adjoining bedrooms (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Crosby said that around October of 1954 Maloney introduced himself 
at the Union hall. Crosby related that Leonard Givens came to him for 
help in getting reinstated in the Sheriff's Department. Since Givens 
worked for John Mccourt in the District Attorney's office as an 
Investigator, Crosby asked him if he knew of Elkins giving money to 
McCourt's campaign. The answer was yes (U.S. Senate Coomittee Hearings 
1957). 
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Langley, in the 1980 interview, insisted that Elkins supported 
Mccourt against him (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Kennedy then brought up Jenkins' testimony that Elkins was active in 
Langley's campaign. Crosby denied having discussions with Jenkins about 
Langley. Crosby said that Maloney' s function for the Union was 
essentially to help get Langley elected and some of his expenses covered 
by the Union. 
Crosby acknowledged that around $2,300 of Teamsters' money went to 
Langley's campaign. Langley was taken around and introduced to some of 
the men. Many Teamsters were then working for Governor Patterson's 
election. 
While Crosby said no one told him to pay Maloney, somehow $707 of 
Maloney' s phone bills were paid for by the Teamsters. The bills, Crosby 
insisted, were accidentally paid. They should not have been (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Crosby said he found out that Maloney was on Elkins' payroll and 
that Maloney was also an undercover agent for District Attorney Langley. 
Maloney did come to Crosby's house a few times. Crosby denied knowing 
that Maloney was getting money from Elkins until he read it in the 
newspapers. He acknowledged that in December of 1955, in Seattle, the 
Teamsters were paying Maloney's bills for big Union get-togethers. At 
this point a check for $3,4026.57 was presented to Crosby (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). The check included an itemization of $93.00 
for Maloney' s phone bill. Much of the money was for picketing. Maloney 
gave the Teamsters building address as his own. 
Crosby denied threatening Mayor Peterson with withdrawal of support 
if Peterson did not get rid of Chief of Police Purcell. Crosby said that 
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Howard Morgan's statement about what he said to him was not correct (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Crosby denied Elkins' accusation that Elkins and Tom Sheridan of the 
OLCC and he ever met. He said he did not believe he had such a meeting. 
He did not recall the conversation. He said he believed Elkins called 
him once about Sheridan to help him. He said that Lt. Carl Crisp of the 
Portland Police Department did come to him to get help for Sheridan (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
It developed that the Teamsters' books from mid-1954 to 1956 were 
missing. Crosby could not explain why these ledgers were gone. When 
asked why he tried to organize the pinball operators when pinball was 
illegal, he could not give a satisfactory answer (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
More documents were introduced that showed a lot of Maloney' s, 
McLaughlin's and Crosby's bills were paid for by the Teamsters. 
Thomas J. Sheridan, the OLCC officer allegedly helped by the 
Teamsters after being accused of taking a bribe, indicated that he met 
with Elkins in Crosby's office and that it seemed to him that Elkins and 
Crosby were friends. (It is arguable that the meeting itself would have 
made no sense at all if the two had not been at least business associ-
ates.) He acknowledged that he had some conversations with Langley at 
the time the OLCC was supposedly being investigated by Langley's office. 
Langley was the person who instigated the meeting, calling him and having 
him meet at Maloney's rooms in the King Towers apartments, an odd choice 
for an official inquiry location (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
The D.A. Defends Himself. William Langley began his testimony with 
his resume. Langley went to the Northwest College of Law and before that 
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the University of Oregon. He went into law practice with his father, a 
well-known and respected Portland attorney, in 1938. His father was 
District Attorney of Multnomah County from 1930 to 1934. Langley was 
Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1942 to 1946 (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
When asked when he first met Elkins, Langley took the Fifth 
Amendment, explaining that he was under indictment and that he could not 
talk without endangering himself. The Committee became alienated at this 
point. When asked about Maloney or Crosby, he refused to answer. He 
acknowledged knowing Schrunk since 1949 and indicated that Mayor 
Schrunk, then Sheriff, had never asked for any abatements against 
gambling houses. When asked if he had any interest in gambling houses or 
other such vice places, he took the Fifth Amendment. When asked if he 
had any money or involvement with Elkins in the 1940's, he again took the 
Fifth (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Langley started a long explanation of why he was using the Fifth 
Amendment and what the funtions of the Fifth Amendment are. At this 
point, Senator Mundt said, in response: 
You embarrass yourself. 
Langley said: Senator, I don't want to be disrespectful to 
you, but when you took an oath, you took an oath to uphold the 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment is a part of the 
Constitution. And now I am entitled to my legal rights, and 
you ought not to embarrass me about it. 
Senator Mundt: You embarrass youself about it, and it is very 
embarrassing to me as a citizen of this country to find any 
district attorney presently sitting in that office, hiding 
behind the Fifth Amendment. It is embarrassing to me to think 
of the people of Portland, Oregon, with a mayor who flunks a 
lie detector test and a district attorney hiding behind the 
Fifth Amendment. If I lived there, I would suggest that they 
pull the flags down at half-mast in public shame. So, I am 
embarrassed (U.S. Senate Coomittee Hearings 1957, p. 938). 
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The Chairman, Senator HcClellen, argued that the Fifth Amendment is 
a privilege allowed citizens, but that it is not a necessity. Mundt's 
statement -- that Portland ought to drop its flags in shame -- had 
widespread repercussions in Portland. It created a locally defensive 
attitude, a perception upon the part of many that Portland was under 
attack by outsiders (Thornton-Uris interview 1980, Baker-Uris interview 
1980). 
The Tapes are Played. After Langley's testimony came excerpts from 
the Elkins tapes. The tapes are the only outside corroborative evidence 
in this matter, and the Committee went to great trouble to prove their 
veracity, having experts from the Library of Congress testify that the 
tapes were undoctored. It is not within the scope of this dissertation 
to argue whether or not the September 1955 tapes were in some way manipu-
lated. The experts of the time argued that such was not possible. 
Elkins testified and presented the tapes. The complete tapes were 
never presented to the Committee as either transcripts or as tape record-
ings. The tape selections gave strong evidence against Maloney, McLaugh-
lin, Langley and others. The first tape read to the Committee, called 
Tape 113 of the Committee's listings (chronologically, Tape 1112), is 
allegedly a tape of Maloney and McLaughlin trying to figure out if they 
were being shortchanged by Elkins or Swede Ferguson. Leo Plotkin, "The 
Spy," was named, and there was clear indication that they were worried 
that Crosby would figure out that they were cheating him. McLaughlin 
accused Maloney of talking too much to John Sweeney and Clyde Crosby 
(U.S. Senate CoDBDittee Hearings 1957). 
There were taped indications that Langley and Crosby were involved 
in illegal activities with Maloney, McLaughlin and Swede Ferguson (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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McLaughlin and Maloney apparently did not want to give the same cut 
as previously arranged to those above them. This is an interesting 
point. Throughout the tapes and the Hearings, as well as the hi~tory 
itself, much of the confusion, paranoia and legitimate fears of Elkins 
seemed to have less to do with a conspiracy of the Teamsters than of 
Maloney's manipulations of the situation. It was Maloney who persuaded 
local policitians and vice racketeers to accept him into their ranks as 
an aide; first, in getting Langley elected, second in accomplishing 
various activities. Maloney seemed to be short-changing the higher-ups, 
leaving the deliberate impression that James Elkins was the short-change 
artist. Maloney failed to relay the message to higher-ups that there was 
in fact little to be gained in the vice markets of Portland (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957). 
Norm Reiter, Captain of the East Precinct of the Portland Police 
Department (Reiter-Uris Interview 1980), said that the main reason vice 
activities decreased in this period was not so much Lee's changes in 
1949-52 or the exposures by the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal in 1956, 
but that there was simply a smaller client population. The style of life 
had changed, and the interest in vice activity had been severely reduced. 
Reiter did acknowledge, however, that with both newspapers' constant 
front page exposes on the existence of any vice operation, it was very 
difficult for vice operators to stay open (Reiter-Uris interview 1980). 
Public awareness and constant media spotlighting, together with the 
changing economic and social climate of Portland, more than any other 
single factor brought an end to the extensive vice operations of such men 
as Swede Ferguson: and James Elkins, Reiter argued (Reiter-Uris Interview 
1980). 
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On another tape, voices alleged by Elkins to be Langley and HcLaugh-
lin discussed illegal enterprises: who would get paid how much, especi-
ally how much Tom Maloney should be paid. 
In fact, the voice said to be Langley's said: 
Tom gets all stirred up, and he gets unduly concerned about 
things. He gets out in front of the ...• for the union so we 
should stick back and calculate about it, but if they make a 
change, fine and dandy, and it's the Teamsters' business, but I 
have the Teamsters' business, too, see. Here's the way I feel 
about it, Joe. The Teamsters have been good to me, but I don't 
want people thinking that the Teamsters own me, and yet on the 
other hand, I feel ...• 
McLaughlin (indistinctly) said one word: 
" .... morally." 
Langley replied: 
Yes. Now, on the other hand, I'm a stand up guy. That's all, 
though. I don't want to try to dictate what they are doing, 
and I don't want to see them doing something that is going to 
hurt them. It hurts them, and then, of course, indirectly it 
hurts me, but you've got to •... you've got to ••.• you've thought 
it out clearly, of course •.•. uh, uh - Sweeney throws up his 
hands and says, "it's up to Pete to figure out his own way of, 
you know, of getting rid of Purcell." 
(The Pete referred to here was said to be Mayor Peterson.) 
We'll have to see what he says about that, but it still gets 
back over to Tom thinking it's all wrong, Joe. Tom's thinking 
is all wrong because he's not going for the 10% proposition. 
What the hell is he changing for because if he changes, that's 
all the more that's going to be due, Joe .•.. (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957, p. 953). 
Langley is allegedly discussing the dividing of specific profits of 
illegal activities. 
Langley indicated on the tapes that he wanted to close houses of 
prostitution. McLaughlin indicated that he wanted them open. There were 
also indications that John Sweeney was not anxious to have the houses of 
prostitution operating. 
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All of the tapes at this point give indications of possible police 
corruption and of corruption of the Mayor. Langley said: 
.... I told them that to start out with ... except I put the slots 
in, I mean the pinballs, and they were. . . . It doesn't seem to 
be in the picture now. And the punchboards would be all right 
if you could get them out with just a 10% tax, I mean get the 
things taxed. It's a difficult thing to get accomplished. But 
he' s already got two things going. He's got the bootleg 
joints, and he's got the cards (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957, p. 953). 
This is Langley speaking, and he is allegedly talking about the kind 
of money that would be made by John Sweeney. Langley indicated that the 
bootleg joints "have got to go," and he indicated that he perceived that 
Elkins was in the best shape "you've ever got him in right now." Langley 
agreed to give the Mayor a call about the gypsies (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957, p. 953). Chief Purcell's failure to roust the gypsies 
would be a plausible excuse to oust Purcell. 
There was reference by Langley to the Kenton problem - The 8212 
Club - indicating that it had to be taken care of. How remains unclear. 
Tape #47, recorded on August 22, 1955, according to Robert Kennedy, 
includes D.A. Langley, Joseph McLaughlin, and Tom Maloney. Persons 
mentioned are Attorney General Robert Thornton (described as "that 
screwball in Salem"); Jim Purcell, Jr. (at that time Chief of Police); 
Leo Plotkin (known as "The Spy"); Johnny Delaney (an underworld character 
in Portland, who was working as an Investigator for Attorney General 
Thornton); and Gordon McCreary (Chief of Hard Liquor Enforcement 
Division of the Oregon Liquor Control Commission) (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
Langley allegedly said on tape: 
No reason why he (Jim Purcell) couldn't. Because he can't see 
him on account of his dad's death. That Jim Purcell is so God 
damned hungry for money that he wouldn't even go to his dad's 
funeral if it meant makin' a few bucks. I'm telling you - he's 
money crazy - he's a money crazy guy. Well, the only worry I 
got - that you fellows get taken care of. If you' re satisfied, 
why, it's all right with me. 
Maloney replied: Well, I'm not satisfied. 
Langley laughed: Well, you better do something then. 
Maloney said: Joe's not satisfied. 
Langley responded: Well, I'm not holding you back, you know 
that. Well, I gotta go home. You will. .. if anything happens 
to you, the Spy will call you, and you call me, okay? 
And then McLaughlin said: I probably won't be seeing you for a 
little while ... 
Langley said to Joe McLaughlin: Well, you can't have any 
prostitution going, Joe, with this screwball in Salem. 
McLaughlin agreed: That' s right. 
Langley said: You can't have them going because he ... I'm 
telling you he's nuttier on prostitution than he (Thornton) is 
on this thing 
McLaughlin said: That's right, and now, with this thing here, 
if you' re not on his side where he feels as though you did ... he 
knew, you know, that you did some •.. didn't do everything that 
you could have that he wants you to do, why, and if he draws a 
blank on it, why, that would be the next move. 
Langley replied: He'd try to hurt me somewhat. 
McLaughlin said: That's right. 
Langley said: He'd be mad at me. 
McLaughlin said: How long is he in there for? 
Langley answered: Well, they got to defeat him, and he's in 
there until next year. He's in there until January 1, 1957. 
They'd have to defeat him next year, or it will be a nightmare 
for four more years. 
Maloney said: Oh, he'll get beat. There's no chance for him. 
Langley disagreed: I don't know. 
Maloney said: Well, all right. I'm just telling you. I know 
politics. 
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McLaughlin said: Maybe he's doing the screaming a little 
earlier, Tom. People forget. 
Maloney said: You see, people forget all about him, and they 
think he's screwy. 
Langley reasserted: 
Well, he's nuttier on prostitution that he is on this so if you 
give him an opportunity on prostitution, he'll go. Let them 
run in some counties around here, and he'll focus on those. 
They're running, you know, in Ontario and places like that. 
McLaughlin said: That's right. 
Langley repeated: 
So the prostitution is out, and now it's no good, and we don't 
want it anyway, and it's too dangerous with him. Do you see? 
So the only way you're going to do any good is cards, high 
dice. Like I told you all along, cards and book, and then if 
you get into pinballs and punchboard, that's all right, but 
that's what it amounts to. The bootleg joints .•. it will go if 
you will make it anything. That's all right. I don't see any 
reason to close that down now (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957, p. 957 ff.). (All transcriptions were confirmed by tapes 
from Oregon State Archives). 
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Here was a clear indication of an agreement by Langley to tolerate 
certain illegal enterprises that were taking place. 
There was also concern that the Federal government, Uncle Sam, as it 
is referred to on the tapes, not become involved. This related directly 
to the Mann Act, which prohibits the interstate transportation of women 
for immoral purposes. 
Elkins argued during this period that he was only pretending to be 
frightened of these men, but it is clear from his actions, the fact that 
he blew the whistle on his own operations as well as on everyone else's, 
that he was indeed troubled. The reference to the Kenton trouble, of 
course, was the 8212 Club matter. The operation of the houses of prosti-
tution in Eastern Oregon is interesting because Bennett, the operator of 
the 8212 Club, got himself in trouble operating houses of prostitution in 
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that area of the state. These were known to the Attorney General 
(Attorney General's files, Oregon State Archives). 
Langley indicated that Elkins was not to be trusted, that they 
should be harder on him, perhaps set him up for a fall. There are several 
references to John Sweeney. By late August, 1955, (on Tape #62) there 
were references to "The Character," Jim Elkins. This conversation 
involved Langley, Maloney, and McLaughlin. 
Langley, who seemed anxious in several instances to uphold the law, 
indicated that Sheridan should close down illegal liquor operations, and 
Langley said: 
I want to find out if there has been any bribery. Now that is 
the only thing that Delaney might bring in. (Delaney is the 
investigator for the Attorney General's office.) Delaney 
might claim there has been some bribery to let those bootleg 
joints go, see. Well, I don't see how he is going to prove it. 
It's only speculation on this Delaney's part. And then if the 
"The Character" has been giving it to McCreary or whatever his 
name is, so maybe we could get the Character into a mess (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957, p. 961). 
In other words, Langley suggested that they set up "The Character," 
who was allegedly Jim Elkins. 
There was indication through the tapes of John Sweeney's involve-
ment in all of this activity, or at least his awareness of it, and as 
well, Clyde Crosby's frequent contact with Langley. There was no 
absolute indication, however, that Sweeney was in on the money. There is 
only circumstantial evidence linking Sweeney or Crosby with the others 
(U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
There were discussions once more of getting rid of Jim Elkins and 
indications that the Chief of Police in Portland wanted everything closed 
"for a while" (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
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There was a discussion of kickbacks from various gambling 
establishments and the dividing of that particular pie. 
The tapes gave an indication of a very important social aspect of 
the division of vice operations in Portland. Langley indicated that he 
received money from "the Greek and from the Chinaman." 
Langley: 
"Well, now, he gave me something for the two. He gave me four 
bills, two of them for each one, the Chinaman and fifty bucks 
for some ... for the Big Seven or some damn thing. And two of 
the Chinamen are going? 
McLaughlin said: Only supposed to be one. 
Langley insisted: There are two China joints going. Isn't 
there, Tom? Two China joints going? (U.S. Senate Committee 
Heraings 1957, p. 966.) 
During the Committee testimony Elkins indicated that there were two 
Chinese joints going, and there was only one in Chinatown and one in 
colored town. 
Elkins said: 
But the one in colored town had colored people and white people 
and everything running it, and I knew it couldn't operate more 
than a week or two before they would knock it off (U.S. Senate 
Committee Hearings 1957, p. 970 ff.). 
What Elkins was indicating was that by custom and tradition in 
Portland, black vice and white vice were kept separated. The minute the 
two merged, there would be a police response. As long as they were 
separated, there need not necessarily be such a reaction. 
On July 23, 1956, the Oregon Journal published a series of articles 
by William Langley. The Journal printed Langley's version of the vice 
story in Langley's own words. Beginning on July 23, 1956, and running 
continuously through several issues of the paper, Langley gave his 
version of the vice story. He argued that he had been framed, that the 
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tapes, in fact, were doctored. The D.A. stated that Jim Purcell, Chief 
of Police, was in league with Jim Elkins and was part of the attempt to 
frame him (Langley). The Oregon Journal, by publishing it, gave credence 
to this report. The paper emphasized, for example, Elkins' shady back-
ground, a matter played with much less emphasis in the Oregonian, where 
Elkins was initially unidentified and later only described as a 
bankroller for vice operations. 
Langley refused to resign from office and on the 23rd said: 
With arrogance of wealth and official protection which they 
have had in this city, they will stop at nothing to destroy 
anyone who has stood in their way as I have stood. 
Unfortunately for me and the public, they are assisted in their 
operation by those who should support me instead of trying to 
ruin me and thereby remove the greatest hindrance to their 
illegal operations. I have been hindered by Jim Purcell, 
Police Chief, at every turn. My opposition to the racketeering 
will be abundantly proved by my numerous letters to Jim 
Purcell, and the state police who will verify by their 
statements that on at least four occasions I urged them to come 
in and clean up Portland (Oregon Journal, July 23, 1956) 
Senator Mundt angrily presented to the CoDDnittee the Oregon Journal 
article which, he said, Langley had been handing out in Washington. 
Mundt cited the following quote from Langley's article: 
My view that Elkins has tried to use the grand jury as his bear 
trap for framing me is shared by at least one other public 
official, a man of unimpeachable character. That man is 
Sheriff Terry B. Schrunk. He knows that. one of Elkins' 
hirelings has told the grand jury a vicious pack of lies about 
a payoff in connection with an after-hours joint in the Kenton 
district, which is within the city. Because of this attempted 
frame, Schrunk has consented to a lie detector test to show 
this man to be the liar that he is (Oregon Journal, July 25, 
1956). 
Senator Mundt then pointed out that Schrunk flunked his lie detector 
test in Oregon and walked out of the test in Washington. The Senate case 
seemed to depend on discrediting Schrunk as well as Langley. Langley, 
when confronted with the essay, took the Fifth Amendment. Langley 
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acknowledged knowing John Sweeney, but refused to answer any questions 
about his contacts with Sweeney. He acknowledged that his Office drew up 
the papers for the search warrant for the tapes at Ray Clark's house, but 
would not say anything further under heavy questioning. 
Finally, Langley asked the most significant question that he could. 
Anyone reading the transcriptions of the hearings of the Select Committee 
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) must 
wonder as Langley did, Why weren't Brad Williams and Doug Baker of the 
Journal asked to testify? 
This question was never adequately dealt with by the Committee 
except to say that there were indications that anything the Journal 
reporters would have to give would already have been given as testimony 
by others. The refusal to call them was essentially Robert Kennedy's. 
Basically, the Committee's assertions are the same as the Oregonian's 
case as orchestrated by Robert Kennedy. It was presented to the 
Committee as an absolute truth. 
Langley, under further questioning, refused to state anything about 
the King Towers or his involvement with Sheridan, the OLCC officer. 
Langley refused to answer any real questions about the Teamsters' 
expenditures in his campaign. 
Through the Teamsters' records there is an indication that by 
November 2, 1954, $3, 160. 88 had been spent on Langley' s campaign. 
Exhibits 1089 and 1090 indicate the total expenditure in the campaign may 
have been higher but that only $2, 188 came from the Teamsters (U.S. 
Senate Committee Hearings 1957). Kennedy presented a check (Exhibit 1155) 
made to the order of William Langley dated October 26, 1954, for $500 and 
signed by Frank Brewster and John Sweeney, Secretary-Treasurer of the 
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Teamsters. It was endorsed by William Langley. No one had filed this 
check as a campaign expenditure. 
Investigator Alphonse Calabrese of the Senate investigative staff 
placed Langley at the Olympic Hotel in San Francisco and showed that his 
"' bills were paid for by the Western Conference of Teamsters in November 
1954. Tom Maloney was also placed at the Olympic; Hotel on the same days. 
On November 26 and 30 of 1954, Langley was placed at the Olympic Hotel in 
Seattle with his wife. His bill there also was paid by the Teamsters. 
All of the payments were authorized by Brewster and Sweeney. Maloney was 
also in Seattle at the same time. On December 16 and 17, 1955, Langley 
was at the Ben Franklin Hotel in Seattle, also paid for by the Teamsters, 
and Maloney again was there. 
When asked about those meetings, Langley again took the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Frank W. Brewster, Chairman of the Western Conference of Teamsters 
and Fifth Vice President of the National Brotherhood of Teamsters, took 
the stand. 
The scope of the Teamsters 1 power was indicated by the fact that it 
controlled Teamsters activity in the 11 Western states. There was a 
Policy Committee, a governing board of 33 members that met six times a 
year. There were eight Joint Councils and 246 locals. 
Brewster denied having anything to do with local politics anywhere 
at any time. He indicated that he signed blank checks ahead of time 
because he traveled a lot. He emphasized the anti-Communist position of 
the Teamsters. He said he would have nothing to do with the Mine, Mill 
and Smelter Workers Union which had been painted with a red brush. He 
named the various charitable activities that the Teamsters had 
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supported. He indicated that he started his life as a Teamster driving a 
dray and had always been interested because of that in horses, and 
subsequently, in horse racing. He had been Chairman of the Washington 
State Horse Racing Commission (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Brewster's emphasis on his anti-Communism can be seen as an attempt 
to prove his character since the Committee included Senator Joseph 
McCarthy, an avid anti-Communist. For Brewster, this attempt failed. 
Evidence against the Teamsters, Brewster argued, was hearsay, 
" ... hearsay, rumor and insidious innuendo with few exceptions from gang-
sters, gamblers and underworld characters." (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957, p. 999). 
Brewster insisted no illegal practices had ever been engaged in in 
Portland to his knowledge and pointed out that Elkins was a crook with 
many indictments and convictions. He pointed out that Elkins' testimony 
was based upon alleged conversations with Maloney and McLaughlin and on 
supposed telephone calls which involved Brewster in discussions about 
rackets in Portland. Brewster said that Maloney first met him around 
1939. He found some work for him at the Longacres Racetrack. He indi-
cated that he also got Maloney a job in Seattle around 1948 or 1949. 
Further, Brewster said, Maloney used other people's names to promote his 
own schemes. (This is true. There is ample evidence that Maloney 
manipulated individuals through name dropping.) 
Brewster indicated that he knew McLaughlin even less than he knew 
Maloney. He denied kn.owing anything about attempts to influence 
elections, law enforcement rackets or liquor control. He then quite 
righteously defended John Sweeney, who, by the time of the Committee 
Hearings, was dead and could not defend himself (U.S. Senate Committee 
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Hearings 1957). Brewster denied ever talking with Stan Terry or taking 
money from him. He indicated that a gambler named Goldbaum did set up a 
meeting with Elkins after Crosby told him Elkins wanted $10,000 for fake 
tape recordings. He told Elkins off, he said, and threw him out of his 
office. 
The Teamsters insisted through Crosby and Brewster that Elkins was 
attempting to blackmail them and had demanded $10,000. Having warned 
everyone that it was unfair to pick on Sweeney, Brewster then did a turn 
around and indicated that Sweeney had told him about Maloney and 
Maloney's involvement in Portland politics and that he, Brewster, had 
warned Sweeney against allowing Maloney to be involved. 
Brewster admitted that some books were missing from the Western 
Conference records (U.S. Senate Coounittee Hearings 1957). He believed 
that the reason the records were missing was because the Fire Department 
had asked them to clean up the basement, and they may just have thrown 
away the records in the rush to comply. 
A $5 ,000 check was shown to Brewster made out to the Public 
Relations Account. He could not identify what the check was for, but 
still argued that the records were well kept. Finally, Brewster 
indicated that the check was to K.C. Tanner, the attorney who represented 
Langley. But he was not sure; it might have been to cover Crosby's legal 
costs on the picketing of the Mt. Hood Cafe. 
When Brewster was asked whether the locals were consulted on politi-
cal matters, he indicated that he did not know the answer to that, but 
admitted that the Teamsters did spend money on Republican Patterson's 
successful election as Governor of Oregon. And, Brewster indicated, they 
did spend money on political campaigns, arguing that the chief 
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expenditures were to educate working people about working people's 
issues (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
At this point, Senator Richard Neuberger (Democrat, Oregon), 
appeared before the Committee. He indicated that legal parimutuel 
betting on dogs was a major problem in Oregon. He suggested that it was 
absurd to complain about a ten cent expenditure on pinball when thousands 
of dollars could be thrown away on parimutuel betting. He indicated that 
Portland had a courageous and good Mayor in Dorothy McCullough Lee, who 
was teased and ridiculed and called "Dottie Do-Good." He said that it 
was even suggested by various businessmen that a viceless town might be 
bad for business. This is interesting because it confirms E. Kimbark 
MacColl's (1978) mention that the business community on the whole was not 
supportive of Dorothy Lee's mayorship (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 
1957). 
Senator Neuberger said that Portland was a wonderful town. He 
objected to the smearing of deceased Governor Patterson and pointed out 
that many people not being heard by the Committee would dispute what the 
Committee was hearing. And, he argued, the Committee should be taking 
contradictory evidence. Schrunk in this case was being unfairly treated. 
He pointed out that corruption had always been a problem in American 
cities. He thought it completely unfair to smear Portland and to suggest 
that Portland lower its flags to half-m4~t (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 195 7) . 
It developed that Nathan Shefferman, a well-known gambler according 
to testimony elicited from Brewster, was getting money for public rela-
tions from the Teamsters. Brewster had also been allowing checks to go 
out paying for the transportation of horse jockeys (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957). 
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The aspect of the Hearings of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) concerned 
with Portland, Oregon, virtually ended at this point. The rest of the 
material in these Hearings was concerned largely with activities of the 
Teamsters Union nationally and in other cities. 
In evaluating these Hearings, the historian must keep in mind a 
number of things. First, the Hearings were derived originally from the 
testimony and stories developed by the Oregonian reporters Turner and 
Lambert through information given to them by James Elkins. Elkins did 
have a vested interest in all of these matters. Second, stories 
developed by the Oregon Journal are not in any way dealt with by the 
Committee, except in terms of manipulations done by Oregon Journal 
reporter Brad Williams. Third, the Committee was looking for a 
sensational way to excite public concern against alleged abuses by 
organized labor. 
The Journal's View. 
As has been mentioned the vice probe first broke into the public 
print on April 19, 1956. A 1980 interview with William Lambert indicated 
that the Oregon Journal, to its credit, quickly caught up on all the 
salient facts in the case, and in fact, was first to break the story of 
Clyde Crosby's alleged involvement in a plan to profit by the purchase of 
options on homes located in the path of the planned Exposition-Recreation 
(Memorial Coliseum) Center. 
Almost one year later, beginning on April 8, 1957, the Oregon 
Journal summarized its differences with the Oregonian on the question of 
what really happened in 1955 and 1956 in Portland's vice politics. The 
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Journal put a so-called "truth squad" on the case. Composed of various 
reporters at various times, the leading personages were: Doug Baker, 
then and today a columnist for the Oregon Journal; Brad Williams, pre-
sently a public relations person for a major airline; and Rolla Crick, 
another Journal reporter. 
The Journal's response to the initial publication of Elkins' story 
and the subsequent articles, according to Baker, in a 1980 interview, was 
caused by their failure to pick up the story at its outset: 
We were left in the starting blocks unnecessarily because one 
of our reporters (Rolla Crick) had stumbled onto this story 
before the morning paper did or at the same time, but he 
couldn't get anyone to take him seriously. He heard things at 
Dan Tomes' Western Club, once called The Press Club. 
He had quite a bit of it laid out for him, but whoever he told 
here at the Journal, whatever executive he told at the Journal, 
didn't show much interest in it, and it sort of just 
languished. And all of a sudden they, (the Oregonian) came 
out, boom, you know, big banners, long ... transcripts of these 
tapes, accusations against the district attorney, the mayor, 
the attorney general, you know, the whole thing, and the 
Teamster thing, all that. 
And of course we' re writing second day copy, you know. All we 
were doing is wallowing in it, and I think our executives very 
quickly saw that we would have to get into this thing, and so 
people like me and Brad Williams were put on the story. But 
even then the Journal's interest was half-hearted. The 
Journal's real interest in this story began when this "runaway 
grand jury;" (the special grand jury under Ralph Wycoff and 
Arthur Kaplan) "returned indictments naming a great many 
Journal people, including the publisher, as co-conspirators. 
That, of course, galvanized the Journal into a lot of 
investigative action. (Baker-Uris interview 1980) 
Again, it must be emphasized that the Oregon Journal was a locally-
owned paper with local financial backing at this time, and due to the 
actions of E. B. McNaughton regarding the estate of the original 
Oregonian founders, the Oregonian was, at the time, in the hands of the 
Newhouse newspaper chain. 
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In a series called "Let' s Look at the Facts," a set of four edi tori-
als begun on April 8, 1957, the Oregon Journal responded to the Oregon-
ian's presentation and basically to the Senate presentation of the vice 
probe facts. They began with a criticism of the April 8, 1957, Time 
Magazine, pointing out that the Time article attacked the Oregon Journal 
unfairly, and argued that many of the facts in the article were 
inaccurate. This editorial went on to commend the Oregonian: "It has 
exposed evidence of questionable ties between Teamsters officials and 
racketeers, but it has glossed over equally dangerous corruption 
involving home-town racketeers." (Oregon Journal, April 8, 1957) 
Thus, the Journal suggested that while there was indeed a plot to 
take over local vice activities by individuals associated with the 
Teamsters Union, there nevertheless was at the same time a continuing and 
ongoing plot among public officials and vice lords to operate illegally 
within the city of Portland, Oregon. The Journal attacked District 
Attorney William Langley, demanding of him a full explanation for his 
behavior. 
The Journal insisted that the Oregonian had failed to explain that 
Jim Elkins (called by the Oregon Journal "Big Jim") was involved in 
corruption within the Portland Police Department and possibly with the 
Office of Mayor Fred L. Peterson himself. As the paper said: 
For months it, the Oregonian, turned a blind eye to corruption 
in Portland's Police Department which could have been 
embarrassing to Elkins and to the Oregonian's candidate for 
mayor, Fred L. Peterson (Journal, April 8, 1957). 
The Oregonian, the Journal wrote, ignored the story reported by the 
Journal that one of the Oregonian' s own reporters was threatened by 
Elkins with being dumped in the Willamette River because he dared 
"investigate payoffs in the police bureau." 
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This article referred to a story based on information obtained by 
James Burr Miller, the Oregonian's police reporter. A piece appeared on 
August 3, 1956, with headline "Police reporter under payoff," subhead 
"Honest patrolman comes to newsman to collect evidence for grand jury." 
The story asserted that a patrolman, Jack F. Olsen, became angry when 
given payoffs through the police department. 
Miller took his story of attempted bribes of Olsen to the editors. 
Olsen apparentely shared money with policemen in an attempt to get 
evidence against the bribers within the Police Department. Olsen was 
approached by an East Precinct police sergeant who indicated that there 
was a little deal going on at a Chinese place on North Williams Avenue 
and Russell. Olsen was told there would be "smile money" if he stayed 
away from the place. When Olsen expressed anger to his partner, his 
partner told him that it would be worth $50 a month and not to even talk 
to his wife about it. When Olsen suggested he should go to the Chief of 
Police about the matter, his partner supposedly said, "Who do you think 
is running the thing?" The Chief of Police at that time was Jim Purcell. 
Olsen apparently recorded the numbers of the bills that he received 
and marked his initials on them. Eventually, he took the story of the 
money bribe to Miller. This information is supported by the Oregonian 
story as well as the Journal. 
Olsen reported that he shared the money with other policemen between 
September 8, 1955, and April 10, 1956. He said he was paid either by a 
sergeant, a patrolman or the vice operators themselves. Olsen went 
befor1~ a Grand Jury, told his story and gave that body $158.50 in marked 
money to substantiate the charge. Most of the money, according to Olsen, 
came to him from the Chinese and black gambling joints in the Williams 
Avenue area. 
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In an editorial in the series "Let's look at the facts," published 
on April 9, 1957, the Journal emphasized that some of the money came from 
a woman named Sunny Martin (a prostitute, according to the Journal), who 
shared a duplex with Elkins' man Ray Clark and his wife Jerry Rogers 
(Oregon Journal. April 9, 1957). 
When Miller took his story to the Oregonian editors without identi-
fying Olsen, they suggested that he go to the District Attorney, William 
Langley. Langley took no action. However, after the Grand Jury had 
indicted seven officers on perjury charges arising out of the bribery 
evidence presented through the efforts of Officer Olsen and Miller, the 
Oregonian ran its story on October 3, 1956. 
The Journal argued in an editorial of April 9, 1957 that Miller's 
full role and involvement in the story and in the investigation was never 
brought to light by the Oregonian. It pointed out that Elkins' 
involvement in an attempt to bribe and then threaten Miller, the police 
reporter, was never metioned in the Oregonian. On August 26, 1956, the 
Journal disclosed that in October of 1955, a police captain approached 
Miller and asked him to join the International Footprint Association, a 
social club of policemen and their friends. This was a few weeks after 
Miller and Olsen had got together with the payoff story. Miller said he 
was not sure he wanted to join. A police capatin assured him he could 
find a sponsor to cover membership dues and expenses. Miller apparently 
was curious about the identity of the sponsor and agreed to a rendezvous 
with his unknown benefactor. The unnamed police captain took Miller to a 
downtown restaurant and introduced him to Jim Elkins. The captain then 
left Miller, according to the Journal story, and the racketeer and Miller 
conversed alone. 
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According to the Journal, Elkins talked in generalities and then 
told Miller he understood the Oregonian reporter was interested in 
joining the Footprinters. A large wad of money was shoved across the 
table to Miller. Miller refused to accept it. As he refused it, Elkins, 
to quote the words of the Oregon Journal, "turned off the smile and 
switched to threats." (April 8, 195 7.) He talked vaguely but pointedly 
of people disappearing, being dumped in the Willamette River. He threat-
ened Miller's family. 
Miller told the story of his dealings with Elkins not only to his 
editors but apparently to the Grand Jury, to Attorney General Robert Y. 
Thornton and to a number of state policemen. On August 5, 1956, Miller 
explained in a bylined article in the Oregonian how he and Patrolman 
Olsen gathered the evidence of bribery. But the article made no 
reference to his meeting with Elkins, according to the Journal. This is 
confirmed by an examination of the article. The Oregonian did indeed 
fail to tell of Elkins' threat, if such a threat actually occurred as 
asserted by the Journal. 
On August 28, 1956, Captain Robert Mariels, then the Commander of 
the Portland Police Department's North Precinct, told the Journal that he 
was the police captain who set up the meeting between Elkins and Miller. 
Mariels insisted that he was flabbergasted by the report that Elkins had 
attempted to bribe Miller and then threatened him. Mariels said he set 
up the meeting because Miller told him he wanted background information 
for a book he was writing. 
Hiller denied Mariel's version of the story, according to the 
Journal. Apparently, said the Journal, according to friends of Miller, 
he took the threat quite seriously and requested protection from the 
Beaverton Police Department for his family and home. 
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Chief Purcell (by the time of this Oregon Journal editorial, no 
longer Chief of Police) ordered an investigation by his Deputy Chief, 
Gene Ferguson. Ferguson apparently filed an inconclusive report with 
Purcell, and Purcell, in the week of April 2, according to the Journal, 
informed the Journal that the report had been passed to former Mayor Fred 
Peterson and that that, apparently, was as far as it got. 
Miller, according to the Journal editorial, was no longer a police 
reporter. He was at that time working on the farm market beat. 
Meanwhile, said the Journal, the Oregonian's editorials kept 
changing their position on Mayor Peterson's regime. At first - and this 
is verified by the editorials in the Oregonian - the police were 
supposedly successfully blocking the attempts of the outside vice 
combine to gain power. This was in April of 1956. By May of 1956, the 
Oregonian's editorials were less certain, and it was suggested that the 
combine' s efforts were only to some extent frustrated by the city police. 
By June 6, the paper was suggesting that Portland was singularly free 
from organized vice. But in early August, after the Grand Jury began to 
return its indictments, allegations linking several Portland policemen 
to the practice of payoffs for protection of illegal joints were made. 
Chief Purcell was also indicted on charges of incompetence, delin-
quency and malfeasance. At that point, the paper informed people that 
the Oregonian was aware of the charges and that Miller had been working 
on substantiation of those charges and was instrumental in the success of 
the indictments. 
But by October 26, 1956, the Oregonian suggested the facts against 
Purcell were obscure, and in that same issue of the paper, supported 
Fred L. Peterson for Mayor. Peterson had refused to suspend Purcell 
after his indictment by the Grand Jury. 
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On May 1, two weeks after the furor had started, an Oregonian 
editorial said that District Attorney Langley and his staff should be 
"barred from any appearance before the new Grand Jury except as 
subpoenaed as witnesses." (Oregonian, May l, 1956.) It even went on to 
suggest that Langley should resign. 
The Oregou Journal contrasted the Oregonian' s attitudes toward 
Langley with their attitudes toward Mayor Fred Peterson and Police Chief 
Jim Purcell. Finally, in August, according to the Journal and substan-
tiated by an editorial of August 13 in the Oregonian, the Oregonian 
decided that the "unprejudicial suspension of both Mr. Langley and Chief 
Purcell, pending the judgment of the trial court" should be carried out. 
However, on March 30, 195 7, in commenting on the indictment of Mayor 
Terry D. Schrunk, the Oregonian forgot its arguments about unprejudicial 
suspension and suggested that Schrunk should resign as well. 
The Journal emphasized in its editorial of April 9, 1957, that it 
had always insisted that all of these individuals should have resigned as 
soon as they faced indictment. 
Turning now to the first of these "Let's look at the facts" editor-
ials in the April 8, 1957 Journal, the Journal pointed out Jim Elkins' 
inconsistencies in testimony. These editorials were attacks upon the 
Oregonian. In the course of these attacks, however, the Journal empha-
sized that Jim Elkins was arrested and convicted for engaging in a gun 
battle during an attempted robbery in Globe, Arizona, and that Elkins was 
also convicted for receiving narcotics. The Journal said also that he 
was more than simply the bankroller of illegal operations, that he was 
actively involved in vice activities in Portland, aad was dangerous. 
Further, the Journal pointed out that the Grand Jury, under Attorney 
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General Thornton, indicted Elkins more of ten than any other person 
involved in the vice probes, and that the charges included gambling, 
extortion and receiving the earnings of prostitutes. 
Elkins, in explanation both in the Oregonian and to the Senate 
Committee, insisted that one of the major motivations in his going to the 
Oregonian reporters was his dislike of prostitution and his anxiety not 
to have prostitution become part of his operation. 
Elkins did have close involvements with Ray Clark and his wife Jerry 
Rogers and other madams. He had knowledge of and involvement with other 
prostitutes and madams in the Portland area. There was a tight 
involvement of prostitution with other forms of vice activity, histori-
cally, in Portland. 
Another explanation for Elkins' motives exists which makes sense 
and gives consistency to Elkins' approach. Elkins feared, given the tape 
recordings that he had secured, that he was being cut out of the action. 
According to the tapes, he was in danger of losing not only control of 
vice activity, but of going to jail as well. Ex-District Attorney 
Langley reported that he intended to break Elkins' power (Langley-Uris 
interview 1980). 
The Journal of April 8, 1957, argued that it had always demanded a 
full investigation of the vice conspiracy. The April 8, 1957, Time 
Magazine article was entirely inaccurate in several instances not 
relevant to this particular study. Time, on March 18, 1957, asserted 
that: 
Last week Elkins and some corroborating witnesses told how 
Teamsters' representatives, stymied in their original efforts 
to open the city to vice, simply took over the municipal 
government (p. 25). 
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Elkins did not say this, and Time Magazine was in error as the Journal 
editorial pointed out. 
In dealing with the incident of the attempt to discredit Elkins 
initiated by the Oregon Journal through a raid on May 17, 1956, on the 
home of Ray Clark and his wife, Jerry Rogers, the Journal justified its 
actions in terms of their interest in finding out what was really going 
on. 
In the second of these editorials, "Let's look at the facts," on 
April 9, 1957, the issue of Miller and Olsen's attempts to uncover the 
bribery of police officers and the "smile money" payoffs is detailed. In 
the third of these editorials on April 10, 1957, in the Journal, there is 
a careful discussion of the recording sessions and tapings and the 
securing of the search warrant to gain the tapes from the home of Ray 
Clark. 
The Ray Clark Raid. The evidence of the wire tap itself was gained 
through this incident. It was to become notorious in the Portland vice 
probe. District Attorney Langley was able to obtain a search warrant on 
May 17, 1956, the eve of the primary election. Ray Clark had been Police 
Chief for the town of St. Helens and had also been a Portland policeman. 
He was a business associate of Elkins and an electronics whiz. Clark's 
wife, Jerry Rogers, was a well-known madam in Portland. 
Based on a phone conversation between Ellsworth Herder, St. Helens 
Police Chief and Journal reporter Brad Williams, with Langley listening 
in, Langley drew up a warrant which he presented to Judge John Mears 
based on allegations that Clark had pornographic materials in his house. 
Under pressure, Judge Mears signed the warrant believing it was valid. 
He sent Detective Minielly and others to execute it. The raid took place 
on the eve of the primary election of May 18, 1956. 
181 
Doug Baker and Brad Williams of the Journal went with the deputies 
to Clark's home to seize the allegedly pornographic materials. What was 
found there were some party records and 26 slot machines. While the raid 
was in progress, Jerry Rogers was sitting on a hassock. 
Baker described in a 1980 interview both his and Brad Williams' 
active participation in the search of Ray Clark's house. He said: 
He (Williams) went around opening drawers and rifling through 
shelves .... but myself being a little bit more mindful of the 
ethics of newspaper men .... ! merely stood in the living room 
(Baker-Uris interview 1980). 
But, Baker said, he noticed a hassock which seemed very protected by 
Jerry Clark, and he pointed the hassock out to the Sheriff's men. In the 
hassock were the tapes of Elkins' wiretaps which were then illegally 
seized (Baker-Uris interview 1980). 
Shortly thereafter, Baker remembers, Williams entertained the State 
Police and Teamster Clyde Crosby with the tapes' contents. 
When I got there, he (Crosby) was all set up with all his 
expensive recording equipment. . ..• See, I'm a little more 
ethical type of reporter than Brad. Brad's a derring-doer. 
He's a Front Page type reporter. I'm kind of a different 
school. I was shocked, but Brad was one of these irrepressible 
guys. You couldn't do anything with him, you know. I said, 
"My God, Brad, you can't let Clyde copy these tapes," and he'd 
say, "Oh, it's all right." What are you going to do? (Baker-
Uris interview 1980). 
While the raid was still going on, an Oregonian reporter, William 
Lambert, was tipped off and rushed to Clark's house. He arrived as the 
raid was ending and began to phone his story in. He was threatened by 
Brad Williams according to his taped interview of 1979, for attempting to 
be a part of the action (Lambert-Uris interview 1979). 
Within two days, Judge Mears decided that the search warrant was 
obtained under false pretenses and inadequate testimony. Meanwhile, 
182 
copies of the tapes were made by Schrunk and apparently were played for 
technicians of the Oregon Journal and the Journal-owned radio station 
KPOJ. They made copies for, among others, the Oregon State Police. 
Oddly, the tapes were kept in the vault of the Oregon Journal, which was 
thought for some reason to be safer, according to the Mayor and one-time 
Sheriff Terry Schrunk, than the Sheriff's office safe (U.S. Senate 
Coonnittee Hearings 1957). Apparently, Clyde Crosby heard the tapes 
without Schrunk's permission while Journal reporter Brad Williams was 
playing the tapes for Oregon State Police at Williams' house. It is 
probable that Langley heard the tapes. 
When Judge Mears ruled the affidavit on which the search warrant was 
based as improper, he did not return the tapes to Clark, as would 
normally be the case. Instead, he ordered them turned over to Thornton. 
Thornton gave them to the State Police, who put them in a safe deposit 
box where they were seized by the F. B. I. after Federal Judge Claude 
McCulloch (an old Langley family friend) ordered an investigation by the 
Federal Grand Jury of the charges of wire tapping. 
The raid on Clark's house was treated very differently by the two 
papers. From the Senate hearing materials and, by inference from the way 
the articles were written, it becomes clear that the Oregon Journal had a 
great stake in the success of the raid. Whatever else was happening, the 
raid was manipulated into existence at the instigation and in the 
interests of the Journal. That it was helpful to Langley is another 
issue entirely. 
The Journal, which lacked sensational material like the tapes made 
by Elkins, now had tapes of its own. With this change, the relations 
between the two papers became more intensely rivalrous. 
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The Elkins wire tap bust is a very interesting matter in and of 
itself. The tapes were not allowed as admissible evidence in the Oregon 
State case but Langley was able to persuade Federal Judge Claude 
McCulloch to bring to the Federal Grand Jury nine violations of federal 
wire tap ordinances. Langley, in a 1980 interview, confirmed that he 
influenced the federal judiciary to move against Elkins (Kaplan-Uris 
interview 1979; Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Elkins was vulnerable. At that time the Silver Platter Doctrine was 
law. This rule allowed illegally gathered evidence, given legally to a 
federal agency, to be used in federal court. Elkins eventually carried 
his case to the Supreme Court and won. The Silver Platter Doctrine is no 
more (Elkins v. United States, June 28, 1960). Elkins did away with an 
anomoly in law which allowed illegal state procedures to be admissible 
legally in federal courts. 
William Lambert indicated (Lambert-Uris interview 1980) that he got 
news of the raid through a contact who called him from the Oregonian 
office, but not directly, he said, from Jim Elkins. The Journal, by 
innuendo, suggested that Elkins immediately contacted Lambert, and 
Lambert rushed to the scene of the raid in southeast Portland. When the 
raid and seizure were determined to be based on a faulty affidavit 
prepared by District Attorney Langley, the Journal insisted that the 
Oregonian's attorney had joined forces with Clark's lawyer in an effort 
to take the evidence from Langley. Deputy District Attorney Oscar 
Howlitt attempted to play some of the obscene recordings in an effort to 
prove the validity of the warrant, but Judge Mears, apparently after a 
conference with Attorney General Thornton, refused to allow this. 
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The Oregon Journal in its April 10, 1957 editorial, argued that 
Schrunk was courageous in allowing the Journal's reporters to hear the 
copies of the seized wire taps and recordings. Five Journal and KPOJ 
employees, by the Journal's own admission, were present when the tapes 
were played for the first time on the early morning of Hay 18, 1956. 
It was unusual for a Sheriff to allow reporters to hear, prior to 
trial, any evidence that would be admissible in a court of law. 
The Journal said that it took steps to put the copies of the Clark 
tapes and the information which they contained into the hands of the 
State Police, who were cooperating with Attorney General Thornton in the 
vice investigation. Within hours of the raid, the Journal said, it 
permitted State Police to play copies of the tapes in its possession. 
Schrunk had indicated that the tapes would be turned over to Thornton as 
soon as they had made a copy. 
The Journal, in an attempt to justify its actions, pointed out that 
their reporter Brad Williams made a spur of the moment decision to permit 
Clyde Crosby, at Crosby's request, to attend the meeting at Brad 
Williams' home in which the tapes were being played for Lt. Claude Cross 
of the State Police. Crosby, the Journal editorial admitted, made copies 
of the tapes, which was done without the knowledge of the Journal 
management. Williams' actions, the Journal said, were open actions, 
however, and the copies were made in Lt. Cross' presence. No one was 
hiding the fact that the tapes were being made, they emphasized (Oregon 
Journal, April 10, 1957). 
Among the Hiniphone recorder reels found in Clark's basement were 
two official Portland Police Department recordings - one a recording of 
Chief Purcell's telephone conversations with H.G. Fod Maison, the 
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Superintendent of State Police. Maison apparently did not know that he 
was being taped. For months the Journal demanded explanations why these 
tapes were in Ray Clark's possession. 
In the fall of 1956, ex-mayor Fred Peterson offered an explanation 
of the Miniphone recorder's presence in the Clark home. Peterson put in 
the City Council minutes a report from then Police Chief Purcell saying 
that the former Chief had recorded a telephone call to State Police head 
Fod Maison upon advice of his attorney. The call was prompted by com-
plaints from Portland police officers that they were being hassled by 
State Police in connection with the vice investigation. (Purcell and 8 
of his police officers were later indicted.) The Chief indicated that he 
made the recordings of his call on May 12, 1956. He stated that the 
Oregonian reporter Wallace Turner had requested the loan of a mini-
recorder in February and that Purcell had directed Sergeant Ralph O'Hara 
to give him the machine. When Purcell needed the machine in May, he 
learned that it had been delivered to Clark's home on Turner's 
instruction. The Miniphone was picked up by Sergeant O'Hara and was 
returned to Chief Purcell, but the original recordings that Purcell had 
made were by error left in Clark's home. 
The Journal and the Schrunk Trial. Tom Maloney, who had disap-
peared shortly after the vice story broke in the Oregonian, was found by 
Journal reporter Brad Williams in Washington State. The question arose 
of how the Journal found Maloney, if it were not in cahoots with him. The 
Journal's explanation was that the reporter worked very hard to discover 
his whereabouts and that simple, hard perseverance succeeded where 
police and Oregonian activity had failed (Oregon Journal, April 14, 
1957). 
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The Oregon Journal continued its "Let's look at the facts" series in 
a fourth editorial on April 14, 1957. It dealt extensively with the 
allegations that Terry Schrunk had accepted a bribe from Clifford 0. 
(Jimmy) Bennett, operator of the 8212 Club on North Denver Avenue in 
Portland in the pre-dawn hours of September 11, 1955. The accusations 
centered around several questions which the Journal then answered: 
1. Why did not Schrunk arrest Bennett at the raid? (Schrunk told the 
Senate Committee, reaffirmed at his trial, and was believed by the 
jury, that there was no actual evidence of gambling, drinking or 
money changing hands in the private club.) 
2. Why did several city policemen and several other witnesses see 
Schrunk pick up something Bennett had left behind a telephone pole? 
(Schrunk had denied this, and later the evidence of the various 
policemen was put into disrepute when several of them changed their 
stories, particularly Officer Sutter.) 
3. Why did a lie detector test in Oregon indicate that Schrunk had 
lied? 
4. And why did he balk in taking the lie detector test in Washington? 
(Schrunk had argued that the lie detector test in Oregon and 
Washington D.C. were manipulated against him.) 
Critics of Schrunk saw his activities as part of a plot to extract 
bribes and to support illegal operations. They argued that the raid on 
the illegal joint inside the city was essentially an attempt by Schrunk 
to discredit the city police department, which they argued had been 
highly successful in opposing the Teamster-gangster alliance. 
The Journal pointed out that the Oregonian supported Peterson as 
mayor against Schrunk. The Journal implied that Peterson had been 
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involved in bribery. But because he was a Republican, and the Oregonian 
was a Republican paper, they continued to support him (Oregon Journal, 
April 14, 1957). 
Schrunk's defenders at the Journal saw the $500 bribe incident in a 
very different light. On April 14, 1957 the Journal argued that it made 
no sense that Schrunk would go out early in the morning to get money from 
an underworld figure when, in fact, a telephone call would have sufficed. 
Further, the Journal asked rhetorically: Why would Bennett pay a bribe 
when his place was going to be shut down anyway? Why would he avoid 
arrest with a $500 bribe when the fine would be that amount at the most? 
Why did Schrunk call the city police to pick up a bicycle at the scene? 
Why, in other words, did he expose himself to the full view of policemen, 
Sheriff's officers and passersby to accept a bribe when there were far 
more discreet ways? And finally, why did Portland policemen who said 
they saw Schrunk take the bribe not immediately report it to their 
superiors since evidence of Schrunk's taking a bribe would have been most 
useful to Peterson and Purcell in their campaign to maintain power? 
Schrunk denied taking the bribe and offered to take the Senate lie 
detector test, balking only at questions outside of the bribe issue. 
Schrunk had been indicted and found innocent of perjury in connection 
with lying to the Grand Jury about the alleged bribe. His trial took 
place at the time that he was Mayor and was popular. 
The Journal argued that Schrunk' s general reputation for honesty 
was well known and that reform Mayor Dorothy McCullough Lee used Schrunk 
as one of those at her right-hand side cleaning up vice in Portland. The 
Journal pointed out that the question of Schrunk' s honesty was never 
raised until he had decided to challenge Peterson for the mayorship. 
188 
There were numerous instances cited in 1949 and 1950 of Schrunk's anger 
at being offered bribes, as reported in the newspapers of that time, said 
the Journal editorial. 
Continuing its analysis, the April 14, 1957 Journal editorial 
argued that according to Schrunk, the raid of September 11, 1955 was a 
spur of the moment response. Schrunk had believed that the 8212 Club had 
been closed. When he discovered that it was open while on his way home 
early one morning, he decided to send two officers into the club to see 
if they could gain evidence for an arrest. 
There were 7 witnesses who suggested Schrunk' s guilt: Elkins, 
indicating the shortage in the bankroll; Laura Stone, the bookkeeper for 
Elkins, who operated at the 8212 Club; John W. Vance, an Elkins' employee 
and an ex-convict who agreed apparently with Bennett that the $500 bribe 
was cheaper than a larger loss of money; Mrs. Virginia Jenkins, hatcheck 
girl and wife of an Elkins employee, who mentioned the manila envelope; 
City Patrolman Merle L. Tiedeman, who said he saw Schrunk and Bennett 
both stop by the telephone pole; Lowell Amundson, Tiedeman's partner, who 
described Bennett bending down and Schrunk appearing shortly thereafter 
and bending down at the same spot; and Frank Daniels, bartender who came 
to the club to apply for a job. 
At the perjury trial, the officers' testimony and Elkins' lies about 
his narcotics record would contradict each other. In several instances 
the policemen's testimony had changed from the version of the Oregonian 
and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field (1957). 
By March 8, 1957, the Oregon Journal said Officer Sutter, one of 
those initially accusing Schrunk, had changed his story about Schrunk's 
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bribe. Bennett, who had refused to appear before the Senate Committee, 
stated later to the Journal that he would have appeared at the Hearings 
and told a different story if he had not been afraid. (Editorial, 
April 14, 1957, the Oregon Journal.) He felt that with 7 witnesses 
disagreeing with him, he would be charged with perjury, and instead, went 
with the lesser charge of refusing to answer the questions of the 
Committee - contempt of Congress. Bennett said there were further 
witnesses that would support his story but had refused to name them. 
On June 23, 1957, court reporter Jean Watkins transcribed a 
recording secretly made in a car of conversations allegedly among 
Clifford Bennett, 8212 Club operator, Frank Daniels, bartender-witness 
and Floyd Johnson. The transcription of the secret recording was made at 
radio station KWJJ. The recorded transcript clearly indicated that there 
was a plot involving Elkins' employees to perjure themselves in an effort 
to discredit Terry Schrunk (Bennett, Daniels and Johnson, Attorney 
General's Files, Oregon State Archives, June 23, 1957, accession number 
61-67). 
The transcript stands in direct contradiction to a tape of Bennett, 
Turner, Lambert, Elkins and Clark made at the reporter's hotel room in 
the Hungerford Hotel on May 9, 1956. The tape was made without Bennett's 
knowledge. In this transcription, Bennett tells of bribing Mayor Schrunk 
while Schrunk was Sheriff (Bennett, Turner, Elkins and Clark, Oregon 
State Archives, May 9, 1956, accession number 61-67). 
The Journal (April 14, 1957) stated that Bennett's story in every 
detail had been checked out and made sense. That, for example, Elkins 
held the morcg~ge on the home of Virginia Jenkins, the hatcheck girl who 
testified that Bennett needed a manila envelope. Her motives would be 
suspect, the Journal insisted. 
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A Kenton barber, Clarence Nichols, said that he overheard two men in 
his shop, while one was getting a haircut saying, "He's (Schrunk) got to 
be got rid of, there's talk of him running for Mayor. You can't get to 
him; you can't buy him. He's got to be hit with a frame so hard he'll 
never forget it." Nichols, according to the Journal (April 14, 1957) 
also claimed that city police knew that the 8212 Club was operating and 
did nothing to close it. Once, he said, a car with Seattle license 
plates and containing a roulette wheel and other gambling paraphernalia 
was parked near the club for three days and did not even get a ticket. 
Police officers pushed it to another parking spot, rather than tow it 
away. 
From February 27 to March 10, 1956, Officer Sutter testified to the 
Senate Co11DDittee that he had watched Schrunk' s home to report on his 
movements to the police department should Schrunk initiate any surprise 
raids (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957). 
Officer Lindholm said that he was under heavy pressure by both Jim 
Purcell, Chief of Police, and Wallace Turner and William Lambert of the 
Oregonian to recall events in the same way that Tiedeman and Amundson 
had. Purcell had questioned him for 3 hours and then had sent him to talk 
to Turner and Lambert. They all, he said, told him it would sound funny 
if he ever tried to testify in court that he could not remember the 
episode. Lindholm was never called before the Senate Co11DDittee, the 
Journal (April 14, 1957) pointed out. 
A Journal editorial of October 1, 1957 labeled Elkins as a sociopath 
who had taken the Fifth Amendment 51 times in the course of the Maloney 
trial (Oregon Journal. September 30, 1957). It pointed out that he had 
been involved in safe burglary, drug activity, etc. 
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In July of 1957 there were 65 indictments. Langley faced 7, includ-
ing: conspiracy, malfeasance, bribe taking and the improper use of a 
search warrant. Elkins at that time faced 11 charges. Crosby faced 6, 
including: false swearing, wire tapping and his involvement in the E-R 
conspiracy among others. Several police officers were involved in 
accusations of false swearing. 
The costs of the vice probe were continuously emphasized by the 
Journal. By September 1957, costs had reached $120,000; 64 of the Grand 
Jury indictments had been dismissed; there had been three acquittals, 
only one conviction, 2 guilty pleas, and total fines of $350, all of 
which were pending (Journal, September 28, 1957). 
Mayor Terry Schrunk' s Perjury Trial. By the time of the trial 
witnesses had changed their stories; Lt. William Brian said Nordon Nieman 
saw chips at the 8212 Club. Nieman denied under oath that he had. Brian 
said that Officer Tiedeman never mentioned the bribe at all to him until 
it came up in the Oregonian and at the Senate Hearings. 
During the time of the trial, the Journal was constantly editorial-
izing against Arthur Kaplan, the most vigorous of the prosecutors for the 
State of Oregon. Kaplan's lengthy Grand Jury session with its huge 
number of indictments was called "Kaplan's capers" by the Journal and by 
Thornton in a 1980 interview (Thornton-Uris interview 1980). 
Kaplan, in a 1979 interview, described how he attempted to return to 
Oregon to practice law after leaving the State Attorney General's office 
to work for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field (1957). He said he found that he could not 
find anyone to rent him office space, and he was given the cold shoulder 
throughout the business and law community of Portland. In fact, Kaplan 
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indicated that much of the Jewish coimnunity was most annoyed at him, 
feeling that he had caused negative attention to be brought to improper 
activity by some Jews in the coimnunity (Kaplan-Uris interview 1979). 
Robert Kennedy was brought in as a witness at Schrunk's trial. He 
seemed very close to the prosecution, to Ralph Wycoff, to Turner and 
Lambert of the Oregonian and to Jim Elkins. Kennedy stepped down from 
the witness stand and shook hands with the judge. This must have had an 
interesting effect on the jury at the time (Oregonian, June 28, 1957). 
The two county policemen involved in the trial, Ed Grohs and Gordon 
Newmann, indicated there was no envelope and no gambling visible although 
they had apparently testified to the opposite to the investigators from 
the Prosecutor's office before the trial. Cliff Alterman, a partner of 
Ray Kell (Schrunk's campaign manager) and later of Ted Runstein's, stated 
in the Journal (July 24, 1957) that Oregonian reporters were often with 
ex-policemen, Elkins' workers and Ray Clark. 
Frank Daniels told Alterman to check Room 305 of the Hungerford 
Hotel. There they found Oregonian reporters with Ray Clark. The 
explanation by the Oregonian's publisher Frye was that Clark was hired to 
transcribe tapes. The continued close association of associates of 
Elkins with the Oregonian staff cast serious doubt on the validity of 
that paper's position (Oregon Journal, July 24, 1957). 
One-time Oregonian reporter William Lambert repeatedly insisted 
that Elkins, whatever his crime record may have been, was an honest man 
engaged in activity born out of desperation and fear (Lambert-Uris 
interview 1979). 
Schrunk is Found Innocent and Elkins Falls. On Saturday, June 29, 
1957, Terry Schrunk, then Mayor of Portland, after two hours of delibera-
tion by the jury, was found innocent of perjury. 
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On October 28, 1964 Elkins was found guilty and convicted of a 
narcotics charge. The information for this charge, incidentally, was 
gathered by Dick Bogle, then a policeman, now a television journalist for 
KATU, Channel 2. Later Elkins died in rather mysterious circumstances at 
the age of 67 on August 2, 1972. Elkins was nearing the town of Globe, 
Arizona, where he had been arrested long ago and convicted for exchanging 
gunshots with policemen in the course of a burglary. According to the 
story in the Journal and the Oregonian (August 2, 1972), he suffered a 
heart attack, and his car crashed into a utility pole. 
(It is interesting to note that Captain Norm Reiter of the Portland 
PolicP Department speculated in a 1980 interview that Elkins may not have 
been the man in the car, that Elkins disappeared and another body was 
substituted for his. There is no evidence to substantiate this, but the 
legend of Jim Elkins lives on in the mind of at least one Captain of the 
East Precinct of the Portland Police Department. Reiter-Uris interview 
1980.) 
Blackmail and Elkins' Motives. At the time of the vice scandal, 
District Attorney Langley insisted that the tapes played by Jim Elkins to 
the Oregonian reporters and to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) were faked. 
Experts presented by the Senate Committee (U.S. Senate Committee 
Hearings 1957) insisted they were genuine. Both then Attorney General 
Thornton (presently sitting on the Oregon Court of Appeals) and William 
Lambert, then a reporter for the Oregonian, in interviews conducted in 
1979 and 1980, respectively, insist they were genuine. Both cite the 
unbroken background noises, the overlapping exchanges and poor quality 
of sound as support for the authenticity of the tapes. Doug Baker, then 
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and now a reporter for the Oregon Journal, despite his distrust of 
Elkins, affirms the authenticity of the Elkins tapes (Baker-Uris 
interview 1980). Only William Langley still maintains that the tapes 
were a clever fake (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Whether the tapes were fake or genuine, the possibility still 
existed that Elkins may have initially planned to use them as blaclanail, 
either to get money, as Langley suggested in 1980 (Langley-Uris interview 
1980) and at the Senate Hearings (U.S. Senate Committee Hearings 1957), 
or to change the power relations between Langley and Elkins. 
In the course of Elkins' accusations presented to the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957), he had indicated that the Commonwealth Corporation, a large real 
estate management and property holding firm in Oregon, had attempted to 
pick up some of the property held at the E-R site. This caused, on 
March 6, 1957, a response by Chester A. Morris, vice president of Common-
wealth, and Carvel Linden of the E-R Commission, that the Commonwealth 
Corporation had not been involved in attempting to make purchases at that 
site, but had merely sought one option to discover potential market value 
of property in the area as a service to the E-R Commission. It should be 
remembered that Commonwealth officers were among those, together with 
Norris, Beggs and Simpson, another large real estate firm, who had 
actively supported the Mayor Riley campaign against Dorothy McCullough 
Lee of the famous vice clean-up of 1948-1952 (Maccoll 1978). 
Elkins .•• just doesn't feel comfortable unless he's got you by 
the throat some way." (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Doug Baker, in an interview conducted in 1980, suggested that Elkins 
used blackmail successfully in avoiding prosecution for a safe-cracking 
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conspiracy after the vice probe itself (Baker-Uris interview 1980). 
Elkins, according to Baker's 1980 interview, knew of the presiding 
judge's homosexuality and was thus able to force a dismissal of the safe-
cracking charges. That Elkins controlled and set up safe jobs was common 
knowledge both before and after the vice probe (Langley-Uris interview 
1980; Baker-Uris interview 1980; Lambert-Uris interview 1979). Langley 
asserted that he had spread the word that the shakedown of thieves by the 
police, in tacit cooperation with Elkins, had to stop and that this 
prompted Elkins to move against Langley (Baker-Uris interview 1980; 
Langley-Uris interview 1979). 
To what degree could Jim Elkins be considered a reliable witness? 
Certainly all parties involved today acknowledge that Elkins' motives 
were not unselfish. But there remains more than one plausible 
explanation for Elkins' decision to go public. For one-time Oregonian 
reporter William Lambert, the reason was that Elkins was fighting to 
survive: 
You could hear Langley (on the tapes) talking •.. (his) very 
distinctive voice ... telling Maloney about what they were going 
to do ... to the "Character" they called Elkins, and how they 
were going to do it. They were going to cut him out ... "This 
character is giving us a bad time." And God, he goes on and 
on •. Elkins listened to all of this, and Elkins realized that 
he didn't have the clout, that he was in no position, really, 
to do anything about it. He was afraid of the Teamsters. He 
thought, well, if they got into a knock-down, drag-out, he 
didn't have any troops. These guys ... could literally kill 
him, and then he was afraid of them, and I think when Wally 
(Turner) went out that day to talk to him that Elkins had 
probably just about come to the point where he figured maybe 
I'd better tell somebody on the newspaper about this. We 
learned later that he had said something to a Journal guy 
(Rolla Crick). (Lambert-Uris interview 1980). 
Former District Attorney William Langley agreed that Elkins was 
frightened, but not of the Teamsters. Elkins, Langley said, was fearful 
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of giving up power to Langley. Langley had written letters to Chief of 
Police Purcell insisting that the Chief close certain whorehouses that 
Langley knew to be run by Elkins' people. (This tactic was mentioned on 
the King Towers conspiracy tapes.) The Chief, Langley asserted, went to 
Elkins with Langley's letters. And Elkins showed up at Langley's house 
with the letters and a blaclanail threat (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
In addition, Langley, as mentioned elsewhere, had put out the word that 
the cozy arrangement between the police and Elkins' thief friends was to 
end (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Langley asserted in the 1980 interview that Elkins often would 
inform on other criminals and thus keep himself in the good graces of the 
police (Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Elkins' role in fixing things was further delineated by Langley: 
Whenever a thief or narcotics fellow would come into Portland, 
they would go see Jim Elkins, and he would see certain people 
at the police department; and these people could stay around 
without being harrassed. And if they happened to get caught, 
why, there was an opportunity that the charges could be reduced 
(Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Whatever Elkins' motives, the question of his reliability is para-
mount. William Lambert asserted flatly that Elkins was telling the truth 
(Lambert-Uris interview 1980) and that he was not a junkie despite 
arrests and convictions both before and after the vice probe for 
narcotics involvement (Lambert-Uris interview 1980; U.S. Senate 
Conunittee Hearings 1957). Yet Doug Baker and others insist that Elkins 
lied to the U.S. Senate Select CoDmlittee on Improper Activities in the 
Labor or Management Field (1957) when he said that he had never had 
anything to do with prostitution. 
We used to talk to madams, and the standard thing was when 
you'd say, i:did Elkins have anything to do with such and such a 
house?" their answer would be "Christ, he even counted the 
towels." (Baker-Uris interview 1980). 
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The Oregon Journal, no less than the Oregonian, had its own 
political axe to grind in the vice probe. It generally supported 
candidates opposed by its rival. It was in a circulation fight, a 
virtual struggle to the death. Yet its view of the vice probe was not, as 
the Oregonian and its supporters suggest, simply a reaction to being 
scooped. By November of 1956, the Journal had developed a detailed and 
plausible counter-theory of the vice situation written by Brad Williams. 
The Unpublished "Other" Version. Williams indicated at that time 
that the Oregonian believed Terry Schrunk, William Langley and Clyde 
Crosby were representing a Seattle Teamsters mob. For his part, Williams 
saw Maloney and others not as Teamster goons but as Elkins' men. 
Williams argued that a circumstantial case existed to support the idea 
that Elkins' move toward publicity was not motivated out of fear of the 
Teamsters but out of a desire to hold on to an empire threatened by home-
grown reform elements within the rising Democratic Party. What follows, 
then, is a summary of Williams' version of the Portland vice story 
discovered in its original manuscript form in the files of the Attorney 
General (Oregon State Archives): 
Jim Elkins came to Portland and joined his brother in July of 1937 
upon his release from prison in Arizona. He had been jailed for assault 
with a deadly weapon. There was at that time a loosely knit underworld 
in Portland which included men like Al Winter, Les Beclanan, the Allen 
brothers and Fred Elkins, who ran brothels, slots and bootleg gambling 
joints. 
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Stanley Earl was a bouncer for Fred Elkins. Earl was to rise in 
politics as the Elkins brothers rose in crime. 
Fred and Jim Elkins, using force where necessary, expanded the 
Elkins empire. These operations included narcotics, for which Jim was 
sent to Leavenworth prison. By October of 1947, Stanley Earl, who had 
risen in the CIO, approached Mayor Earl Riley and insisted that unless 
Jim Purcell were made Chief of Police, evidence damaging to Riley would 
be released through a City Club Report. Earl was the principal investi-
gator for the report. Riley refused. 
By the time the report was published in February of 1948, Riley had 
been repeatedly pressured. He had also been visited by Oregonian 
reporter Wallace Turner, who saw Riley as linked to Al Winter. Purcell 
and Earl worked together on the City Club Report. Riley was defeated by 
Dorothy Lee, who, unknown to her, received laundered funds from the 
Elkins group. Riley opened a Packard agency off Burnside Street. 
In August of 1948, Stanley Earl, as a CIO executive, wrote to the 
Arizona authorities asking for a pardon for Jim Elkins, whom he indicated 
he had known for some time. Earl was joined in this by Governor John Hall 
and Portland Police Chief Leon Jenkins. The pardon was granted. Later 
Earl was to deny the importance of his action on Elkins' behalf. Earl on 
several occasions attempted to further the career of Jim Purcell. 
In 1952, Earl was elected to the Portland City Council seat vacated 
by Fred Peterson, who successfully ran for Mayor. Elkins at this time 
reputedly controlled pinball in Portland. 
Earl attempted to legalize pinball which had been ineffectively 
outlawed in the Lee administration. By January of 1954, the Teamsters in 
Seattle had decided to organize the pinball industry. Elkins attempted 
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to join the Union with his men, but because the Union feared Elkins as a 
potential Jimmy Hoffa, who would both rival the Seattle group's power and 
bring unfavorable attention to the Union, the leadership refused Elkins 
and moved to shut him out of the pinball business. This was the origin of 
the picketing in :Cortland of certain pinball locations. Elkins sold most 
of his holdings to Stan Terry and Lou Dunis. 
In response to the shut out of Elkins, Stanley Earl reversed his 
position on pinball and denounced the devices. Crosby attempted to patch 
things up but found Earl enraged at Elkins' being shut out. 
During the 1954 election, Elkins brought Maloney down to help 
Langley but also supported Mccourt. Once elected, Langley, who had had 
bad dealings with Elkins, began to harrass Elkins by writing letters ~o 
state and city officials listing places operated by Elkins. (The tapes 
confirm Langley's action against the Elkins group using the "Spy," Leo 
Plotkin, but suggest that Langley was actively supporting the Seattle 
group in an effort to move into Portland and that the Seattle group 
initially suggested the letter-writing tactic.) 
Maloney brought in McLaughlin to expand cardrooms, punchboards and 
other vice activities. A meeting was held in Maloney' s apartment between 
Maloney, McLaughlin, Elkins and Norman Nemer, who at that time was a 
punchboard distributor. (Nemer would later marry Sylvia Schnitzer and 
leave gambling for the real estate business.) 
Meanwhile, Plotkin continued to spy for Langley at Maloney' s 
behest. One night Plotkin was beaten by two of Elkins' men, Joey Clemo 
and Chuck Brown. Plotkin confessed his spy role, and Elkins, now wise to 
the game, manipulated Maloney into an apartment at the King Towers. The 
apart:ment had been bugged in advance when two adjoining apartments were 
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rented by Elkins two years previously. It was rumored that Elkins had a 
financial interest in the building and that the management was in collu-
sion with Elkins. 
Maloney had made no real progress in trying to set up Portland and 
gave thirty days' notice on his King Towers apartment on September 1, 
1955. At the same time, his next-door neighbor, Bernard Kane, in whose 
apartments the recordings were being made, gave notice as well. Maloney 
was chased out of town by Elkins and by pressure from Seattle to abandon 
an impossibly complicated and compromised plan. 
Langley continued to push Elkins, who responded by trying to black-
mail Langley and Crosby intr. silence and cooperation using the King 
Towers conspiracy tapes. 
When the very popular Terry Schrunk, who it had been assumed would 
run for Secretary of State, decided instead to run for Mayor, Elkins 
realized that his power was broken and with nothing to lose decided to 
make his tapes public. Elkins had corruption rumors spread throughout 
the city (Brad Williams, Manuscripts, Oregon State Archives). 
This version of the events surrounding the vice probe emphasizes the 
tie-ins between Earl, Purcell and Elkins. It does not, however, explain 
away the ties between Seattle Teamsters leadership and Maloney and 
McLaughlin. Nor does it explain Langley's apparent involvement with the 
Seattle group which is clearly revealed on the King Towers conspiracy 
tapes. On tape, Langley is clearly identified as saying that he is owed 
$8,000 by Elkins and his people (Oregon State Archives, 69A 52/2, Tape 
R9-l). 
Williams' version has another major weakness. He asserts that 
Langley's letter-writing campaign revealing Elkins' joints began before 
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Maloney was persuaded to move into the King Towers. Yet the tapes show 
Maloney and McLaughlin inventing the tactic while in the King Towers. 
More importantly, it was the Seattle men, not Langley, who first 
suggested the idea of the letters. 
In the end, despite the volumes of documents, tapes, accusations and 
counter-accusations engendered by the Portland vice probe, only these 
things had changed: The obvious aspects of the vice scene disappeared; 
the public career of William Langley was ended; James Elkins faced a 
possible jail sentence which was later reversed by the Supreme Court; and 
most importantly, the Teamsters-connected Seattle group had disappeared. 
The Schrunk Position and the Portland Network 
Mayor Terry Schrunk's role in the Portland vice situation remains 
unclear. Unfortunately, Schrunk is dead. His perspective would be lost 
to us were it not for the survival of those who were close to him. 
Schrunk' s friend and long-time supporter, attorney Raymond Kell, is 
still active in Portland, practicing law. It is from Kell that a view 
more closely akin to that of Terry Schrunk's can be gained. 
Raymond Kell came to Portland during the late war years when the 
city had a reputation of being wide open. His law practice in Portland 
began under Gus Solomon, who was his senior partner until 1949 when 
Solomon became a United States District Judge. Kell, along with Solomon, 
was instrumental in choosing Terry Schrunk, then a career fire fighter, 
as the Democratic Party's choice for Multnomah County Sheriff after the 
ouster of Democrat Mike Elliott. (Marion L. (Mike) Elliott held brief 
tenure as Sheriff after defeating Republican machine candidate Martin 
Pratt in November, 1948. Taking off ice in January of 1949, he was 
recalled 6 months later.) 
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During the years of the Schrunk administration, Kell served on 
various civic co111Dissions, the Portland Dock Commission and later the 
Port of Portland Commission. Kell's career rise closely paralleled that 
of Terry Schrunk. Kell was Schrunk' s campaign manager in his race for 
Sheriff and his successful challenge to the Republican-dominated 
Peterson incumbancy in 1956. Kell acknowledged the close ties of 
friendship and legal advice that existed between his law partner Gus 
Solomon and gambler, entrepreneur Al Winter. Winter was described by 
Kell as being active in liberal causes along with Kell and Solomon. Kell 
and the others shared with Schrunk a strong commitment in the 19SO's to 
an organization in those days characterized as being dangerously 
sympathetic to left-wing causes - The Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA). The ADA was formed in reaction, Kell said, to the cold war 
attitudes and actions of President Harry Truman (Kell-Uris interview 
1981). 
Kell saw the Portland vice probe as growing out of a number of 
diverse elements all of which came together as he put it, "like pieces of 
a mosaic." 
Kell indicated the following factors as crucial to the probe: 
1. Oregonian reporters Lambert's and Turner's successful investi-
gations of Indian land frauds led the two reporters to seek yet 
another sensational expose; 
2. Elkins' decision to go public with his blackmail tapes; 
3. The appearance in Portland of Tom Maloney and Joe McLaughlin 
who had ambitions to become involved in Portland vice 
activities; 
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4. The continuing successful challenge to Republican hegemony in 
Oregon state politics and more particularly in Portland's 
regional politics by the Democrats; 
5. The Oregonian' s continued commitment to the Elkins story 
despite mounting evidence to discredit him and his cohorts; 
6. Robert Kennedy's decision to begin the Hearings of the U.S. 
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or 
Management Field (1957) with a sensational expose of an 
attempted Teamsters take-over of vice and political power in 
Portland. 
Kell described Elkins as a "self-starter" very much on the fringe of 
the Portland scene. Elkins' tape recordings were made as a part of an 
attempt at genteel blackmail, Kell suggested. This is confirmed by 
Langley (1980) and Thornton (1980). Elkins had established himself in 
Portland and was allowed to operate through the tolerance and occasional 
active help of the Portland Police Department. In exchange, Elkins 
informed on burglars, safecrackers and other outsiders for the police 
department. This cozy arrangement was disrupted first by William 
Langley's election as District Attorney and then by Schrunk's refusal to 
cooperate in a policy of tolerance in areas under his jurisdiction (Kell-
Uris interview 1981). This view is shared by William Langley (Langley-
Uris interview 1980). 
Ray Kell insisted that the only thing Terry Schrunk was guilty of 
was naivete. The raid on the 8212 Club in Kenton was made out of frustra-
tion and on the spur of the moment in the early morning hours after 
Schrunk had had a few drinks and was on his way home. This was why the 
Sheriff's deputies involved were in uniform and why Schrunk was there. 
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Kell reiterated the oft-made point that if Schrunk were taking bribes, he 
would hardly do so in such a public manner. 
Kell said he urged Schrunk at the time of the Senate Hearings to 
bring a lawyer with him. But Schrunk, at that time a loquacious and open 
person, felt that he could handle Robert Kennedy's questions. He balked 
at the lie detector test when he realized that the questions that he was 
asked had more than one meaning and that the truth or falsehood of his 
answers was not as simple a matter as he had assumed it would be (Kell-
Uris interview 1981). 
Schrunk's indictment for perjury on the bribery question came, Kell 
said, only after the Grand Jury had several times had the matter 
presented to it and refused to issue a true bill. Attorney General 
Thornton introduced the matter to the Jury after being pressured 
repeatedly by the Oregonian. Thornton acknowledged the repeated 
pressure and repeated referral to the Grand Jury in a 1980 interview 
(Thornton-Uris interview 1980). 
For Mayor Terry Schrunk, who was found not guilty of perjury, Kell 
said, the negative publicity, humiliation and expense of the trial meant 
a real change in his attitudes and politics. Schrunk, an open easy-going 
liberal, became a cautious, far more conservative and somewhat 
disenchanted man. 
0 That 18 months changed his personality and career ambitions. Terry 
Schrunk became much more suspicious, cautious and conservative" (Kell-
Uris interview 1981). 
Kell described the period of the vice probe as the end of an era. 
The city under Mayors Carson, Riley and Peterson had been robust and 
open. It was a period in which policemen at all levels were commonly 
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bribed. Bribery, both subtle and direct, was an acknowledged way of 
financing politics during those years (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
On the question as to whether or not there was a syndicate in 
Portland, Kell said that, 
"there had been a pattern of that in that whole decade. It was 
a genteel, home-grown sort of thing. I never had any sense of 
outsiders, no Mafia Involvement." (Kell-Uris interview 1981) 
Kell confirmed that there was a racetrack wire at Winter's Pago Pago 
Club. There was gambling frequently at the Multnomah Athletic Club, the 
Arlington Club and the University Club, all upper-class clubs. It was 
here that the elite of the gambling world socialized with Portland's 
upper crust. Gambling was equally genteel at Duncan's. Games like Pan 
were played, largely by successful older Jewish men (Kell-Uris interview 
1981). 
Al Winter was seen by Kell as being at the top social and economic 
strata of gambling in Portland. At the next level were men like Norman 
Nemer, Lou Dunis and Stan Terry. "If pinball was illegal then they were 
illegal" (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
Far below these men, Kell suggested, were fringe operators with 
great ambitions and few connections, like Jim Elkins. 
Kell emphasized that men like Stan Terry had nothing to do with the 
crowd with which Al Winter was associated. The three strata had little 
to do with each other and men like Elkins were not welcome in the company 
of those at the top (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
It was, Kell said, an era of accoomodation, 
" ••• there was some of the paternalism of the big-city 
machine - a Republican machine. If people were down on their 
luck, they would tide them over." (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
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Kell saw District Attorney William Langley as a victim of Elkins. 
"Langley would never have been convicted of malfeasance had he properly 
prepared his case when he was set up by Elkins at the Jack & Jill Club," 
Kell said (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
The various elements of the mosaic lay about waiting for the magnet 
that would bring them together. They were drawn together by the 
Oregonian's interest in maintaining Republican power and its own 
credibility. Elkins' credibility came through the police department. He 
was, Kell suggested, a very convincing talker. 
Kell felt that the Teamsters were making no special inroads in 
Portland; that official Teamster action in Portland was no different than 
in other cities throughout the nation. Clyde Crosby, Teamsters head for 
Portland, was only a name and not a "wheeler-dealer" (Kell-Uris interview 
1981). 
Tom Maloney's connection to the Teamsters Union and to Clyde Crosby 
was largely discounted by Kell. Maloney, Kell believed, was like Elkins, 
an ambitious self-starter who manipulated others to his own ends (Kell-
Uris interview 1981). 
Democratic Party head Howard Morgan's belief that the Teamsters 
were moving in was explained by Kell in terms of Morgan's propensity to 
see things in large terms, "He was a giant slayer" (Kell-Uris interview 
1981). 
Kell felt that much of Morgan's animosity toward Schrunk had devel-
oped in 1952 when Schrunk had supported Estes Kefauver, bolting from the 
liberal position of Howard Morgan and others who supported Adlai 
Stevenson. 
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"There was no central theme to this thing," argued Kell, "the key 
was Elkins and the discredibility of Elkins. I think it was one of 
these things where all these pieces were laying around and a magnet 
was introduced. The Oregonian' s hard line was the magnet. The 
significance of the various aspects and relationships was an 
artificial creation. If a paper ever lost responsibility and became 
an advocate, it was the Oregonian. They just wanted to send people 
to jail. The Journal was more responsible. Of course, it served 
its purposes - as witnessed in the election returns." (Schrunk 
received the plurality of votes in the May primary and survived the 
allegations to be elected Mayor over Republican Fred Peterson.) 
"Peterson's loss in the primary must have hurt the Oregonian, which 
is why they pushed so hard to have Terry indicted before the fall 
election." (Kell-Uris interview 1981) 
In an informal unpublished brief on Elkins and the vice probe 
developed after the Schrunk trial, Kell carefully documented 18 
instances in which Elkins was contradicted by various witnesses during 
the Langley, Schrunk and Crosby trials before the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957). 
The contradictory witnesses, in many instances, may have been no more 
credible than Elkins, yet the sheer volume of contradiction must suggest 
that Elkins' veracity was questionable. The areas in which Elkins' 
testimony was contradicted include the following list from that 
unpublished brief: 
1. His drug addiction; 
2. Statements made by him to Probation Officer McFarland in 
May, 1957 regarding use of drugs; 
3. The James Burr Miller incident; 
4. Alice Erickson's affidavit re: Attorney General's promise 
of immunity for Elkins; 
5. Elkins' efforts to obtain police Officer Elmer Loos as 
witness for E-R story; 
6. Schrunk's advice to re-open the 8212 Club; 
7. Elkins' 1955 visit to Schrunk's office; 
8. Stan Terry - $10,000 initiation fee to Teamsters; 
9. Completeness and accuracy of Elkins' records for the 8212 
Club and other clubs; 
10. Elkins' knowledge of bookkeeping - contradictory state-
ments by Elkins; 
11. Elkins ' acquaintance and meetings with Janice Langley; 
12. Elkins' offer to sell tapes to Langley for $10,000; 
13. Elkins' offer to sell tapes to Crosby; 
14. Elkins' possession of original letters from Langley to 
Purcell; 
15. Campaign contributions by him to Langley; 
16. Elkins advises Johnson of Crosby interest in E-R options; 
17. Elkins-Crosby meeting at 2lsi:. and Division Streets; 
18. Elkins-Crosby discussions re: E-R options (Kell n.d., n. 
pag.). 
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In swmnary, Ray Kell saw the vice probe as largely a coincidental 
phenomenon in which a number of ambitions and interests happened to 
coincide. From his perspective, the result was an increased attitude of 
conservatism on the part of the rising new elites within the context of 
the Democratic Party's challenge to Republican hegemony. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE PORTLAND VICE PROBE 
This chapter analyzes and evaluates the material previously 
developed in the case study of the Portland vice probe. This chapter is 
divided into two parts: 1. DiscoYeries and evaluations made during the 
study about the vice probe under investigation; 2. An analysis of the 
probe in terms of the set of propositions developed during the review of 
historical, sociological and political science literature. 
What Really Happened? 
The three major sources of data for this study; mass media, govern-
ment documents and interviews, do not all agree one with the other or 
within each source area. This is a common and expected problem in 
historical case study research. There are, however, a number of points 
upon which there is adequate evidence to develop some conclusions about 
what occurred during the period under investigation. 
How did the vice probe begin? The probe began with an effort by 
James B. Elkins, a local racketeer, to protect and possibly improve his 
economic situation in the face of changes that were occurring in the 
local political and organized crime scenes. Repeatedly sources 
indicated that Elkins faced a possible end to his arrangement of 
tolerance with the Portland police in exchange for providing information 
to them on other criminal activities. 
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Elkins, who denied that he had used blackmail, first went to a 
number of officials, including the local head of the Teamsters Union, 
Clyde Crosby, and the Multnomah County District Attorney, William 
Langley, to pressure them into a more tolerant position vis-a-vis his 
operation. He did this because he claimed the Teamsters, in the persons 
of Tom Maloney and Joe McLaughlin, were attempting to move in and cut him 
out of his business. William Langley, however, suggested that Elkins was 
acting because Langley had indicated that the old arrangement of tolera-
tion would no longer apply now that he was District Attorney (Langley-
Uris interview 1980) . There is ample evidence to suggest that both 
Elkins and Langley are being truthful in this instance, but have a 
different perspective on events. 
Having failed in his attempt to oust the men he believed to be 
supported by the Teamsters, and knowing that he could not use force 
against so powerful an adversary, Elkins went first to the Oregon Journal 
and second to the Oregonian with the clandestine tape recordings he had 
made of conversations among Maloney, McLaughlin, Langley and others at 
the King Towers Apartments. The Journal was unresponsive. The 
Oregonian, having experienced success in other recent exposes, believed 
Elkins and ran uncritically his version of the Portland vice story. 
These stories were written by Wallace Turner and William Lambert. Parts 
of Elkins' version was independently supported by Howard Morgan, State 
Chairman of the Democratic Party. 
What changes were under way that affected events? The Democratic 
Party, after years of failure at the polls, was on the rise in Oregon 
and, more importantly, in the Portland metropolitan area. The Oregonian, 
a Republican paper, had an interest in stopping or reversing this trend. 
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Elkins' arrangements with the police and others may have depended upon 
the maintenance of the predominantly Republican city administration led 
at the elective level by Fred Peterson in a nominally non-partisanmayor-
council system. There is no evidence to indicate that Peterson himself 
gained financially by the policy of vice tolerance then customary in 
Portland. Peterson has denied that any policy of tolerance existed 
(Peterson-Uris interview 1980). 
The decision of then Sheriff Terry Schrunk to run for mayor was 
another possible factor in Elkins' decision to go public with his tape 
recordings. The tapes indicate that Schrunk, a Democrat, did not share 
the attitudes of the Portland police toward vice and its operations. 
Did the Teamsters move in? During this period the Teamsters Union 
was organizing the pinball and vending machine industry in Portland. The 
Union may have had ambitions beyond the organizing effort, however. 
There are indications that the Union was interested in supporting candi-
dates for office in return for influence in matters of public policy. 
Two such areas were the liquor industry and the selection of a District 
Attorney for Multnomah County. The Union also gave apparent support to 
Terry Schrunk's bid for mayor, although this is consistent with labor's 
general stand against Republican candidates and Schrunk's then liberal 
pro-labor reputation. 
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field (1957), Howard Morgan and the Oregonian all insisted 
at the time that the Teamsters were making a concerted bid for power in 
Oregon. There was much evidence presented at the Senate Committee 
Hearings and in the Oregonian to support this view. 
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Others, including Ray Kell, argue that the Teamsters had no special 
interest in Portland, and that there was little to be gained in so small 
and poor a state by the Union. (Kell-Uris interview 1981; anon.-Uris 
interview 1980.) These observers see the Union's actions as typical of 
union policy at the time but of far less ambitious intentions than did 
the Oregonian and the Senate Committee. The attack on organized labor 
launched in Portland by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Improper 
Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957), and led by council 
Robert Kennedy, resulted in the passage of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, known as the Landrum-Griff in Law. 
It is difficult to make a definitive statement on the role of the 
Teamsters in Portland at the time of the vice probe. The men who claimed 
to represent the Union in their bid to restructure the organized vice 
scene in Portland, Tom Maloney and Joe McLaughlin, were tied through 
various documents and testimony to the Teamsters' leadership in Seattle. 
Howard Morgan reported that he was told by Maloney to allow the Teamsters 
to influence OLCC decisions and appointments and that local Teamsters 
head, Clyde Crosby, backed Maloney on this matter. Maloney did attempt 
to gain influence and power using the Teamsters name. He did play a 
major part in getting William Langley elected Multnomah County District 
Attorney. 
Yet Maloney was, as Ray Kell described him (Kell-Uris interview 
1981), a real self-promoter. It is difficult to separate Maloney' s claim 
from the truth. It is even less easy to be clear on what Clyde Crosby's 
role was. He may have been Maloney's dupe or a conscious agent of the 
Teamsters Union acting in concert with Maloney (U.S. Senate Hearings 
1957). 
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What role did the Oregon Journal play? The Journal, having missed 
the opportunity to use the Elkins story, quickly developed a position in 
contradiction to that of the Oregonian. It was highly critical of the 
Elkins story. It participated through its reporters Doug Baker and Brad 
Williams in an illegal raid on the home of Ray Clark, an Elkins employee. 
There the tapes that resulted in Elkins' conviction on federal wiretap 
charges (later reversed) were discovered along with a Miniphone 
recording machine belonging to the Portland police. 
The Journal, which supported Terry Schrunk and attacked incumbent 
Mayor Fred Peterson, was a nominally independent evening paper, with a 
definite Democratic bias. It was involved in a fierce rivalry and 
circulation struggle with the larger, morning Oregonian. 
Both papers have been critized for ruthless advocacy journalism in 
the vice probe. Yet the competition served to bring more information to 
the public tha..a if they had not been independent rivals. 
How extensive was the corruption? Evaluating the level of 
corruption involved is difficult. It is made all the more so because, as 
is so often the case, there was no consensus en what really happened. 
There is general agreement, however, that in those days bribery and 
arrangments of mutual benefit among organized vice figures, politicians 
and police were commonplace in Portland (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
Yet, no policemen were convicted of bribery or other forms of 
corruption during the probe. District Attorney William Langley's 
conviction for malfeasance was eventually overturned and Terry Schrunk 
was found not guilty of perjury in connection with his denial to the 
grand jury of having taken a bribe from Clifford O. (Jimmy) Bennett, 
operator of the 8212 Club. 
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Three Types of Police Corruption. Lawrence Sherman (1974) identi-
fied three types of corrupt police organizations. Type I is the form 
most often acknowledged to exist by the police themselves. Sherman 
called this type "Rotten Apples and Rotten Pockets" (1974, p. 7). In 
this form corruption is minimal and is a reflection of the behavior of a 
few independently operating corrupt policemen. 
Type II involves a majority rather than a minority of a given 
department in corrupt practices. Corruption is here endemic and involves 
tolerated, independent graft-taking and bribery at all levels of the 
police hierarchy. Sherman called this type "Pervasive Unorganized 
Corruption" (1974, p. 9). 
Finally, Type III involves pervasive corruption as in Type II, but 
is organized and structured. It extends beyond the police department to 
other elements of the criminal justice system, including district 
attorneys and judges. It also involves elected high officials and high 
bureaucrats. Chambliss (1978) and Steffens (1904) argued that this type 
is coaunon. Under this system policemen are directed to make pickups of 
smile money. Sherman called this type "Pervasive Organized Corruption" 
(1974, p. 10). 
During the course of this study, all three data sources seem to show 
that Portland, at the time of the vice probe, was a Type III city. Yet 
there is no agreement among those sources about exactly which people were 
involved or how the organized corruption took place. 
Did the expose and subsequent events end the corruption? Inter-
views taken with Captain Reiter (Reiter-Uris interview 1980) of the 
Portland police and anonymous respondents (anon.-Uris interview 1980) 
indicate that while the kind of police corruption existent in the mid-
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1950's has ended, there is still today corruption of the Type III form. 
Reiter argued that present-day corruption is now limited to the Type I 
form among police but Type III among politicians (Reiter-Uris interview 
1980). 
Respondents like Ray Kell (Kell-Uris interview 1981) and others 
argue that what corruption now exists is of the Type I form. Recent 
revelations in Portland suggest that at the least, Type I form corruption 
continues. 
Was there an organized crime syndicate in Portland? Various 
sources acknowledge the existence of a cooperative, local, criminal 
cabal at work in Portland. It has been characterized as relatively 
genteel and hierarchical (Kell-Uris interview 1981). It had developed 
and had access to informal networks of association and business dealings 
with other elites in the economic, criminal justice, legal and political 
communities. Some argue that it was relatively benign and/or no longer 
exists (Kell-Uris interview 1981). Other sources insist that it 
continues to flourish on various levels (anon.-Uris interview 1980; 
Reiter-Uris interview 1980). One source sited the recent restoration of 
pinball by the city council as an example of its influence (Reiter-Uris 
interview 1980). 
Pinball was relegalized on November 10, 1977. This action by the 
city council rescinded a referendum passed on May 18, 1956, the same day 
Terry Schrunk received a plurality of votes for Mayor. In 1977, the 
pinball industry was represented by Ted Runstein of the firm Kell, 
Alterman and Runstein. 
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The Propositions and the Case History 
Earlier in this work a set of propositions was developed from the 
observation of sociologists, political scientists and historians con-
ceming the nature of corruption and vice and responses to those 
phenomena. The propositions serve to suggest some of the elements that 
may be useful in developing a general understanding of both the phenomena 
of vice and corruption and the reactions to those events. Emphasis was 
placed upon situations in which there was reaction to corruption and vice 
networks. 
The works of functionalists and Marxist sociologists were used to 
suggest a general commonality of understanding based on the notion that . 
these official irregular practices and activities are useful to the 
maintenance of the social system. 
The first proposition developed was that: 
I. URBAN VICE AND CORRUPTION SERVE TO MAINTAIN SYSTEMIC NEEDS. 
Looking at Portland, Oregon during the period under study, a pattern 
emerges. Tom Johnson, who provided liquor to a mixed clientele in the 
1920's and bankrolled black vice operations throughout the 1940's and 
1950' s, was useful to the community not only as a bootlegger and a 
provider of illegal services. He also served as an agent of social 
control in the black community and communicated the demands of whites and 
the needs of blacks to an established informal community network which 
included black ministers, black doctors and others. Through him the 
police could keep track of activity within the black community. 
In a relationship (probably unspoken, but certainly understood) of 
mutual benefit, his operation was generally tolerated in exchange for his 
cooperation in the policing of black Portland (anon. -Uris interview 
1980). 
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James Elkins operated in much the same way in the white vice world. 
William Langley (Langley-Uris interview, 1980) emphasized the 
arrangement for informal crime control that Elkins had established with 
the Portland Police Department. Crime was thus franchised, limited and 
ordered. For the police this meant less trouble, less risk and less 
public complaint. Vice could exist while the public stand of politicians 
and the law remained officially supportive of a crime-free city. Vice in 
general met needs in Portland. And vice tolerat.Lon was useful as a 
device for social control. 
II. ORGANIZED CRIME IS TOLERATED AS A USEFUL DEVICE FOR PACIFICATION OF 
POTENTIALLY REBELLIOUS POPULATIONS. 
Energies that might otherwise be turned to political action are 
spent in the effort to acquire wealth through acts outside the law and in 
the pursuit of pleasures officially circumscribed. In the process, the 
legitimacy of claims on society by the oppressed is compromised and 
tainted. 
In Portland, large numbers of working men were consumers of vice 
services (Lambert-Uris interview 1979). Others turned their attention 
to making money by providing these services. 
In a more speculative vein it can be argued that if men like Tom 
Johnson had not had access to an alternative route to wealth they might 
have developed a more radical political perspective. This might have led 
to demands for fundamental social change (Spitzer 1975). 
All of this suggests that Proposition II is consistent with the 
findings in the Portland study. 
Kell, Langley, Lambert and Baker (Uris interviews 1981, 1980, 1978 
and 1980, respectively) all agreed that the existing arrangements in 
218 
Portland between the police and men like Elkins continued for many years 
unchanged in most aspects. When change did occur in 1956, it came about 
because of public attention and outside forces. These issues will be 
dealt with later. 
III. WHEN CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES ARE PERCEIVED AS A THREAT TO THE STATE'S 
LEGITIMACY, THEY THEN BECOME THE OBJECT OF OFFICIAL ACTION. 
These pressures for change left the powerful in Portland with a 
limited choice. To ignore the negative attention and corrupt activities 
could result in a public demand for even more sweeping alteration of 
existing power relations. The response of the state was quite 
predictable. It undertook a limited investigation through the 
appropriate channels, in this case the grand jury system. Those who 
suffered were those who had been most clamorous in denouncing the 
existing system and who themselves were a part of that system. In the 
process, public faith was restored in the capability and legitimacy of 
the system to identify and correct the perceived problem. 
IV. REFORM FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES THE RISE OF THE NEW ELITES IN THE 
CITY. IT IS PART OF A LARGER STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL INVOLVING MAJOR 
POWER SHIFTS. 
In Portland, two reform movements were outlined. The first, in 
1948, saw the rise of an outgroup led at the public level by Dorothy 
McCullough Lee, whose successful mayoral campaign was widely believed to 
occasion a vice cleanup which accompanied changes in the police 
department. There is disagreement among sources as to how thorough this 
cleanup was. Certainly the visible sin dens were closed for a time. 
Yet, as was shown earlier, a multitude of sources suggest that the Lee 
shakeup was temporary and did not strike to the heart of the syndicate. 
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The second movement, during the vice probe of 1956, closely 
paralleled the rise of the Democratic Party in its successful challenge 
of the Republicans for dominance of Portland politics. At the same time, 
the leading public initiator of the vice probe, the Oregonian, was a 
Republican paper. It cannot be said then that the probe, whatever the 
motiv~;; for its initiation, was a totally controlled or manipulated 
event. 
While party politics was an important factor in the choosing of 
sides during the probe, the new elite, whose political ascendance 
occurred during the probe, more closely reflected the entrepreneurial 
orientations suggested by Hays (1964) and Lubove (1969). By 1960 these 
rising elites had gained significant economic and political power in 
Portland. Under Mayor Schrunk the old south-Portland area came under the 
control of a new development agency, the Portland Development Commis-
sion, created in 1958. A new industrial base was also becoming part of 
the Portland economic establishment (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
Yet the man who officially led these new forces at the political 
level, Terry Schrunk, was himself tainted with accusations of corrup-
tion. His humiliation at the hands of the U.S. Senate Select Committee 
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) has been 
detailed in Chapter IV. His eventual trial and acquittal of bribery 
charges notwithstanding, there was little that his supporters could do to 
purify his somewhat soiled image as a reformer. Interestingly enough, 
Schrunk's career was characterized as free of scandal and even puritan 
(Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
New elites, then associated with the Democratic Party, were rising 
at the time that the vice probe occurred, yet there is no definite 
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evidence suggesting a causal relation between the probe and the rise of 
new power groups. Rather, as is often the case in politics, the new 
groups were able to use some implications and revelations uncovered in 
the struggle, but sometimes were harmed by other events which were part 
of the probe. 
V. URBAN STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN SUCH AREAS AS LAND USE PLANNING SERVE 
THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE CITY AND AT THE 
SAME TIME PROVIDE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION. 
The creation of the Exposition-Recreation Commission meant economic 
growth for the business community in general and for land holders at 
whatever site was finally selected. It also meant an opportunity for 
corruption within the commission and a concurrent opportunity for 
speculation based on that corruption by elements of the underworld. Here 
too, however, the state failed to prove a conspiracy to benefit through 
special knowledge of the E-R site location. 
Yet the accusation of such a conspiracy is repeated by countless 
sources in the course of the probe. Members of the alleged conspiracy 
did make land purchases at the site selected by the E-R Commission (the 
Memorial Coliseum). 
VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR VICE AND CORRUPTION CAN EXIST DUE TO THE 
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN IDEALIZED NORMS AND ACTUAL BEHAVIOR AS 
REFLECTED IN CRIMINAL LAW. 
Making desired acts illegal does indeed create crime. Daniel Bell 
(1960) emphasized the confliL ~tween Puritan morality made into law and 
the actual desires and behaviors of the people as a major factor in 
creating illegal activities which present opportunities (as Sherman 
(1974) and Gardiner (1970) suggested) for police corruption. This was 
expressed as the above proposition. 
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It can be seen that the issue of the outlawing of pinball did create 
an opportunity for the Teamsters to organize that trade. The Teamsters 
targeted the pinball industry for an organizing effort at the same time 
that the industry was outlawed by the City Council. The industry came 
together in the Coin Machine Men of Oregon in the face of the effort to 
ban their business. It seems probable that had the industry not been 
placed in jeopardy, there would have been little opportunity for the 
Teamsters to use the pinball dealers association in the organizing 
effort. 
The state monopoly on the liquor industry offered the outsiders 
another opportunity to gain power and influence. Liquor control under 
the Oregon Liquor Control Commission had long been thought of as a major 
area for influence peddling and bribery (Thornton-Uris interview 1980. 
It is campaign contributions in exchange for favors relating to the OLCC 
that must share significance in the process of corruption and influence 
allegedly demonstrated by the Teamsters Union in Portland. 
VII. ORGANIZED CRIME IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF ANY PARTICULAR 
ETHNIC GROUP. 
In Portland the organized crime cabal that existed clearly involved 
territories with ethnic divisions. Yet there was interaction, coopera-
tion and exchange among these groups. The pattern of ethnic division 
appears more as a matter of convenience than of exclusive ethnic 
tradition. The classic Italian-American crime family model, as 
suggested by organized crime theorists who believe in a national crime 
organization with an ethnic base, did not reveal itself to have existed 
to any extent in Portland in the 1950's. Indeed, the only interstate 
organized crime syndicate suggested_ to exist by the material available on 
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the Portland vice probe of 1956 was an allegedly corrupt labor union with 
a complex national organization, the Teamsters. But the importance of 
this to the total of Portland's corruption problems is questioned by 
several sources (Kell-Uris interview 1981; anon.-Uris interview 1980). 
These sources argued that the Teamsters' activities in Portland were no 
different than those carried out elsewhere. The acts of persons such as 
Tom Maloney and Joe McLaughlin may not have represented the Union's 
wishes as they claimed. Instead they were mistaken for the acts and 
policies of the Union itself. 
VIII.AUTHORITATIVE, EXTERNALLY ORIGINATED AND VERIFIED CONDEMNATION OF 
LOCAL CORRUPTION IS A MAJOR FACTOR FOR LOCAL REFORM. 
Earlier it was suggested by Gardiner (1970) that federal interven-
tion and condemnation was a factor stimulating local reform. 
In Portland, the probe began when two elements within the community 
from very diverse backgrounds presented essentially the same story to the 
Republican oriented newspaper, the Oregonian. Interestingly enough, one 
of these, James Elkins, said he went first to the Oregon Journal, the 
Oregonian's rival. Howard Morgan, the other figure, came to the 
Oregonian with much the same tale as Elkins had told: his version agreed 
with Elkins that the Teamsters were moving in on vice in Portland. The 
stories' credibility was improved by corroboration from different levels 
of society. But it was the outside investigation of the Teamsters move 
on Portland that probably had the greatest impact on the city's self-
image. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the 
Labor or Management Field (1957) essentially repeated the Oregonian 
version of the Portland story and in the process made it a national 
scandal. Yet, in Portland there is remarkable consensus even today that 
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the Senate Committee was unjust and that the treatment afforded witnesses 
was unfair. 
This suggests that while externally verified condemnation did have 
impact upon the vice probe it did not particularly further, in the public 
mind at least, the credibility of the accusations made. 
In fact, for some, the effect was rather the opposite. Many argue 
that the Senate Committee was decisive in turning people away from 
concern about the internal problems of Portland and toward concern for 
creating a positive, wholesome image for the city. 
Many vice operators were closed down as a result of the prob~. Yet 
there is no consensus that vice activity per se was necessarily reduced. 
Corrupt practices to the degree that they existed within the police 
department may or may not have been altered. All that can be said with 
certainty is that most officers at all levels survived the probe. There 
are at least two possibilities that can explain this: 1. That everyone 
was innocent or, 2. Everyone stopped doing the bad deeds they were 
accused of when the exposure took place. 
One standard reform commonly suggested for problems of police 
corruption is to increase the pay, status rewards, advancement oppor-
tunities and supervision of police departments. This is Gardiner's 
(1970) suggestion and it was the conclusion of the Portland City Club 
Report in 1948. This is the inspiration for proposition IX: 
IX. WHERE STRONG REWARDS, ADV AN CEMENT OPPORTUNITY, HIGH STATUS AND 
CLOSE SUPERVISION OF POLICE DO NOT EXIST, PAYOFFS WILL TEND TO 
BECOME POLICY. 
Obviously there are limits placed sooner or later upon advancement 
opportunity. For example, not every officer can become a police captain 
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or lieutenant. There will be some who will not advance at all or will 
experience very limited advancement. One way to avoid this is to 
increase the number of high-paid, high-status, command-level positions. 
This produces one of two results: top-heavy organization which is 
expensive to operate, or an increase in the size of the police department 
itself to justify the new rank of sergeants, lieutenants, captains and 
commanders. 
Similar problems exist with higher pay. There are limited monies in 
the city budget. All agencies must compete for that money (Weinstein 
1968). 
That payoffs existed in Portland was agreed upon by many sources 
(Kell-Uris interview 1981; Lambert-Uris interview 1979; Langley-Uris 
interview 1979). In Portland, as in most locations, the police tend to 
close ranks around their own (Sherman 1974). 
X. VICE AND CORRUPTION ARE STRUCTURED THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTO THE OPERATION OF VARIOUS BUSINESSES. 
In Portland the outlawing of pinball was a pivotal issue around 
which a great deal of political pressure and organizing efforts devel-
oped. The coin-machine men of Oregon came together through an organi-
zation to lobby in the interest of their business. Once organized, this 
group was brought into the Teamsters Union, again to increase its 
political clout through an alliance with a powerful outside network. 
As Kell suggested (Kell-Uris interview 1981), the pinball operators 
were legitimate businessmen until their trade became illegal. Had this 
not happened, there may well have been less pressure to attempt to 
influence other aspects of the political system. 
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XI. ORGANIZED CRIME, WITH ITS USES OF VICE AND CORRUPTION, IS NO 
DIFFERENT THAN OTHER FORMS OF BUSINESS EXCEPT THAT, BECAUSE THEY 
CANNOT RELY UPON THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO ENFORCE THEIR BUSINESS 
ARRANGEMENTS, ORGANIZED CRIMINALS CAN AND DO RESORT TO THE USE OF 
VIOLENCE AND OTHER EXTRA-LEGAL SANCTIONS. 
Two basic theories are presented in this history as to why James 
Elkins went to the newspapers with his tale of Teamsters takeovers. The 
Oregonian's version, which was shared by the U.S. Senate Select Committee 
on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field (1957) held that 
Elkins was afraid of the Teamsters and in the process of eavesdropping 
and wiretapping discovered that he was being cut out of the action. This 
explanation was never made part of the Oregonian's public analysis of the 
probe. 
The Oregon Journal argued that Elkins, facing a change in admini-
strations, feared exposure and had to attempt blackmail to keep his 
power. When that failed, he carried out his threat and went to the 
press. Articles in the Journal questioned the veracity of Elkins' tape 
recordings. 
It may well be that both versions are true. The unpublished 
analysis of the probe credited to the Oregon Journal from the Oregon 
State Archives and the Journal suggest that Elkins was caught in a 
political power change that would oust those who tolerated him; Republi-
can Mayor Fred Peterson and his Chief of Police, James Purcell. This was 
confirmed by Ray Kell and William Langley (Kell-Uris interview 1981; 
Langley-Uris interview 1980). 
Elkins' motives remain unclear, but that he was a businessman who 
could not legally enforce agreements is clear. 
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From the evidence, Tom Johnson, Swede Ferguson, James Elkins, all 
conducted their business in much the same way as other businesses. Loans 
were made for percentages of profits (known generally as "buying a piece 
of the action"). This is not much different than arrangements made in 
the legitimate business community. 
Elkins could not resort to violence against the Teamsters Union for 
that was a struggle he could not win. It is likely that he was aware of 
this. He had little choice; his power was threatened no matter what he 
did. It was pointless for him to go to court. None of his contracts were 
enforceable through the legal system. Instead, whether or not he tried 
to blackmail his attackers first, he went to the press and to the court 
of public opinion. 
XII. A VICE PROBE WILL AFFECT THOSE INVOLVED IN INVERSE PROPORTION TO 
THEIR POWER, PRESTIGE AND WEALTH. 
Chambliss (1978) suggested that the higher socio-econimic status or 
more politically powerful an individual was, the less likely their public 
and private lives would be affected by a vice probe. In Portland, the 
highest official affected in terms of career and conviction was Multnomah 
County District Attorney William Langley. 
He was ousted from off ice after a conviction for failure to 
prosecute the operators of a slot machine. His conviction was later 
overturned and he served no time in prison. He eventually was readmitted 
to the Oregon bar. Whether Langley was simply sacrificed to protect 
someone else is unclear. What is clear, however, is that such insiders 
in the Democratic Party as Howard Morgan, had no faith, trust or belief 
in the loyalty of William Langley. This was because of Langley's 
association with the Teamsters Union and his alleged associations in the 
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past with James Elkins and others. However, Langley's father was an 
established and respected lawyer in Portland. It is not clear that 
Langley was anything more or less than a man following a traditional 
political career path. His interview (Langley-Uris interview 1980) 
indicates that it was his challenge to the established procedure of 
cooperation between the police and the criminal element under Elkins' 
leadership that led to Elkins' blackmail attempt. As suggested earlier, 
Elkins' operations were tolerated by the police for reasons of mutual 
advantage. These included Elkins' role as an informer on thieves and 
Elkins' use of bribery (Kell-Uris interview 1981). 
Langley was the only important figure to suffer at the hands of the 
courts. But the Chief of Police, James Purcell, former Mayor Fred 
Peterson, new Mayor and former Sheriff, Terry Schrunk, all suffered some 
negative consequences from the probe. For Purcell and Peterson, the 
probe meant retirement from public life. For Schrunk it meant the 
annoyance and humiliation of a public trial for allegedly taking a bribe. 
Schrunk, of course, survived his trial with his career intact. He 
became, however, a much more conservative and cautious man (Kell-Uris 
interview 1981). 
Only the racketeer, James Elkins, and his associates felt severe 
consequences for their crimes. Yet in the end, Elkins, too, successfully 
fought his conviction. It is generally thought that Elkins' power and 
income generating ability were broken by the probe he had started. 
Because the probe was so limited in its legal consequences for the 
individuals involved it cannot be shown that what was discovered in 
Portland is consistent with proposition XII. 
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XIII. INFORMAL INTERACTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES AND OTHER 
ELITES DO EXIST AND AF~ USED IN MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL. 
The importance of informal interaction between elements of the 
organized crime community and other elites is clear in the Portland case. 
Tom Johnson's usefulness both as a bootlegger and as an agent of social 
control in the black community are examples of a mutually beneficial 
informal arrangement built on informal interaction. Yet Johnson, in all 
probability, did not have access to the elites in a siga.ificant and 
ongoing relationship of power or prestige in the manner of Costello (Bell 
1960). That distinction would belong to those who were welcomed into the 
circle of elites who gambled at exclusive clubs and whose friendships 
extended into the community of the powerful. 
In Portland such relationships did exist according to respondents 
(Kell-Uris interview 1981). The friendship between Al Winters, an 
entrepreneur in the gambling business, and Gus Soloman, Ray Kell' s 
partner in law practice who went on to become a leading figure in the 
Schrunk and subsequent Portland city administration, is an excellent 
example of an informal relationship that could have had a politically 
significant role. 
In this same context, the gatherings at the Bourbon and Ham Club 
(the old Press Club) in which politicians, newsmen and vice figures drank 
and talked, is another example of an informal network in operation. 
Yet none of these examples constitute an adequate proof of proposi-
tion XIII. The first part of the proposition is true in Portland. The 
second part, that such relationships were used in a significant political 
control context, was not demonstrated by the material presented. 
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XIV. MEDIA ATTENTION AFFECTS PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF A GIVEN SITUATION: 
THIS IN TURN IS A FACTOR IN FORCING ACTION. 
The media, as Kell, Thornton, Lambert and Baker (Uris interviews 
1981, 1980, 1979, 1980, respectively) suggested, was instrumental in 
forcing action in Portland. Much of the visible vice operation and many 
of its leading figures faded from the public eye. It would be difficult 
to establish, however, that one version of the incident was favored over 
the other. In the end, the public retained Terry Schrunk as Mayor. 
Earlier in May 1956, he won a plurality in the primary election. This 
was after he was accused of taking a bribe. His acquittal of perjury is 
seen by Robert Y. Thornton (Thornton-Uris interview 1980) as the turning 
point of the investigation. It ended the aggressive and continuing 
inquiry. It destroyed the credibility of James Elkins and, by 
implication, the story that Elkins told. 
The probe was not short lived. It emerged in public in April, 1956, 
and it survived into the winter of 1957-1958. Cases reiated to the probe 
were moving through the court system in the 1960's. Clearly, action was 
taken because of media attention. It was media attention which caused 
the governor to act. Governor Elmo Smith ordered the Attorney Generals' 
intervention and investigation using Multnomah County grand juries. The 
same exposure brought the event to the attention of the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field 
(1957). The conflict in the media's stories may have been a factor in 
limiting the amount, form and depth of action taken. The Portland events 
are therefore consistent with proposition XV. 
In examples cited by Gardiner (1970), Miller (1976) and Chambliss 
(1978), the media's role in calling public attention to alleged vice and 
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corruption is emphasized as a factor in the process of exposure and 
reform. None of these cases deal with a situation quite like Portland's. 
In Portland the intense rivalry between the two major newspapers in the 
city during the political struggles of the period produced two very 
different versions of the problem and who was to blame. 
A more general notion suggests itself here: Is it possible that, 
lacking a consensual model of what was happening, the public found it 
difficult to believe either version of the story and chose eventually to 
disregard both? 
XV. THE ATTEMPT OF A NEW ELEMENT, SUCH AS A POWERFUL LABOR UNION, TO 
ALTER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AMONG CITY OFFICIALS AND ORGANIZED VICE 
OPERATORS IS A FACTOR IN CAUSING REFORM. 
While media action initiated the vice probe, the alleged attempt of 
the Teamsters Union through its agents to dominate Oregon and Portland 
politics influenced the Oregonian decision to publish Elkins' story. It 
was the same supposed Teamsters takeover at the state level that brought 
Howard Morgan to the editors of the Oregonian. The allegation that the 
Teamsters were moving in was the central theme developed during the 
Hearings of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activites in the 
Labor or Management Field (1957). The outsiders moving in on something 
local and controllable was a significant factor in the perceptions of 
Oregonian reporter William Lambert (Lambert-Uris interview 1979). This 
view was shared by the one-time Attorney General, Robert Y. Thornton 
(Thornton-Uris interview 1980) and others. That the outsiders were part 
of a suspect labor union may have had a great ideological significance to 
the editors of the Oregonian which, with its rich Republican tradition, 
was certainly not a strong supporter of any aggressive labor union. 
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Yet the accommodations, arrangements and understandings among the 
police and vice operators were critically upset by the heavy-handed style 
and aggressive tactics of outsiders like Tom Maloney who claimed to be 
agents of the Teamsters Union. 
XVI. WHEN THE SUM OF THE FACTORS REVEALED TO THE PUBLIC IS SUFFICIENTLY 
IN VIOLATION OF IMPORTANT MORAL VALUES, PUBLIC MORAL OUTRAGE 
DEVELOPS. THIS OUTRAGE IS THE BASIS FOR A POPULAR CONSENSUAL DEMAND 
FOR REFORM. 
In Portland there appeared to be little consensus for sweeping 
reform. The accusations made by Drew Pearson against City Councilman 
Stanley Earl, which were in effect sustained when Earl lost his libel 
suit against Pearson, had no apparent political repercussions for Earl. 
He was reelected to the council as often as he ran. 
The charges against Mayors Schrunk and Peterson, never proven and of 
questionable origin, had limited effect as well. For Peterson, they 
meant the end of his political career. He ran for office again but was 
never successful. Yet Schrunk, certainly as tainted as Peterson, went on 
to finish his political life as a very popular mayor. 
As has been stated earlier, the only man who suffered certain harm 
from the probe was District Attorney William Langley who was removed from 
office after his conviction for malfeasance. His conviction was later 
reversed and he returned to the practice of law. 
Thus, it may be argued that a popular consensual demand for reform 
did not materialize in the degree seen during the reform era. The 
structure of government was unchanged. Few persons were seriously 
affected who held public office. None of the accused policemen, from the 
chief down, were convicted or even brought to trial. It is apparent that 
proposition XV did not hold for Portland in 1956. 
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The public evidently did not feel that what was revealed required 
the sweeping reforms. Either there was no moral value violation of great 
enough importance or the case was never clearly made that those morals 
had in fact been seriously compromised. 
With the attack upon corruption made by the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957) 
and with the national publicity that accompanied the attack, many in 
Portland may have felt that the city's and their own reputation and honor 
had been hurt. In reaction, it can be argued public attention shifted to 
a defensive posture. The possibility of serious local corruption became 
less important than the effort to rally to the defense of the city's 
reputation. The community may have united against an externally 
perceived threat, ignoring the original causes for that attack (Kaplan-
Uris interview 1979). 
This is not to say that there were not changes wrought by the vice 
probe and expose. The men who claimed to represent the Teamsters fled 
the city. If the Teamsters really did have ambitions of taking over 
Oregon politics, this effort failed. 
Elkins' power, whatever its extent, was broken along with the 
arrangements that had developed between the police and the vice opera-
tors. A referendum in 1956 ended pinball for two decades. City, county 
and state politics saw increasing successful involvement by Democrats. 
As in 1948, the more visible houses of prostitution, gambling spots and 
after-hours saloons disappeared. 
Portland's almost mythic image as a wide-open city died in the vice 
probe. While not as sweeping as some, the reform of 1956-1958 in 
Portland ushered in an era of conservative life style and middle-class 
virtue. 
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A new group came to dominate Portland's economic and political life. 
This elite emerged at the same time that the vice expose climaxed. It 
rose to power with the cooperation and active support of Mayor Terry 
Schrunk. Its members were of a new class of businessmen. While not in 
agreement on all issues at all times, they included in their ranks men 
like Ray Kell, who rose with Schrunk, and Ira Keller, who brought to 
Portland his wealth and know-how. Men such as these served as powerful 
appointees most notably on the Docks, Port of Portland and Portland 
Development Commission, where they effectively reshaped the city through 
massive urban renewal of the downtown core and other areas. 
Their perspective was rational and fiscally exemplary. They built a 
new tax base and a modern concrete, steel and glass city on the rubble of 
iron fronts and wood frame buildings. Their ideals were in the tradition 
of progress through growth. The public policies they followed closely 
paralleled the reform model of the Progressive Era. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has used the technique of the historical case 
study to examine a vice probe that took place in the years 1954 to 1958 in 
Portland, Oregon. The material for the study was gathered from three 
sources: the mass media; the archives and public documents of the State 
of Oregon, the City of Portland, Multnomah County and the U.S. Senate; 
and interviews and papers of those who had an intimate knowledge of the 
vice situation and the expose. 
As public attention focused upon the city, and as national attention 
followed the sensational local revelations, the careers, lives and power 
of people important to the scheme of things in Portland seemed under very 
real threat. But a combination of factors limited the reform effort. 
There was an eventual reaction of disinterest on the part of the public 
and the criminal justice system. 
The failure of the effort to convict Mayor Terry Schrunk was seen by 
more than one informant as the turning point in the expose' s effort. 
With that trial, the credibility of the chief informant, James Elkins, 
was seriously damaged. The cost of the investigation, inept prosecutions 
and inadequate staff support, together with a consequential lack of 
convictions, took their toll. Public attention, fickle as always, turned 
from vice to other problems. 
The two contradictory versions of the vice situation in Portland 
presented by the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal contributed to public 
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awareness but also to distrust in the investigative process. The two 
papers, as we have seen, derived their views from their opposing 
political perspectives. 
For the Oregonian, there was ample evidence of a conspiracy by the 
Teamsters Union or elements within that Union to take over the local vice 
scene. This view has much evidence to support it and is upheld by the 
then Attorney General Robert Y. Thornton and the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957). 
For the Oregon Journal the major issue was not the question of an 
attempted Teamsters takeover, but the vice situation on the local level 
itself and the honesty of the Oregonian' s chief informant. This view has 
ample support as has been shown by then District Attorney William 
~angley, Raymond Kell and others. It was also shared by the jury in the 
Terry Schrunk perjury trial. 
The stories developed by the two rival newspapers were sensational 
but each was incomplete. Taken together, however, they provided far more 
information to the public than would one view alone. It is unlikely that 
a similar divergence of views would gain such a wide audience in Portland 
today for now there are not two independent and competing daily 
newspapers in the city. 
This dissertation attempts to show how in other places and at other 
times as well as in Portland in the 1950's, vice exposes have been used 
as devices to alter political power relationships. In this case the 
reform effort never seized the public imagination to the degree that 
sweeping local or statewide reforms took place. Instead, the process of 
change that had marked the post-war years in Portland continued. A 
popular Democrat, ~ough implicated in the probe, was elected mayor over 
an incumbent Republican who was similarly accused. 
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The group that supported Terry Schrunk as mayor stil: in large part 
dominates the economic and political life of the city. Yet this group's 
rise to power appears in retrospect more a reflection of larger economic 
and political factors than of the vice expose' s consequences. As Captain 
Reiter (Reiter-Uris interview 1980) of the Portland Police Department 
suggests, the death of the vice scene that existed in the 1940' s and 
1950's may have had less to do with the revelations of the time than the 
changing patterns of entertainment and sexual mores that developed in the 
years that followed. 
Even without the prosecution and conviction of all who were impli-
cated, the vice probe had important effects. The efforts of Tom Maloney 
and others to move into Portland, whether as agents of the Teamsters 
Union or not, were blocked. The national attention and continued local 
publicity made it difficult if not impossible for local vice operators 
and those they allegedly paid off in the police department and other 
agencies of government to continue with business as usual. This is not 
to suggest that such relationships are not to be found today by those who 
are willing to look long and hard. Rather, the specific pattern and 
extensive payoff system that existed in 1956 was at least disrupted. 
Without the existence of a multitude of after-hours, liquor, gambling and 
prostitution houses, the opportunity for graft and corruption at the 
command level was much reduced. 
There is not adequate evidence to prove that there was a single 
syndicate in control of vice activity in Portland, yet there is ample 
documentation to warrant the suspicion that such was the case. The local 
press, the Attorney General's files, the Senate Committee and recent 
interviews all substantiate this. 
237 
Beyond the question of the syndicate is the issue of those in 
positions of importance who were linked to the alleged syndicate, those 
in the legal, business and political elites. The extent of their inter-
connection remains unestablished in a satisfacory evidential context, 
yet their interrelationships on an informal basis clearly exist and 
appear significant. 
The failure of the probe to go further could be explained in terms 
of the power of such a network or cabal to stop the probe. It can also be 
explained by the contradictory nature of the events. The opposed media 
versions, the courtroom failures and public disillusionment were all 
factors. 
An historical study such as this cannct establish with any degree of 
reliability such matters as public attitudes at the time toward vice and 
corruption, the extent of such corruption, or the reasons behind support 
for one candidate over another during elective contests involving those 
implicated in corruption or reform. 
Yet the public did express its will through the elective process on 
two of the issues raised in the expose. In May of 1956 the voters decided 
for an east side location for the E-R Center (Memorial Coliseum). They 
also voted to support the city council's decision to make pinball 
illegal. Both were issues in the vice probe and both · were much 
publicized before the election. 
While the triangulation method used in this study helps avoid 
reliance on one source alone, it has its limits. The recognized unreli-
ability of eye-witnesses, combined with inherent limitations occasioned 
by personal perspective (the Rashomon effect), as well as the intervening 
25 years, take a toll upon accuracy of memory. Documents frequently 
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prove equally unreliable or unavailable. All sources are unavoidably 
biased in almost direct proportion to the degree that such persons or 
materials reflect closeness to the events under study. 
Future scholars would do well to consider an approach involving the 
task of systematic investigation of corporate and land records as a 
fourth source in developing histories of this type. While land records 
were examined in this study, that examination was limited to specific 
times and places previously mentioned in accounts of the vice probe. Of 
further use would be an investigation of such records for periods of 
twenty years bracketing the events under study. These records could 
reveal the interconnections of business, political, criminal and other 
elites. Such a search would certainly be quite costly in terms of time 
and money. 
Studies like those of Chambliss (1978), Domhoff (1978) and Gardiner 
(1975) are crucial in the development of an understanding of how exchange 
and power in the city actually work. They serve to provide the 
foundation of understanding that will hopefully lead to the development 
of a grand theory of governance in the urban context. It is hoped that 
the present effort, by looking at one case in the Northwest, will aid in 
developing that foundation. 
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Doug Baker, (Oregon Journal reporter and columnist 
Richard Carney, (attorney for Clyde Crosby) 
Arthur Kaplan, (Former assistant in Oregon Attorney General's office) 
Raymond Kell, (lawyer, Portland civic leader) 
William Lambert, (former Oregonian, reporter) 
William Langley, (former Multnomah County District Attorney) 
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265 
Robert Y. Thornton, (former Oregon Attorney General) 
All other interviews were conducted with persons not generally known to 
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